Managing Uncertainty in Engineering Design Using Imprecise Probabilities and Principles of Information Economics by Aughenbaugh, Jason Matthew
 
MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN ENGINEERING DESIGN 
USING IMPRECISE PROBABILITIES AND PRINCIPLES 












Presented to  













In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the requirements for the Degree 











MANAGING UNCERTAINTY IN ENGINEERING DESIGN 
USING IMPRECISE PROBABILITIES AND PRINCIPLES 
























Dr. Christiaan J. J. Paredis, Chair 
School of Mechanical Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Leon McGinnis 
School of Industrial and Systems 
Engineering 




Dr. Bert Bras 
School of Mechanical Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Mark Ferguson 
College of Management 




Dr. Ye-Hwa Chen 
School of Mechanical Engineering 











Above all others, I would like to thank my family for their never-ending support 
and dedication.  My mother and father have always put me first in their lives, and I would 
not be the person that I am today without their nurturing, guidance, discipline, and 
encouragement.  I would also like to thank my grandparents, who throughout their lives 
worked to give my parents great opportunities and also gave back to society through 
teaching, engineering, and community service.  They have served as role models for hard 
work and dedication. 
Academically, I am very grateful to my advisor, Dr. Chris Paredis.  He 
simultaneously gave me the academic freedom to pursue a topic of interest to me and the 
necessary guidance to realize my goals.  I would particularly like to acknowledge his 
willingness to debate issues and to engage in productive dialog.  This intellectual 
exchange contributed greatly to my research contributions and my enjoyment of my 
graduate studies.   
I am also very grateful to the National Science Foundation for my Graduate 
Research Fellowship.  This financial support enabled me to pursue a novel research topic 
and to push myself to make a significant contribution to the engineering design 
community.  I would also like to thank the Georgia Institute of Technology and Tau Beta 
Pi for additional fellowship support during my graduate studies. 
I would also like to thank the members of the Systems Realization Laboratory at 
Georgia Tech.  This group provides a unique environment of support, both socially and 
academically.  I would like to specifically thank Rich Malak, Jay Ling, Morgan Bruns, 
Scott Duncan, Steve Rekuc, and Tarun Rathnam for their valuable feedback and 
collaboration on my work.  They have also been great friends and added enjoyment to my 
iv 
life outside of the office.  I would also like to note Chris Williams and Matt Chamberlain, 
who always made tailgating more fun and sports more competitive.  I thank Dr. Farrokh 
Mistree for offering advice, providing inspiration, and challenging me to define and 
achieve my goals.  
I would like to thank my committee—Dr. Bras, Dr. Chen, Dr. McGinnis, and Dr. 
Ferguson—for their time and feedback. 
I also owe many thanks to various professors, teachers, friends throughout the 
years.  There is more to life than research, and without my friends, my life would be 
unbalanced.  I would like to thank my great friends and former roommates Eric 
Anderson—who was always up for something fun and for academic cooperation—and 
Deepak Hedge—who kept me thinking about stimulating topics that do not involve 
engineering design.  These two greatly enriched my Georgia Tech experience.  Finally, I 
would like to thank the Atlanta Flying Disc Club and its members, who have kept me 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ iii 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xii 
GLOSSARY.................................................................................................................... xvi 
LIST OF SYMBOLS ..................................................................................................... xix 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... xxii 
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................. xxiii 
CHAPTER 1 :  INTRODUCTION...................................................................................1 
1.1 The engineering design context ...........................................................................3 
1.1.1 Systematic design ......................................................................................... 3 
1.1.2 Partitioning the design problem.................................................................... 5 
1.1.3 Decision-based design .................................................................................. 7 
1.1.4 Simulation-based design............................................................................... 8 
1.1.5 Decision problem formulation and solution ................................................. 9 
1.2 Information economics ......................................................................................12 
1.3 Information and uncertainty modeling...............................................................13 
1.4 The context of engineering design research.......................................................18 
1.5 Motivating questions..........................................................................................20 
1.5.1 Motivating Question 1 ................................................................................ 24 
1.5.2 Motivating Question 2 ................................................................................ 24 
1.5.3 Motivating Question 3 ................................................................................ 25 
1.5.4 Motivating Question 4 ................................................................................ 27 
1.5.5 Motivating Question 5 ................................................................................ 27 
1.6 Organization of the dissertation .........................................................................28 
CHAPTER 2 :  UNCERTAINTY IN ENGINEERING DESIGN ...............................30 
2.1 Definition of uncertainty....................................................................................30 
2.2 Recognition of different states of uncertainty....................................................31 
2.3 Types of uncertainty ..........................................................................................32 
2.3.1 Reducible and irreducible uncertainty........................................................ 32 
2.3.2 Aleatory and epistemic uncertainty ............................................................ 33 
vi 
2.3.3 Practical usefulness of distinguishing different characteristics of uncertainty
.................................................................................................................... 34 
2.3.4 Imprecision and irreducible uncertainty ..................................................... 36 
2.4 Sources of imprecision in engineering design ...................................................38 
2.4.1 Sequential decision making ........................................................................ 39 
2.4.2 Limited statistical data................................................................................ 41 
2.4.3 Imprecise subjective probabilities .............................................................. 43 
2.4.4 Expert opinion ............................................................................................ 44 
2.4.5 Imprecise analysis models .......................................................................... 44 
2.4.6 Imprecise preferences ................................................................................. 46 
2.4.7 Numerical calculations ............................................................................... 47 
2.5 Summary ............................................................................................................48 
CHAPTER 3 :  MODELING UNCERTAINTY ...........................................................49 
3.1 The importance of well-defined interpretations.................................................49 
3.1.1 Operational definitions in science .............................................................. 51 
3.1.2 The role of the observer in science............................................................. 52 
3.1.3 Standards of measurement.......................................................................... 53 
3.1.4 Operational definitions for uncertainty models .......................................... 54 
3.1.5 Summary..................................................................................................... 56 
3.2 Survey of uncertainty representations................................................................56 
3.2.1 Fuzzy sets ................................................................................................... 57 
3.2.2 Possibility theory ........................................................................................ 60 
3.2.3 Evidence theory .......................................................................................... 67 
3.2.4 Summary of uncertainty representations .................................................... 73 
3.3 Probability theory...............................................................................................74 
3.3.1 Axioms of probability................................................................................. 74 
3.3.2 Basic calculus of probability theory ........................................................... 76 
3.3.3 Interpretations of probability ...................................................................... 76 
3.3.4 Traditional statistical decision theory and utility theory ............................ 87 
3.3.5 Ability of probability theory to represent imprecision ............................... 88 
3.4 The theory of imprecise probabilities ................................................................92 
3.4.1 Motivation for imprecise probabilities ....................................................... 93 
3.4.2 Definitions of upper and lower previsions and probabilities...................... 94 
3.4.3 Axioms of coherence and avoidance of sure loss....................................... 97 
3.4.4 Eliciting and assessing................................................................................ 98 
3.4.5 Imprecise probability distributions............................................................. 99 
3.4.6 Discussion of objections to imprecise probabilities ................................. 100 
3.4.7 Computational limitations of imprecise probabilities .............................. 102 
3.5 Hierarchical uncertainty models ......................................................................104 
3.5.1 Second-order probabilities........................................................................ 104 
vii 
3.5.2 Imprecise probabilities as a second-order uncertainty model .................. 106 
3.5.3 Other hierarchical uncertainty models...................................................... 107 
3.6 A general mathematical representation of decisions under uncertainty ..........108 
3.6.1 Precise model............................................................................................ 108 
3.6.2 Basic imprecise model.............................................................................. 109 
3.6.3 Generalized imprecise model ................................................................... 111 
3.7 Summary ..........................................................................................................115 
CHAPTER 4 :  PROBABILITY BOUNDS ANALYSIS (PBA) ................................116 
4.1 Probability boxes (p-boxes) .............................................................................116 
4.2 Expressivity of a p-box ....................................................................................120 
4.3 Constructing p-boxes .......................................................................................123 
4.3.1 Constructing p-boxes for normally distributed uncertain parameters ...... 123 
4.3.2 Choosing the confidence level for p-box construction............................. 125 
4.3.3 Constructing p-boxes for other distributions ............................................ 126 
4.4 Interpreting a p-box..........................................................................................127 
4.5 Computing with p-boxes..................................................................................128 
4.5.1 Dependency Bounds Convolution (DBC) ................................................ 128 
4.5.2 Limitations of DBC methods.................................................................... 131 
4.6 P-boxes and decision making...........................................................................133 
4.6.1 Intervals of expected utility ...................................................................... 134 
4.6.2 Calculating the expectation of a p-box ..................................................... 135 
4.6.3 Decision making with intervals of expected utility .................................. 140 
4.7 Summary ..........................................................................................................142 
CHAPTER 5 :  COMPARING DIFFERENT METHODS FOR REPRESENTING 
UNCERTAINTY................................................................................................143 
5.1 Demonstrating the value of an uncertainty model ...........................................144 
5.2 Example design scenario..................................................................................145 
5.3 Experiment comparing uncertainty models .....................................................146 
5.3.1 Design using approach A: precise normal fit ........................................... 150 
5.3.2 Design using approach B: imprecise probabilities ................................... 151 
5.3.3 Supervisor’s design under precise information ........................................ 152 
5.4 Experimental results.........................................................................................153 
5.4.1 Value of using imprecise probabilities for 25 samples of the true yield 
strength ..................................................................................................... 153 
5.4.2 Variation of value with level of imprecision ............................................ 154 
5.4.3 Explanation of results ............................................................................... 155 
viii 
5.4.4 Summary of results................................................................................... 159 
5.5 Discussion of experimental results ..................................................................159 
5.5.1 Computational costs ................................................................................. 160 
5.5.2 Decision policies and preferences ............................................................ 161 
5.6 Summary ..........................................................................................................164 
CHAPTER 6 :  PBA AS A GENERAL APPROACH  TO SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS .........................................................................................................165 
6.1 Traditional sensitivity analysis approaches .....................................................166 
6.2 Sensitivity analysis in decision analysis ..........................................................169 
6.2.1 Choosing the best alternative.................................................................... 170 
6.2.2 Performing a basic one-way sensitivity analysis...................................... 170 
6.2.3 Performing a more advanced one-way sensitivity analysis...................... 172 
6.2.4 Beyond one-way sensitivity analysis........................................................ 174 
6.3 PBA as a generalized sensitivity analysis for decision robustness ..................174 
6.3.1 Interval arithmetic as a sensitivity analysis in two dimensions................ 177 
6.3.2 Interval arithmetic as a sensitivity analysis higher dimensions................ 178 
6.3.3 Sensitivity analysis with imprecise and probabilistic parameters ............ 182 
6.4 Limitations and extensions of PBA-based sensitivity analysis........................185 
6.4.1 Bounds are rigorous but not necessarily best possible ............................. 186 
6.4.2 Lack of rigorous black-box methods ........................................................ 190 
6.4.3 Sensitivity analysis for information prioritization.................................... 190 
6.5 Additional advantages of PBA as a sensitivity analysis ..................................193 
6.5.1 Unknown distribution types...................................................................... 193 
6.5.2 Known or unknown dependencies............................................................ 194 
6.6 Summary: General usefulness of PBA ............................................................195 
CHAPTER 7 :  DEMONSTRATION OF PBA AND A COMPARISON TO ONE-
WAY SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ENVIRONMENTALLY BENIGN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE........196 
7.1 Environmentally benign design and manufacture (EBDM) ............................197 
7.2 EBDM Example: Selecting an appropriate oil filter design ............................199 
7.2.1 Types of oil filters..................................................................................... 199 
7.2.2 The design problem .................................................................................. 200 
7.2.3 Objective function .................................................................................... 201 
7.2.4 Environmental impact calculation ............................................................ 202 
7.2.5 Total user cost calculation ........................................................................ 204 
7.2.6 Assumptions on available information ..................................................... 204 
7.3 Oil filter selection using PBA..........................................................................206 
ix 
7.3.1 Total cost calculation................................................................................ 206 
7.3.2 Comparing p-boxes................................................................................... 207 
7.3.3 Resolving indeterminacy .......................................................................... 208 
7.3.4 Considering shared uncertainty ................................................................ 210 
7.3.5 Interval arithmetic and repeated variables................................................ 211 
7.3.6 Multiple objective analysis and selection................................................. 212 
7.4 Oil filter selection with decision analysis and sensitivity analysis ..................213 
7.4.1 Basic decision analysis ............................................................................. 213 
7.4.2 Sensitivity analysis ................................................................................... 215 
7.5 Discussion of oil filter example .......................................................................217 
7.5.1 Veracity of the analysis ............................................................................ 217 
7.5.2 Acuity of analysis ..................................................................................... 218 
7.5.3 Complexity of analysis ............................................................................. 220 
7.5.4 Flexibility of the analysis ......................................................................... 220 
7.6 Conclusions and summary ...............................................................................221 
CHAPTER 8 :  DECISION MAKING IN THE PRESENCE OF IMPRECISION 223 
8.1 A set-based view of design ..............................................................................224 
8.2 Indeterminacy in Decision Making..................................................................226 
8.3 Elimination decisions with imprecise information ..........................................228 
8.3.1 Interval dominance ................................................................................... 228 
8.3.2 Accounting for shared uncertainty ........................................................... 230 
8.4 Resolving remaining imprecision ....................................................................235 
8.5 The design example .........................................................................................237 
8.6 Demonstration of existing elimination criteria ................................................240 
8.7 Sequential reduction of the design space .........................................................243 
8.8 Discussion of results and identification of future work ...................................244 
8.9 Summary ..........................................................................................................245 
CHAPTER 9 :  BOUNDING THE VALUE OF FUTURE INFORMATION 
COLLECTION ..................................................................................................247 
9.1 Decision formulation and information collection ............................................247 
9.2 Information economics in engineering design.................................................250 
9.3 Example problem.............................................................................................251 
9.4 Mathematical problem formulation .................................................................252 
9.4.1 Specifying probabilities over the state space............................................ 253 
9.4.2 The payoff of a decision ........................................................................... 253 
x 
9.4.3 Making an optimal decision ..................................................................... 255 
9.4.4 Information and information sources ....................................................... 256 
9.4.5 The value of information .......................................................................... 256 
9.5 Example with known probabilities ..................................................................259 
9.6 Estimating the value of information ................................................................265 
9.6.1 Design decision policy.............................................................................. 265 
9.6.2 Motivation for using imprecise probabilities............................................ 265 
9.6.3 Bounding the value of information........................................................... 267 
9.6.4 Computational Experiment....................................................................... 272 
9.7 Results..............................................................................................................272 
9.7.1 Small sample sizes yield large value intervals ......................................... 274 
9.7.2 The bounds on value are not monotonic................................................... 274 
9.7.3 The lower-bound is always non-positive.................................................. 275 
9.7.4 Examining the net value ........................................................................... 275 
9.8 Comparison of realized payoffs .......................................................................276 
9.9 Future work......................................................................................................279 
9.10 Summary ..........................................................................................................282 
CHAPTER 10 :  DISCUSSION AND REMARKS .....................................................283 
10.1 Review of motivating questions ......................................................................283 
10.1.1 Contributions relating to modeling uncertainty........................................ 284 
10.1.2 Contributions related to decision making................................................. 287 
10.1.3 Contributions related to managing information collection....................... 287 
10.2 Summary of contributions................................................................................288 
10.2.1 Contribution 1: Value of imprecise probabilities ..................................... 288 
10.2.2 Contribution 2: Decision making with imprecise information................. 289 
10.2.3 Contribution 3: Information collection and information economics ........ 289 
10.3 Onward and outward........................................................................................290 
10.3.1 Considerations for complex problems...................................................... 291 
10.3.2 Considerations with regard to decision policies ....................................... 293 
10.3.3 Potential areas for future application of imprecise probabilities and 
information economics ............................................................................. 296 
10.4 Revisiting the journey......................................................................................300 
10.4.1 Modeling uncertainty and making decisions: using the right tool for the 
right task ................................................................................................... 300 
10.4.2 Managing uncertainty: exploration........................................................... 302 
10.5 Summary ..........................................................................................................304 
REFERENCES...............................................................................................................305 
xi 




Table 1.1.  Systematic design phases...................................................................................4 
Table 3.1.  Fuzzy set example, human height survey example response...........................59 
Table 3.2.  Fuzzy set example, tabulated frequencies from human height survey ............59 
Table 6.1. Comparison of sensitivity analysis scenarios, assuming correct inputs .........189 
Table 7.1.  Types of filters ...............................................................................................200 
Table 7.2.  Total environmental impact and cost functions.............................................204 
Table 7.3.  Assumptions about uncertainty......................................................................205 
Table 7.4.  Base values for imprecise quantities..............................................................214 
Table 7.5.  Results with nominal values ..........................................................................215 
 
 xii




Figure 1.1.  Subsystems of a car ..........................................................................................6 
Figure 1.2.  Recursive systematic design process, design phases numbered 1-4 ................7 
Figure 1.3.  Abstraction of a sequential decision process in simulation-based design........8 
Figure 1.4.  Imprecise model example: cake or death. ......................................................16 
Figure 1.5.  Research overview..........................................................................................23 
Figure 2.1: Characteristics of uncertainty, adapted from (Nikolaidis 2005) .....................36 
Figure 2.2.  One stage decision..........................................................................................39 
Figure 2.3.  Sequential decisions .......................................................................................39 
Figure 2.4.  Decision alternatives and sets of design alternatives .....................................40 
Figure 3.1: Probability-possibility transform example ......................................................63 
Figure 3.2.  Example distribution adjusted for imprecision...............................................90 
Figure 3.3.  Example distribution adjusted for imprecision...............................................91 
Figure 3.4.  Anatomy of a gamble: money transfers..........................................................95 
Figure 4.1. Example p-box...............................................................................................118 
Figure 4.2.  General and parameterized p-boxes with the same bounding functions but 
different admissible distribution examples. .............................................118 
Figure 4.3. Resulting p-box .............................................................................................120 
Figure 4.4. Forming bounds of the p-box ........................................................................120 
Figure 4.5. Dimensions of uncertainty.............................................................................120 
 xiii
Figure 4.6.  A discretized p-box.......................................................................................130 
Figure 4.7. Calculating expected value of a p-box ..........................................................137 
Figure 4.8. Intervals of expected utility ...........................................................................141 
Figure 5.1.  Pressure vessel schematic and design variables ...........................................145 
Figure 5.2. General experiment for comparing uncertainty models in engineering design 
decisions...................................................................................................148 
Figure 5.3. A computational experiment for determining the value of using imprecise 
probabilities..............................................................................................148 
Figure 5.4. Variation of value with imprecision ..............................................................154 
Figure 5.5. Histogram of value of p-box approach..........................................................156 
Figure 5.6. Example expected utility functions, V(B)<0.................................................158 
Figure 5.7. Example expected utility functions, V(B)>0.................................................158 
Figure 5.8. Example expected utility functions, V(B)=0.................................................159 
Figure 5.9. Variation in value with imprecision for midpoint policy ..............................162 
Figure 5.10. Midpoint policy results................................................................................163 
Figure 6.1. Sample tornado diagram, one imprecisely known alternative.......................171 
Figure 6.2. Sample tornado diagram, comparing alternatives .........................................173 
Figure 6.3. Two dimensional imprecise parameter space and sensitivity analysis..........176 
Figure 6.4. Two dimensional imprecise parameter space example problem...................178 
Figure 6.5. Three dimensional imprecise parameter space..............................................179 
Figure 6.6. Planes searched using 2-way sensitivity analysis in three dimensions .........180 
Figure 6.7. Total consistent region searched using two-way sensitivity analysis in three 
dimensions ...............................................................................................181 
 xiv
Figure 6.8. Example p-box for 9 x ...................................................................................184 
Figure 6.9.  Graphical scenarios of sensitivity analysis...................................................189 
Figure 6.10. Pinching a p-box..........................................................................................192 
Figure 6.11. Example p-box for mean and variance, no distribution knowledge............194 
Figure 7.1. The components of an environmental analysis .............................................198 
Figure 7.2.  Oil filter schematic diagram .........................................................................200 
Figure 7.3.  Influence diagram of the decision problem..................................................201 
Figure 7.4.  Probability box for vehicle life.....................................................................207 
Figure 7.5.  Probability box for filter change frequency..................................................207 
Figure 7.6.  Probability box for total number of filter changes .......................................207 
Figure 7.7.  Probability box for total cost of SEC filter...................................................207 
Figure 7.8.  Intervals of expected cost .............................................................................208 
Figure 7.9.  Intervals for expected difference and cost....................................................211 
Figure 7.10.  Cost p-boxes for the quantity (SEC minus TASO) ....................................212 
Figure 7.11. Intervals of expected difference in utility....................................................213 
Figure 7.12. Traditional tornado diagram for one alternative..........................................216 
Figure 7.13. Tornado plot comparing multiple alternatives ............................................217 
Figure 8.1. Intervals of expected utility ...........................................................................227 
Figure 8.2. Many overlapping intervals...........................................................................229 
Figure 8.3. Comparing two alternatives with and without shared uncertainty. ...............231 
Figure 8.4. Performance of 5 alternatives influenced by a single uncertain parameter (e.g. 
temperature). ............................................................................................233 
Figure 8.5. Gearbox configuration schematic..................................................................237 
 xv
Figure 8.6. Formulation of Mini-Baja gearbox problem. ................................................239 
Figure 8.7.  Elimination using interval dominance..........................................................241 
Figure 8.8. Eliminating using maximality .......................................................................242 
Figure 8.9. Sequential reduction process. ........................................................................243 
Figure 9.1. Calculating the value of information with known probabilities....................261 
Figure 9.2. Net gain in payoff per sample .......................................................................262 
Figure 9.3. Net expected payoff of the design .................................................................263 
Figure 9.4. Box plots for various sample sizes ................................................................264 
Figure 9.5. Overview of approach using imprecise probabilities to bound the value of 
information...............................................................................................269 
Figure 9.6.  Various distributions in the P-box................................................................270 
Figure 9.7. Example high-level behavior of gross value .................................................273 
Figure 9.8. Two example traces of gross value ...............................................................273 
Figure 9.9. Actual expected net payoffs for Trace A.......................................................277 
Figure 9.10. Actual expected net payoffs for Trace B.....................................................278 







aleatory uncertainty Uncertainty that arises from a random process. 
certainty The condition of knowing everything necessary to choose the 
course of action whose outcome is most preferred. 
consistent region The region in the hyperspace of imprecise quantities that is 
consistent with the available information. 
decision alternative A specific option for a specific decision. 
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current decision is robust, given the DM’s state of 
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represents the limit of the ratio of times that one outcome 
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The engineering design community recognizes that an essential part of the design 
process is decision making.  Each decision consists of two main phases—problem 
formulation and problem solution.  Because decisions generally are made under 
uncertainty, engineers need appropriate methods for modeling and managing uncertainty.  
Existing literature focuses on modeling uncertainty using precisely known probabilities. 
The objective of this thesis is to investigate and develop alternative methods for 
managing uncertainty during the formulation phase of engineering design decisions, 
focusing on situations in which probabilities are not known precisely.  
 Two important characteristics of uncertainty in the context of engineering design 
are imprecision and irreducible uncertainty.  In order to model both of these 
characteristics, it is valuable to use probabilities that are most generally imprecise and 
subjective.  These imprecise probabilities generalize traditional, precise probabilities; 
when the available information is extensive, imprecise probabilities reduce to precise 
probabilities.  However, when information is scarce, they more accurately represent a 
decision-maker’s uncertainty. 
An approach for comparing the practical value of different uncertainty models is 
developed.  The approach examines the value of a model using the principles of 
information economics: value equals benefits minus costs.  The benefits of a model are 
measured in terms of the quality of the product that results from the design process.  
Costs are measured not only in terms of direct design costs, but also the costs of creating 
and using the model.   
Using this approach, the practical value of using an uncertainty model that 
explicitly recognizes both imprecision and irreducible uncertainty is demonstrated in the 
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context of a high-risk engineering design example in which the decision-maker has few 
statistical samples to support the decision.  It is also shown that a particular imprecise 
probability model called probability bounds analysis generalizes sensitivity analysis, a 
process of identifying whether a particular decision is robust given the decision-maker’s 
lack of information.  An approach for bounding the value of future statistical data 
samples while collecting information to support design decisions is developed, and 
specific policies for making decisions in the presence of imprecise information are 








During the engineering design process, a designer’s actions are constrained by 
limited resources.  Consequently, the information available for guiding analysis and 
decision-making is generally incomplete, and the designer must make design decisions 
under a state of uncertainty.  The majority of existing design research has focused on 
solving design problems—that is, choosing a specific design.  Much less attention has 
been given to the process of formulating design problems, which includes collecting 
relevant information and transforming this information into a form that can be used to 
support decision making. 
Some research advancements, such as improved computer modeling and 
increased computing power, are complementary to both the formulation and solution 
phases of design problems.  For example, increases in computing power enable engineers 
to run analysis models that were previously infeasible.  Other research has focused on 
computer algorithms, such as approaches to optimization.  Improved analysis and 
solution methods help designers solve the formulated problem more accurately than they 
could with previous methods, but the solution to the formulated problem will only match 
the true solution if the problem is formulated appropriately.   
Despite the significant advancements in engineering research with respect to 
solving design problems, there has been much less attention paid to the fundamental 
problem of formulating the design problem, including the crucial recognition of what is 
known (i.e. information) and what is not known (i.e. uncertainty).  Specifically, the 
underlying models of uncertainty used by practicing engineers and researchers have 
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remained mostly the same for decades; traditional practice uses perfectly known, precise 
probability distributions.   
In this dissertation, it is argued that there is more to uncertainty than just perfectly 
known probabilities.  For example, often one goal of information collection is to learn 
about the probabilities of events and the dependencies between events, such as the 
experiment of drawing samples from a random process to characterize its mean and 
variance.  The goal of this experiment is to increase knowledge about the probabilities, 
which implies that there can be lack of knowledge, or uncertainty, about probabilities.  If 
there is uncertainty about probabilities, can probabilities still be the most general 
representation of uncertainty? 
The goal of this thesis is to investigate methods for managing uncertainty and 
information during the formulation phase of engineering design decisions, focusing on 
situations in which engineers do not have complete information.  The main motivating 
question of the dissertation is: 
How should engineering designers manage information to 
support decision making under uncertainty? 
This question will be answered from two perspectives: 
- A theoretical perspective—identifying the internal consistency and applicability 
of representations to design problems 
- A practical perspective—given the benefits and costs associated with different 
methods, identifying the method that yields the highest overall economic value 
to the design process.   
The proposed answer to this question is that engineers need to represent 
uncertainty using methods that go beyond precise probabilities.  These methods should 
generalize from probability, meaning that they should include probability as a special 
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case.  At the same time, these methods should recognize that often engineers lack perfect 
knowledge about the problem.  It is also argued that uncertainty due to a lack of 
knowledge should be represented distinctly from inherent randomness, because otherwise 
lack of knowledge and randomness become intertwined and indistinguishable.  This 
confounding of two different things makes analysis difficult, including complicating the 
management of information collection that seeks to reduce uncertainty.   
The remainder of this chapter establishes the context of the research (Sections 
1.1-1.4), identifies the secondary motivating questions addressed in the dissertation 
(Section 1.5), and provides an overview of the organization of the remaining chapters 
(Section 1.6). 
1.1 The engineering design context 
Design is a process of converting information about customer interests and 
requirements into a specification of a product.  This process involves searching through a 
very large, unstructured space of solutions (Tong and Sriram 1992) based on vague and 
uncertain knowledge about possible solution alternatives (Gupta and Xu 2002), their 
physical behavior (Aughenbaugh and Paredis 2004), their cost (Garvey 1999), and the 
decision maker’s (DM’s) preferences (Kirkwood and Sarin 1985, Otto and Antonsson 
1992, Carnahan, et al. 1994, Seidenfeld, et al. 1995).  In order to guide engineers through 
this process, several approaches have been developed.  One approach to this process is 
the systematic design method described by Pahl and Beitz (1996).   
1.1.1 Systematic design 
In systematic design (Pahl and Beitz 1996), the design process is broken into four 
main phases, as summarized in Table 1.1.  In the product planning and clarification of 
task phase, a need for a product is determined and described.  Product planning is mostly 
in the domain of corporate strategy and marketing; a company’s situation and market 
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condition are analyzed, profitable product ideas sought, and a product proposal made.  
The next step is to clarify the task by refining the product proposal and creating a detailed 
requirements list for the product.  These requirements tell engineers what a product 
should be, should not be, and what it must be (at a minimum) in order to be successful.  
Once a list of requirements and objectives is created, conceptual design can begin. 
The conceptual design phase takes the list of requirements and objectives and 
determines the principle solution structures to be pursued in embodiment design.  To 
some, this is where traditional engineering begins.  First, designers distill the problem 
down to its core, asking what are we really trying to build.  Then they identify what 
functions (e.g. in a car design, functions such as move person, protect person, monitor 
performance) the design must perform and how these functions interact at a high level, 
such as transfers of energy, mass, and signals.  All of this information is combined into a 
function structure.   
Next, designers seek to enumerate possible physical implementations, or working 
principles, for each function.  For example, three working principles for the function 
mark a piece of paper could be deposit material by friction (e.g.  a pencil), melt material 
onto paper (e.g.  laser jet printing), or burn away material (e.g.  scorching the paper with 
a laser).  Since in general there are multiple functions, each with multiple working 
principles, they can be combined into an overall product in many different ways, or 
solution variants.  Finally, these solution variants must be evaluated and a principal 
solution concept chosen.  This concept forms the foundation for embodiment design.    
 
Table 1.1.  Systematic design phases 
Phase Main tasks 
1.  Planning and clarifying the 
task 
Investigation into the economic and technical viability of creating 
a given product, and the definition of the exact requirements of a 
system and the criteria surrounding its functioning. 
2.  Conceptual design Development of function structure and the evaluation of different 
solution variants to this problem.   
3.  Embodiment design Conversion of a conceptual working structure to a specification of 
layout. 
4.  Detail design Finalization of the design and production details. 
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In embodiment design, designers develop the design concept in more detail by 
considering additional technical and economic criteria.  Essentially, embodiment design 
takes the working principles and concepts developed in conceptual design and develops 
an actual design specification, at which point detail design can lead directly into 
production.  During detail design, the arrangement, dimensions, materials, and production 
methods of all parts of the product are finalized and documented. 
1.1.2 Partitioning the design problem 
Complex problems can rarely, if ever, be solved globally in one step.  Most 
products have reached a level of complexity at which it is infeasible for one engineer, or 
even engineers from a single discipline, to design them completely.  Instead, the design 
problem must be broken down into smaller chunks that are designed by separate design 
teams.  The solutions to these sub-problems are then synthesized and integrated into a 
complete design for the overall system.  Systematic design is an appropriate approach for 
designing a product at one level of detail, but it does not address this higher-level process 
of decomposing a system into subsystems, concurrently designing subsystems, and 
subsequently integrating subsystem designs into the overall system.  A holistic, 
hierarchical decomposition approach to the design process that addresses these problems 
is provided by systems engineering (Forsberg and Mooz 1992, Buede 2000, Forsberg, et 
al. 2000, Blanchard 2004).  Although this dissertation will not address systems 
engineering formally (see Aughenbaugh and Paredis (2004) for a discussion of modeling, 
simulation, and uncertainty in systems engineering), it is useful to consider the 
consequences of decomposing the design process. 
When the design process is decomposed, it becomes recursive—the overall design 
process is a sequence of design sub-problems.  For example, consider the design of a car.  
A car can be broken down into many subsystems (such as engine, drivetrain, wheels, 
chassis, and so on), and each of these subsystems can be broken down into smaller 
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subsystems, as cartooned in Figure 1.1.  In many cases, a different team of engineers will 
perform the embodiment of each subsystem.  Teams may also work on sub-problems 
concurrently, rather than sequentially.  For example, one team may be designing the 
drivetrain while another team is designing the engine.   
When a team is formed to design the engine, its members first must clarify their 
task by using their technical expertise to elaborate on the requirements.  For example, a 
particular engine concept is one of the working solutions from the conceptual design 
(phase 2 of systematic design) of the car, as shown in Figure 1.2.  Part of this engine 
design process is subdividing the engine into its subsystems, such as the fuel intake, and 
so on down to the smallest component of the system.  This design process is challenging 
because the performance of the overall system may be a function of the interactions 
between sub-systems.  Thus, the decisions of one team depend on future decisions and on 
decisions made concurrently by other design teams.  The decisions outside of the control 
of one group are sources of uncertainty to that group’s decision.  The importance of 
decisions in the design process, including decisions under uncertainty, has lead many 
















Figure 1.1.  Subsystems of a car 
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1.1.3 Decision-based design 
Independent of the design method that an organization adopts, designers 
repetitively must identify problems, search for solutions, evaluate solutions, and choose 
an action or design.  Inspired by this process, decision-based design recognizes that the 
principal role of an engineer in the design process is to make decisions (Mistree, et al. 
1990, Hazelrigg 1998, Marston, et al. 2000).  This paradigm shifts the emphasis of design 
research to decision making; the motivation is that one way to improve the design process 
is to enable engineers to make better decisions.   
Engineers have finite resources with which to conduct the design process.  
Consequently, they cannot study every detail of every subsystem extensively.  Decisions 
often are guided with approximate models, expert opinion, rules of thumb, and even pure 
intuition.  In general, it is very difficult for the right person to have the right information 
available at the right time in a format that he or she can comprehend (Cooper 2003).  One 
goal of decision-based design is to support decisions with formal methods that make the 
most out of the available information and resources.  The idea is that a final design can 
only be as good as the decisions that led to it, so the decisions need to be as good as 
possible.  The open question is what formal methods are most appropriate for engineering 
1 2 3 4
Design of drivetrain  (subsystem of car)
Design of car
1 2 3 4
Design of engine (subsystem of car)
Design of fuel intake (subsystem of engine)
…
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
…
 
Figure 1.2.  Recursive systematic design process, design phases numbered 1-4 
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design.  This question is next viewed in the more specific context of simulation-based 
design.   
1.1.4 Simulation-based design 
As already noted, the partitioning of the design problem into sub-problems results 
in a sequence of decisions (for simplicity, concurrent decisions by multiple decision 
makers are ignored), of which one is illustrated in Figure 1.3.  In this grossly abstracted 
model of the design process, a designer or decision maker (hereafter abbreviated as DM), 
has identified two decision alternatives.  The DM performs multiple simulations ( iS ) or 
other analyses ( iA ), including eliciting expert opinion, to study the performance of the 
alternatives in various environmental factors.  Performance attributes are then combined 
or weighted according to the DM’s preferences, perhaps according to utility theory(von 
Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, von Neumann and Morgenstern 1980, Keeney and 
Raiffa 1993).  Finally, the most preferred alternative is selected, or alternatively, when 
there are more than two decisions alternatives, the DM can proceed by selecting a set of 
alternatives and subsequently eliminating the inferior solutions (Rekuc, et al. 2006), a 
topic considered in detail in Chapter 8.   
The abstract model in Figure 1.3 is useful because even in its simple form, it 









































































































Figure 1.3.  Abstraction of a sequential decision process in simulation-based design. 
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alternatives, environmental factors, simulations, analysis, preferences, and probabilities—
introduce uncertainty into the decision.  In order to make a good decision, a DM should 
recognize and account for these uncertainties when making the decision.  The motivating 
research question in this dissertation asks how to best manage information in this process. 
Because information and uncertainty are duals (see Section 1.3), it also asks the question 
of how these uncertainties can best be propagated through the analysis process and then 
incorporated into the decisions, a question that involves both the formulation and solution 
of the decision problem.   
1.1.5 Decision problem formulation and solution 
Decisions have two phases—problem formulation and problem solution.  The 
decision formulation phase involves an important sub-decision problem, namely, how 
much information to collect in support of decision making, that is, the solution of the 
decision problem.   
The basic elements of formulating a decision problem and collecting information 
can be summarized in five steps, adapted from Kmietowicz and Pearman (1981): 
1. Identify an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive decision alternatives, which 
could include ranges of continuous parameters 
2. Identify an exhaustive set of mutually exclusive alternative states of the world, 
or alternatively define the appropriate continuous variables that capture the 
state 
3. Predict the payoff of every decision alternative in every state of the world 
4. Assign probabilities to each state of the world (including assigning probability 
mass functions to any continuous states), or acknowledge that such information 
is not available 
5. Select the criteria for evaluating alternatives 
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Only after formulating the problem can a DM attempt to solve the problem by 
identifying the decision alternative that is most preferred.  In general, engineers must 
complete the formulation process within significant constraints, such as deadlines, 
monetary budgets, and bounded rationality—a phrase coined by Herbert Simon (1947) 
that refers to the inherent bounds on human thinking.  It can thus be difficult or 
impossible to carry out all five steps of the formulation process in their entirety (Murphy, 
et al. 2005) [see Section 2.4 for more on particular causes of a DM’s lack of information 
in design].  Without such constraints, it would be possible to make use of a single 
objective decision making, traditional probability theory, and von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility theory (1944), as recommended by Hazelrigg (1996) and others.  But what should 
be done when the constraints do exist? 
Despite the existence of such constraints in practice, the problem formulation 
phase of the decision problem has received much less attention than the problem solution 
phase.  Recent literature (Bradley and Agogino 1994, Gupta and Xu 2002, Radhakrishnan 
and McAdams 2005) acknowledges the reality of resource constraints and the 
impracticality of exhaustive analysis, but it presents few alternatives for problem 
formulation.  Gupta and Xu (2002) note the impossibility, given time and budgetary 
constraints, of exploring all possible design alternative payoffs (steps 1-3), and they 
identify significant tradeoffs in the number of alternatives considered, but they present no 
guidance for actually managing the design process in this aspect.  Radhakrishnan and 
McAdams (2005) analyze the cost-benefit trade-offs in selecting models of various levels 
of abstraction in engineering design and present a framework in which a designer can 
reason about model uncertainty, but the designer is left with little guidance in estimating 
actual value of information from different models.  Bradley and Agogino (1994) develop 
a decision-analytic approach to assist designers in cost-benefit analysis of resource 
expenditures using precisely characterized probability distributions to guide and prioritize 
information collection, but they do not explain how to estimate these distributions. 
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Other work has focused on evaluation, Step 5.  Engineers have developed or 
adopted various methods to support design decisions under uncertainty, such as statistical 
decision theory (Pratt, et al. 1995) and utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1944), decision analysis (Howard 1968, 1988a, 1988b), safety factors (Elishakoff 2004), 
probabilistic risk assessments (Bedford and Cooke 2001), reliability based design 
optimization (Mourelatos and Liang 2004), and robust design (Byrne and Taguchi 1987, 
Taguchi 1987, Allen, et al. 2006).  Each of these methods requires the designer to 
formalize preferences in some way.  The process of eliciting and formalizing preferences 
is not necessarily trivial, and there can be significant imprecision in utility functions 
(Smith 1961, Aumann 1962, 1964, Kirkwood and Sarin 1985, Weber 1987, Thurston 
1990a, 1990b, Otto and Antonsson 1991, Thurston, et al. 1991, Otto and Antonsson 1992, 
Carnahan, et al. 1994, Antonsson and Otto 1995, Seidenfeld, et al. 1995), but it is not the 
focus of this research.  In this dissertation, it is assumed that designers can capture their 
preferences accurately and completely using a single utility function.  The combined 
problem of incompletely known preferences and incompletely known future states of the 
world (e.g., incompletely known probabilities), is left for future work. 
In addition to the above limitations, most methods also suffer from the lingering 
assumption of the existence of clearly defined probabilities.  That is, in most engineering 
design methods, it is assumed that Step 4 can be completed with little difficulty; the 
possibility that the probabilities are unknown is often ignored, even though decision 
theory has long acknowledged that they are not always known (Knight 1921).  Knight 
specifically distinguishing decisions in which probabilities are known—decisions under 
risk—and cases in which probabilities are not known—decisions under uncertainty.  This 
terminology is not used in this dissertation, but the concepts are closely related to the 
distinctions made about characteristics of uncertainty in Chapter 2. 
From where do designers get probabilities in Step 4?  How should these 
probabilities be represented?  Are probabilities even appropriate for representing 
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uncertainty in engineering design?  These questions are exciting from both a 
theoretical/philosophical perspective—what is uncertainty?—and from a practical 
perspective—what method is most valuable to the designer? 
1.2 Information economics 
While philosophical questions are interesting to ponder, this dissertation goes 
beyond them by also tackling practical issues—in practice, how should engineers 
overcome resource constraints and uncertainty in the design process?  This question is 
answered not only from a mathematical perspective, but also from a practical and 
economic perspective.  Different formalisms for uncertainty have different assumptions, 
different methods, and different costs associated with their use.  Part of managing 
uncertainty in engineering design is choosing the “right” representation.  Another part is 
collecting the “right” amount of information to make a decision.  So how can “right” be 
defined?  Extending the principles of information economics (Marschak 1974),  an 
engineer should choose the methods, models, and information that accord the greatest net 
value—benefit minus cost—to the entire design process and product lifecycle.  By 
focusing on the practical value, the usefulness of the methods can be evaluated directly.   
In most of this dissertation, information economics is used as a motivating and 
guiding principle rather than a specific method of analysis.  Restated from above, this 
basic principle is that an engineer should only take a course of action—whether 
purchasing information, performing experiments, or using a particular model—if the 
benefits of that action outweigh its costs.  The prediction of the benefits of a model is a 
difficult problem because the results and impact of a particular model are uncertain.  A 
more detailed discussion of the application of information economics to information 
collection in engineering design, including a proposed method for estimating the value of 
additional information collection, is presented in Chapter 9.  However, the practical, 
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economic principle of cost-benefit analysis is used throughout, especially in Chapter 5 
where the practical values of two models of uncertainty are compared. 
1.3 Information and uncertainty modeling 
There is a definite relationship between information and uncertainty; the more 
information one has, the less uncertainty exists.  As such, information management and 
uncertainty management are intimately linked.  Most of this dissertation approaches the 
problem from the perspective of uncertainty.  The motivation is that in order to make 
good design decisions, a DM must recognize and account for the uncertainty that actually 
exists because overlooking this uncertainty can result in under-designed systems and 
catastrophic failure, or over-designed systems that require more resources than necessary.   
An engineer recognizes uncertainty by modeling uncertainty.  Like most aspects 
of the real world, the true state of information and uncertainty is often too complex to 
deal with exactly, so a DM instead builds a manageable model.  To be useful, this model 
should contain the most important aspects of the state of the world for the given problem.  
To be efficient, the model should not contain much unnecessary information, as this 
increases the cost of building and using the model but provides no benefit.  In this 
context, the subject of this dissertation is the process of building a theoretically justifiable 
and practically useful model of uncertainty in engineering design. 
It is useful throughout this dissertation, especially when studying the 
characteristics of uncertainty (Chapter 2) and then exploring possible models of 
uncertainty (Chapter 3), to keep in mind a quote from Edward de Bono : 
The purpose of science is not to analyse or describe but to 
make useful models of the world.  A model is useful if it 
allows us to get use out of it.   
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Applied to the topic of uncertainty, this quote can be taken to mean that the goal 
of the scientific study of uncertainty does not need to be absolute truths, but only models 
that help designers make better designs.  This emphasizes the practical perspective of 
information and uncertainty modeling.  However, the theoretical part of the problem, 
which for uncertainty modeling is somewhat philosophical, is not altogether irrelevant; so 
it is addressed in Chapter 2.  The remainder of this section discusses practical aspects of 
the problem. 
As mentioned in Section 1.1.5, engineers currently recognize uncertainty in a 
variety of ways.  The most basic way is through the use of safety factors (Elishakoff 
2004).  This simple approach presents a useful context in which to discuss uncertainty 
modeling.  When engineers apply safety factors in design, they are stating that they know 
that there is uncertainty in the analysis models.  Because of this uncertainty and the 
assumptions that they adopt during analysis, the results of their analyses differ from the 
true state of the world.   
For example, if an engineer is building a pressure vessel with material yield 
strength yσ , the requirement to avoid failure is that yσ  exceeds the maximum stress in 
the pressure vessel, maxσ .  That is: maxyσ σ> .  In a safety factor approach, the engineer 
employs a safety factor 1SF >  with his or her best point estimates yσ  and maxσ  of the 
true yσ  and maxσ , respectively.  The engineer then designs the pressure vessel such that 
maxy SFσ σ> × .  The engineer hopes that by designing the pressure vessel with a safety 
margin around the estimates, the true yield strength yσ  (which may be much less than 
yσ ) will exceed the true maxσ  (which may be much larger than maxσ ). 
What does the use of a safety factor say about the engineer’s model of 
uncertainty?  Assuming that the engineer is striving for 100% reliability (an uncommon 
goal, but one with clear meaning), then it essentially says that the uncertainty in the 
estimates yσ  and maxσ  is small enough that the SF  fully compensates for it.  
Mathematically, this is equivalent to Equation (1.1), where max 1( )σ ε+  represents the 
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absolutely largest stress that could occur in the pressure vessel walls and where 2( )yσ ε−  
represents the absolutely smallest yield strength of the pressure vessel that the engineer 
believes is possible. 
 2 max 1( ) ( )y SFσ ε σ ε− > ⋅ +  (1.1) 
This notation emphasizes that the DM is making two estimates—an estimate of 
the largest maximum stress in the walls of the pressure vessel and an estimate of the 
smallest yield strength of the material.  In order for the design to be reliable, a safety 
factor is chosen such that Equation (1.1) holds.  However, since 1ε  and 2ε  are unknown, 
the choice of an appropriate safety factor is a challenge.   
Is Equation (1.1) a sufficient model of the uncertainty?  The answer depends on 
an information economic analysis.  In order to be sure that the inequality in Equation 
(1.1) holds, an engineer may have to choose a very large safety factor because 1ε  and 2ε  
are uncertain.  A larger safety factor in general corresponds to a more costly design, such 
as a pressure vessel with thicker walls.  If this cost is small compared to the benefits of 
guaranteeing reliability, it may be a valuable tradeoff.  For example, consider moving to a 
probabilistic model of uncertainty.  The construction of a probabilistic model requires 
significantly more data than a basic safety factor approach (Elishakoff 2004).  The 
acquisition of this data may take considerable time and money, in which case the costs of 
collecting the information that the probabilistic model requires may exceed the costs of 
over-design from the safety factor approach.   
The movement from a safety factor model to a probabilistic model of uncertainty 
represents the general situation of comparing models.  Different models generally are 
based on different assumptions and require different information.  At one level, it makes 
sense to use a model that captures exactly the available information, meaning a model 
that fully represents what is known without requiring additional assumptions.  This model 
would be as close to reality as possible.  However, this model could be very complex and 
 16
difficult to use to make calculations and decisions.  Therefore, at another level it may not 
be economically valuable to use a complicated model. 
Hazelrigg (2003) has used a skit by Eddie Izzard to illustrate this point.    In an 
extension of this example, a person is presented with a choice between cake or death (i.e., 
eating a piece of cake or dying).  For most people, even the very abstract model of 
“cake”—the person is not told the flavor, freshness, size, or any other detail of the cake—
is sufficient for them to choose cake over death, even though the model of death—the 
person is not told how he or she will die—is also very abstract.   
In Figure 1.4, a DM’s preferences for cake and death are shown as intervals.  
Intervals are used because no single value of preference can be associated with the rough 
models of cake and death.  For example, a person may really like chocolate cake with 
vanilla icing but hate white cake with peanut butter icing.  Each type of cake has a certain 
preference associated with it, and together the class of all “cakes” forms an interval of 
preferences.   
Even without specific information, the person can conclude that cake is preferred 
to death, since the entire interval for cake is at a higher level of preference than the entire 
interval for death (i.e., the interval for cake is entirely to the right of the interval for death 
in the figure).  This means the person’s least preferred cake is still preferable to any 
death.  It is thus sometimes possible to reach a conclusion or decision without a detailed 






Figure 1.4.  Imprecise model example: cake or death. 
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not change the conclusion and therefore provides no direct benefit, but may incur 
additional costs.  Since the benefit does not exceed the cost, there is no value in acquiring 
extra information about the cake1. 
In general, it is infeasible to represent exactly all of the available information 
because this would require a model that matches the current state of the world.  However, 
all models are by definition abstractions of reality.  G. E. P. Box (1979) is widely cited as 
being the first to state this as, “All models are wrong; some are useful.”  In most cases, in 
order to conform the current state of information to the restrictions of a particular model, 
the DM must both make additional assumptions and discard available information.  
Consequently, there is no absolute truth as to what the best model is, but rather choice of 
a model is relative and depends on the available information and the decision at hand.  
For expensive, high-risk projects such as aerospace design, a very complicated model of 
uncertainty might provide the most value.  For simple, low-risk project such as plastic 
utensil design, a very simple model of uncertainty might provide the most value. 
In the context of uncertainty modeling, the goal of this dissertation is to explore, 
present, and develop a method for representing and managing uncertainty that is more 
valuable, at least in some contexts, than the methods currently used in engineering 
practice.  These methods will not always provide greater value, but it will be shown that 
there are definite circumstances in which they do (0).  It will also be shown that the 
methods have specific benefits over traditional methods that readily generalize to a broad 




1 It is of course possible that the intervals of preference for cake and death overlap.  One 
example is the comparison of a cake containing a poison that leads to an agonizing 
death compared to a death in which the DM dies peacefully in his or her sleep.  A 
second example is a suicidal DM, who would prefer death over any other earthly 
indulgences, including cake. 
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class of problems (Chapter 6), although the specific tradeoffs between cost and benefit 
are problem specific and cannot be generalized. 
In this section, the notion of an uncertainty model was introduced, and the 
concept of model selection based on information economics was developed.  One of the 
goals of this thesis is to identify how uncertainty should be managed in engineering 
design. As the next section describes, the research area of engineering design is in some 
ways very different from other engineering research domains.   
1.4 The context of engineering design research 
Much engineering research is scientific in nature, meaning that research questions 
are posed and refutable hypotheses are advanced.  However, the engineering design 
domain is different in nature from a physics-based field such as acoustics or fluid 
dynamics; in practice, it is often closer to a social science than a physical science, and as 
such requires a different approach. 
Herbert Simon makes a distinction between “natural science” and “science of the 
artificial” (Simon 1982).  Natural sciences are descriptive, concerned with how things 
are, whereas the science of the artificial is normative, concerned with how things ought to 
be.  Simon defines the artificial as things that are the result of human actions—
specifically from the act of making, which he calls synthesis.  Clearly engineering design 
is intimately connected with synthesis; design is a process that includes the act of making 
(synthesis) as one of its steps, but it also includes the act of observing (analysis).  The 
aspect of Simon’s theory that is important for this dissertation is the emphasis it places on 
the human aspect of engineering design.  While engineering design includes analysis 
steps and has as its main goal synthesis of a product, the engineering design process is 
ultimately a process carried out by humans and for humans, as the resultant artifact 
generally provides some function to humans.  Some authors acknowledge a specific 
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subjective, rather than objective role in validation of design methods (Pedersen, et al. 
2000).   
According to Karl Popper (1959a), a scientific hypothesis must be phrased such 
that it can be refuted by some conceivable event; any hypothesis or theory that cannot be 
refuted by any conceivable event is non-scientific.  A scientific hypothesis can be refuted 
by a single exception.  However, humans are a crucial component of engineering design.  
Consequently, design is characterized by human characteristics, including beliefs, biases, 
values, and a strong propensity for making mistakes.  Human behavior does not 
universally follow a clear set of rules, so there are exceptions to nearly all descriptive 
models of human behavior.  Because a model is an approximation of reality, such 
exceptions should be expected; if there were no exceptions, it would be reality, rather 
than approximately modeling reality.   
The existence of an exception to a particular model essentially refutes that model 
as an acceptable scientific hypothesis or theory of reality, but the model may nevertheless 
be useful in describing human behavior.  It is for these reasons that models (rather than 
scientific theories) of behavior, uncertainty, and rationality are considered in this 
dissertation.   
The process of establishing a level of trust or confidence in a model is known as 
model validation (Schlesinger, et al. 1979, Balci 1995, Malak and Paredis 2004).  Usually 
some models are better than others for a particular application, even though they are all 
known to be imperfect.  It is therefore important to identify in what ways and under what 
conditions one model is superior to another.  Often this is a practical consideration—
which model yields the most useful results for the scenario under consideration.  At the 
same time, a valid model should have some theoretical grounding within a particular 
context or set of assumptions. 
Research in the social and cognitive sciences has presented normative models—or 
normative theories—of human behavior.  These models essentially state how a rational 
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individual should act under specific circumstances.  Researchers typically construct these 
models by beginning with a particular set of axioms and then developing a self-consistent 
theory from those axioms.  However, there is not always universal agreement about the 
initial axioms.  The theoretical “correctness” of these axioms is often philosophical or 
even theological in nature, and as such, no universal “correctness” can be proven or 
refuted; only intuitive and consistent arguments can be constructed and then the practical 
value of employing theories based on them can be demonstrated.   
The practical value of the methods depends on the decision maker’s preference 
and is a subjective, problem-dependent attribute of the method.  As such, there is no point 
in attempting to employ purely objective, scientific tests for or against a particular 
method.  It is necessary to combine practical and theoretical arguments, such as 
practically arguing for a set of assumptions, demonstrating in a scientific manner the 
consequences of these assumptions compared to other assumptions, and then practically 
comparing the consequences and their further implications.   
In light of these observations, the questions posed in this dissertation are referred 
to as motivating questions, and proposed answers are advanced rather than pure scientific 
hypotheses that are directly refutable by objective observation.  In the next section, the 
specific motivating and research questions that guide this research are developed.  
1.5 Motivating questions 
It was explained in the previous section that engineering design research is 
different from research into the natural sciences.  It is more of a hybrid, combining 
aspects of natural sciences, social sciences, and the science of the artificial.  It is thus 
appropriate to formulate motivating research questions and answers.  These motivating 
questions can still be answered in a systematic and rigorous manner, and in some cases a 
purely scientific approach can be adopted.  In other cases, more philosophical, intuitive, 
subjective, or practical arguments must be made. 
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The introduction to this chapter presents the main motivating question of the 
dissertation:   
How should engineering designers manage information to 
support decision making under uncertainty? 
This question is now decomposed into five secondary motivating questions.  The 
overall essence of the questions and their connection to the primary motivating question 
and to each other is loosely illustrated in the followed paragraph. The specific questions 
and hypotheses are introduced in the following sub-sections. 
As discussed in Section 1.3, the representation of uncertainty is a modeling 
process—a decision maker seeks to build a model of uncertainty that is appropriate for 
his or her specific problem.  The basic story of the dissertation centers on the 
development of this model and proceeds in the following manner: 
1. When constructing a model, it is first necessary to understand what one is trying 
to model, in this case asking what are the fundamental characteristics of 
uncertainty in the context of engineering design?   
2. Once the nature of uncertainty is described, what is the most appropriate and 
general model of uncertainty for engineering design? 
3. Given several potential models from which to choose, how should engineers 
compare alternative models of uncertainty?   
4. Once a model is chosen, how can this model be used to support the decisions?   
5. Finally, given an existing state of knowledge, a model of uncertainty associated 
with it, and an approach for solving the original decision problem, how should 
one decide whether to proceed with the problem formulation phase and collect 
more information or whether to proceed to problem solution phase?  
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These five questions are adapted into specific motivating questions in the 
following sections.  The motivating questions, answers, validation, and structure of the 
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1.5.1 Motivating Question 1 
Question (Q1):  What are the fundamental characteristics of uncertainty in the context 
of engineering design? 
Answer (A1):  Uncertainty can have characteristics of being irreducible (or random) in 
nature as well as characteristics that are related to a reducible lack of 
knowledge (or imprecision) in available knowledge. 
This philosophical question is addressed directly in Chapter 2 of the dissertation.  
The general argument is that there are two important characteristics of uncertainty in 
engineering design—one characteristic is defined as irreducible uncertainty and the other 
is defined as imprecision, as explained in Chapter 2. 
The arguments in Chapter 2 are mostly intuitive in nature.  They appeal to human 
experience with uncertainty and draw from existing literature.  More extensive practical 
validation of this hypothesis is achieved in conjunction with a chosen representation of 
uncertainty, the subject of Motivating Question 2. 
1.5.2 Motivating Question 2 
Question (Q2): What is the most appropriate and general model of uncertainty for 
engineering design? 
Answer (A2):  It is often valuable to use probabilities that are most generally 
subjective and imprecise. 
Many models of uncertainty have been proposed.  Chapter 3 contains a review of 
several models and a discussion of their applicability to engineering design problems.  
The conclusion is that the potential value of using probabilities that are subjective and 
imprecise in nature is high.  In Chapter 4, the motivation for, the meaning of, and 
mathematics of a particular formalism (called probability bounds analysis) for 
representing and computing with uncertainty are introduced.  This formalism, a 
refinement of the imprecise probability model of uncertainty described in Chapter 3, is 
adopted as the primary representation of uncertainty in the thesis.  
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Together, the answers (A1 and A2) to the first two motivating questions represent 
the core contributions of the dissertation, while the remaining questions and hypotheses 
are necessary and logical extensions of this core.  The validation of A2 is coupled tightly 
with the validation of A1, since the definition of uncertainty and the model of uncertainty 
are inherently linked.  For example, a model could capture certain characteristics of 
uncertainty very well, but if it neglects other important aspects, it is not a complete 
model.  Conversely, a model that assumes characteristics that do not exist is equally 
troublesome.   
As such, the validation of A1 and A2 are considered together.  The appropriate 
means for comparing models of uncertainty is the subject of Motivating Question 3.  The 
validation of A1 and A2 is presented through an example proof of concept (Chapter 5, 
which uses the method developed in A3), a general result (Chapter 6), and an example of 
the general result (Chapter 7). 
1.5.3 Motivating Question 3 
Question (Q3):  How should engineers compare alternative models of uncertainty? 
Answer (A3):  Designers should compare both the theoretical and practical validity of 
different models. 
Multiple models of uncertainty have been proposed in the literature.  In order to 
choose an appropriate model of engineering design, it is necessary to compare various 
models to each other.  The comparison should be performed from both the practical and 
theoretical perspectives adopted in this thesis.   
The practical validity of a model in a particular engineering design problem is 
reflected in the practical results he or she produces.  If an engineer produces a bad design, 
it does not matter how theoretically valid his or her approach to design was; the design is 
still a failure.  The slight caveat is that uncertainty can cloud things.  A bad outcome does 
not imply a bad decision; it may just reflect bad luck.  When choosing a model, an 
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engineer can ask things such as, can the use of one model lead to a better design than the 
use of another model can, or is one model so complex and costly to use that any benefits 
it provides are outweighed by the high costs?  A method for making such comparisons is 
developed in Chapter 5.  Chapter 5 also contains a comparison between the imprecise 
probabilities approach and a traditional, maximum likelihood estimate, precise 
probability based approach that serves as validation of A1 and A2. 
In addition to practical comparison, a theoretical comparison should be performed 
in order to assess the general applicability of the model to a larger class of problems.  
More fundamentally, an analyst should have a true understanding of what is being 
modeled in order to choose a good model (Parry 1996).  For example, which model more 
appropriately captures the true characteristics of uncertainty?  Often this question will 
have an ambiguous answer, as most models have advantages and disadvantages that can 
be difficult to trade-off.  However, in some cases, one model will be more general than 
another model, meaning its contains the other model as a special case but also can capture 
other relevant aspects of the uncertainty.  In this situation, the more general model has a 
definite theoretical advantage over the less general model.  The theoretical advantage of 
PBA over traditional decision analysis is discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
The validation of A3 is performed from an intuitive and economic perspective.  
The hypothesis itself is not very controversial; however, the hypothesis is rarely put into 
practice.  This dissertation essentially shows that both practical (Chapter 5 and Chapter 7) 
and theoretical (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) comparisons of uncertainty models are 
possible.  These comparisons are then used to justify the value of considering an 
imprecise probability model in engineering design.   
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1.5.4 Motivating Question 4 
Question (Q4):  How should a designer make a decision in the case of seemingly 
indeterminate information? 
Answer (A4):  There is no generally optimal way to resolve inherent indeterminacy, 
but set-based decision rules exist that guide the efficient use of 
available information. 
A particular model of uncertainty has no practical value to a designer if there is no 
way to use the model to support decision making.  It will be shown in Section 4.6 that the 
use of imprecise probabilities can yield intervals of expected utility for decision 
alternatives.  If these intervals overlap, there is apparent (and sometimes actual) 
indeterminacy in the optimal action.  Chapter 8 contains a discussion and demonstration 
of set-based methods for managing decision alternatives that guide efficient use of 
available information and reduce the apparent indeterminacy in the problem. 
Validation of A4 is achieved in Chapter 8 via theoretical arguments, literature 
references to other domains, small example scenarios, and the example of the design of a 
gearbox. 
1.5.5 Motivating Question 5 
Question (Q5):  What are the fundamental principles for managing information 
collection in engineering design? 
Answer (A5):  Designers should apply the principles of information economics and 
can use methods that bound the value of information collection.   
Once probabilities are allowed to be subjective and imprecise, an obvious 
question arises: how imprecise can probabilities be and still allow for good decision 
making?  This is a sub-question to a more general question: what are the fundamental 
principles for managing information collect in engineering design?   
The collection of information requires the expenditure of resources, whether this 
involves performing more experiments, building more prototypes, or creating additional 
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simulations.  At the same time, additional information can lead to better decisions, 
thereby increasing the payoff of a design.  The fundamental principle of information 
economics is that information should only be collected if its expected benefit exceeds the 
expected costs.  This is a fundamental and widely accepted principle, but existing 
methods for assessing the value of information rely on assumptions that are often not 
valid in engineering design. Chapter 9 contains a description of these limitations and the 
development of a method for bounding the value of future statistical data collection. 
Validation of A5 is achieved in Chapter 9 through theoretical arguments and an 
example problem that relates the results from a hypothetical experiment with realistic 
information constraints to a hypothetical experiment with complete information.  The 
basic conclusion is that the method and principles can guide decision making, but without 
arbitrary resolution of indeterminacy, the methods do not provide a complete means to 
make decisions on information collection.  However, the contributions of Chapter 9 
establish a strong foundation for future work in the area of managing information 
collection in engineering design, work that is being pursued concurrently by other 
researchers (Ling 2006). 
1.6 Organization of the dissertation 
The relationship between the chapters of the thesis and the motivating questions 
and hypotheses was described throughout Section 1.5  and summarized in Figure 1.5.  
Chapters 2-7 form the core of the dissertation.  In these, the nature of uncertainty is 
addressed (Chapter 2), and various models of uncertainty are considered (0).  A particular 
model (developed by other researchers and called probability bounds analysis) is 
described in Chapter 4.  In Chapter 5, the design of a pressure vessel using this model is 
compared to a traditional, best-fit precise probability model.  The ability of probability 
bounds analysis to serve as a global sensitivity analysis is developed theoretically in 
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Chapter 6, and then the process of using probability bounds analysis in a design problem, 
including as a sensitivity analysis, is demonstrated in Chapter 7. 
Chapter 8 and Chapter 9 are logical extensions to the core of the dissertation.  The 
issue of decision making is addressed and demonstrated in Chapter 8.  This topic is 
crucial for widespread application of the methods discussed in the rest of the dissertation.  
The topic of Chapter 9 is information economics and the collection of information to 
support design decisions.  This chapter servers as a gateway looking forward.  The 
adoption of imprecise probabilities allows for a new method for bounding the value of 
future statistical data collection to be developed (presented in Chapter 9), but many issues 
area left unresolved.  As such, the chapter points towards a new direction for future work, 
demonstrates an additional use of imprecise probabilities and probability bounds analysis, 






UNCERTAINTY IN ENGINEERING DESIGN 
 
This subject of this chapter is the first motivating question of the dissertation:  
What are the fundamental characteristics of uncertainty in 
the context of engineering design? 
In Section 2.1, uncertainty is defined.  In Section 2.2, the notion of different states 
of uncertainty is introduced.  Section 2.3 contains a discussion of types of uncertainty and 
characteristics of uncertainty.  Finally, sources of a particular characteristic of 
uncertainty, called imprecision, are introduced in Section 2.4  
2.1 Definition of uncertainty 
In this dissertation, uncertainty is viewed in the context of decision theory and is 
defined, following Nikolaidis (2005), indirectly from the definition of certainty.  
Nikolaidis defines certainty as the condition of knowing everything necessary to choose 
the course of action whose outcome is most preferred.  A decision-maker’s uncertainty is 
defined as the gap between certainty and the decision-maker’s present state of 
information—the information the decision-maker currently has available for decision 
making, which is a slight refinement of Nikolaidis’s definition2.  As an example, consider 




2 The relative sizes of components in Figure 2.1 have no intended meaning; the purpose 
of the figure is only to show how the components are related to each other.   
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the truth that 12=X .  If the DM knows this, then the DM is in a state of certainty.  If the 
DM only knows that 10 14≤ ≤X , then there is uncertainty in the true value of X .   
2.2 Recognition of different states of uncertainty 
Decision theory has long differentiated between decision making with known 
probabilities3 and decision making without knowledge of probabilities4  (Knight 1921).  
Researchers also have explored the middle ground of partial or incomplete knowledge of 
probabilities (Cannon and Kmietowicz 1974), such as ordered probabilities (Fishburn 
1964) and linear constraints on the probabilities (Kmietowicz and Pearman 1984).  Other 
literature has examined incomplete or partial information (see (Weber 1987) for a review) 
in the context of imprecisely characterized preferences (Otto and Antonsson 1992, 
Carnahan, et al. 1994, Seidenfeld, et al. 1995) and unknown weights in multi-attribute 
decision making (Kirkwood and Sarin 1985).  While many of these distinctions are made 
under the assumption of probability as the model of uncertainty, they also indicate that 
there is more to uncertainty than just probability.   
This contradicts a common assumption [see for example (Lindley 1982a, Winkler 
1996)] that traditional probability theory is the only acceptable language and mathematics 
of uncertainty.  In the standard terminology of decision theory (Knight 1921), the word 
uncertainty explicitly means without knowledge of probabilities.  If probabilities cannot 
capture all uncertainties, what is uncertainty (motivating question 1), and how can 
uncertainty be represented (motivating question 2)?  These questions are the topics of 
this chapter and the following, respectively. 




3  What Knight calls decision making under risk.  This definition of risk is not used in this 
dissertation. 
4  What Knight calls decision making under uncertainty.  This definition of uncertainty is 
not used in this dissertation. 
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2.3 Types of uncertainty 
Many authors attempt to subdivide uncertainty into specific types (Der 
Kiureghian 1989, Casti 1990, Helton 1994, Hoffman and Hammonds 1994, Rowe 1994, 
Ferson and Ginzburg 1996, Hofer 1996, Hora 1996, Parry 1996, Pate-Cornell 1996, 
Cullen and Frey 1999, Oberkampf, et al. 2001, Oberkampf, et al. 2002b, Dai, et al. 2003, 
Haukaas 2003, Nikolaidis 2005).  The motivation for such distinctions is that intuitively 
it seems that there are things that are inherently unknowable until they are realized (e.g., 
the outcome of a basketball game that takes place tomorrow), and there are also things 
that are in theory knowable but may be unknown to the decision maker (e.g., the 
cumulative stats for both teams in the basketball game as of now, or the outcome of the 
game the last time the teams played).  In this section, types of uncertainty are presented 
and a distinction is made between imprecision and irreducible uncertainty. 
2.3.1 Reducible and irreducible uncertainty 
The uncertainty associated with unknowable things is often referred to as 
irreducible uncertainty (Der Kiureghian 1989).   The uncertainty associated with things 
that are knowable but are currently unknown is often referred to as reducible uncertainty.  
Philosophically, the distinction between the two is troublesome.  For example, is the 
uncertainty about tomorrow’s weather reducible or irreducible?  From one perspective, 
the weather cannot be known until it happens.  On the other hand, it might be possible to 
predict tomorrow’s weather exactly using thermodynamics and hydrodynamics—if the 
current state of every atom on Earth and all physical laws were known exactly, and if 
tomorrow’s weather is a deterministic function of today’s weather, then tomorrow’s 
weather is knowable.  From yet a different perspective, perhaps quantum effects or 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle are factors.  These possibilities lead again to the 
question, is accurate weather prediction inherently impossible or just presently 
impractical?  There is not necessarily a clear answer. 
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2.3.2 Aleatory and epistemic uncertainty 
Another distinction frequently made in the literature is between aleatory 
uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty (Parry 1996, Oberkampf, et al. 2002b, Dai, et al. 
2003, Haukaas 2003).  The term aleatory uncertainty comes from the Latin aleator for 
dice thrower or gambler, and refers to uncertainty that arises from a random process.  
Other authors refer to the same concept as inherent variability, or just variability.  It is 
almost universally accepted that aleatory uncertainty is best modeled using probabilities.  
It is recommended that readers who are not familiar with both the frequentist and 
subjective interpretations of probability refer ahead to Section 3.3.3, as a basic 
understanding of these concepts will be useful throughout the dissertation. 
The counterpart to aleatory uncertainty is epistemic uncertainty, with the term 
epistemic arising from the Greek episteme for knowledge, which is also linked to the verb 
to understand.  Epistemic uncertainty is caused by a lack of knowledge; this lack of 
knowledge is a state of the analyst or decision-maker, rather than a state of the physical 
system under consideration.  The distinction is motivated by the “location” of the 
uncertainty—in the decision-maker or in the physical system.   
Many authors align epistemic uncertainty with reducible uncertainty and aleatory 
uncertainty with irreducible uncertainty, but the mapping is not exact.  If one accepts the 
existence of aleatory uncertainty, it is certainly a form of irreducible uncertainty.  
However, the outcome of future deterministic event could be uncertain, and this 
uncertainty could be irreducible without being an inherently random process.  For 
example, the winner of the best picture award at next year’s Academy Awards is clearly 
unknown, but it is almost certainly not an inherently random process.  Similarly and more 
relevant to engineering design, a future detail design decision that affects the total payoff 
of the design is uncertain during conceptual design, yet (assuming a systematic design 
process) that detail design decision is not random but rather guided by rigorous analysis 
and the input of expert engineers. 
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As with irreducible and reducible uncertainty, the difference between aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainty is not always clear.  The dimensional errors in manufacturing 
processes are often modeled as the result of a random process, and therefore as an 
aleatory uncertainty.  However, in many cases it can be argued that the manufacturing 
process is a deterministic, though perhaps chaotic system that obeys the deterministic 
rules of Newtonian physics.  Rather than the process being random, it is more likely the 
input (environmental) parameters to the process that lead to the appearance of random 
behavior.  The difficulty in determining whether an uncertainty is aleatory or epistemic is 
another argument against the actual existence of different uncertainties, but it does not 
imply that such distinctions have no value. 
Despite philosophical questions about the existence of aleatory uncertainty, it is 
clear that engineers frequently model processes as inherently random.  As discussed in 
Section 1.3, models of uncertainty, like all models, will not be exact replications of 
reality.  It is thus necessary to consider aleatory uncertainty in the practical context of 
modeling (Parry 1996, Winkler 1996).   
2.3.3 Practical usefulness of distinguishing different 
characteristics of uncertainty 
Despite the philosophical arguments against inherently different types of 
uncertainty, many modern authors, such as (Ferson and Ginzburg 1996, Hofer 1996, 
Parry 1996) and including skeptics of a fundamental distinction between types of 
uncertainty such as (Winkler 1996), agree that it is useful in practice to make such 
distinctions when possible .  This is especially true when considering building models of 
uncertainty for use in engineering decision making, because there are some 
characteristics of uncertainty that are starkly different and should be modeled as such. 
For example, the strength of different samples of a particular material differ due 
to small fluctuations in the manufacturing process.  Engineers frequently choose to model 
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the strength of a novel material as a random variable.  Assume an engineer knows from 
historical data that most materials are well modeled by a normal distribution with 
truncated tails (a truth assumed in this dissertation for illustration only and with no 
implied relevance to material science).  It is also assumed that the true process is 
stationary.  Consequently, the engineer chooses to model the strength of this novel 
material as a normal distribution.   
Based on the engineer’s modeling decision, there is clearly some type of 
irreducible uncertainty about the strength of a particular material sample; the engineer 
cannot known the specific material strength of a future sample until that material sample 
is manufactured.  However, there is also a type of reducible uncertainty present because 
the engineer does not know the parameters (mean and standard deviation) that describe 
the particular normally distributed stochastic process .  This uncertainty can be reduced 
by performing an experiment, such as creating 100 samples of the new material and 
measuring the strength of each and then using the sample mean and standard deviation to 
estimate the overall population parameters. 
Extending this, 100 samples is not guaranteed to lead to an accurate 
characterization of the mean and variance.  Collecting 1000 samples would be better, and 
10,000 even better still.  This additional information collection is not reducing the 
uncertainty from the random manufacturing process; it is merely reducing the uncertainty 
in how well the random process is known to the engineer.  If the engineer can afford to 
perform 1 million tests, he or she will know the parameters of the distribution even better.  
In practice, collecting samples costs resources, and resources are limited.  Consequently, 
an engineer generally cannot get arbitrarily close to the true parameters of a random 
process.  It is therefore necessary to make tradeoffs between the cost of acquiring 
additional information and the benefits of such information.  In order to guide such 
tradeoffs, it is necessary to express the lack of knowledge about the true parameters—
uncertainty that will be called imprecision. 
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2.3.4 Imprecision and irreducible uncertainty 
In this dissertation, the definitions summarized in Figure 2.1 are adopted.  
Specifically, the definition is adopted that irreducible uncertainty accounts for the gap, 
shown in Figure 2.1(b), between certainty and a state of precise information, defined as 
the state of having acquired all information about a particular model of irreducible 
uncertainty available at any price.  As described in the previous section, even if a quantity 
is assumed to be random, the type of the distribution (e.g.  normal) and its parameters 
(e.g.  mean and variance) still need to be determined.  If the distribution type and 
parameters are known perfectly, then the irreducible uncertainty is known precisely.   
The gap between the present state of information and a state of precise 
information about the irreducible uncertainty, shown in Figure 2.1(b), is defined as 
imprecision.  The terms aleatory and epistemic are specifically avoided in part because 
they have been used primarily in an attempt to differentiate the inherent nature of 
different uncertainties, rather than focusing on how human decision-makers should 
manage and model uncertainty in engineering design.  Additionally, there are irreducible 
uncertainties that are not inherently random in nature, such as the examples noted earlier 
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Figure 2.1: Characteristics of uncertainty, adapted from (Nikolaidis 2005) 
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The term imprecision is chosen over reducible uncertainty because it provides 
additional clarity in meaning.  For example, it is useful to discuss the difference between 
something being known precisely and imprecisely, terminology that is not as obviously 
aligned with the word reducible.  Precise is defined as exactly or sharply defined or 
stated and precision is the quality or state of being precise (Merriam-Webster 1993).  
Imprecise is simply not precise and by extension, imprecision is the quality or state not 
being exactly or sharply defined or stated.  This is exactly what needs to be captured in 
engineering design.  If an engineer lacks knowledge about some parameter, it is not 
sharply defined; as more information becomes available, the parameter becomes more 
sharply defined until it is known precisely.  Until that point, the presence of imprecision 
represents the lack of complete information, which is also an opportunity to collect more 
information; when an engineer fails to recognize imprecision, he or she may also fail to 
recognize the need for additional information.  
As with the distinctions of aleatory versus epistemic and reducible versus 
irreducible, there are cases when the distinction between imprecision and irreducible 
uncertainty is not clear.  This does not, however, imply that they are identical, and 
certainly is not proof that they should be modeled in exactly the same way.  However, it 
does suggest that as imprecision reduces, the model of total uncertainty should approach 
a model of pure irreducible uncertainty.  The modeling of uncertainty is addressed at 
length Chapter 3. 
Previous work has examined imprecision in preferences (Otto and Antonsson 
1992, Antonsson and Otto 1995), but in that literature the word imprecision is used in a 
slightly different, though related way that is applicable only to preferences.  This 
dissertation focuses on a more fundamental and general problem that subsumes 
imprecision in preferences, and it is assumed that preferences are known precisely. 
Additional arguments for the explicit consideration of imprecision separately 
from irreducible uncertainty are made in the following chapter, focusing on the context of 
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specific uncertainty representations (such as probability theory).  However, before 
discussing representations, the consideration of imprecision is justified by describing the 
many sources of imprecision in engineering design. 
2.4 Sources of imprecision in engineering design 
Almost every aspect of the engineering design problem introduces imprecision5.  
Figure 1.3 on page 8 provides a nice context for exploring these sources.  Specifically: 
1. Sequential decision making introduces imprecision because the results of future 
decisions are unknown. 
2. Statistical data from finite samples of environmental factors are inherently 
imprecise. 
3. Bounded rationality leads to imprecise subjective probabilities. 
4. Expert opinion and judgments are not precise, due to lack of information or 
conflict. 
5. Behavioral simulations and analysis models are imprecise abstractions of reality. 
6. Preferences may be imprecise due to bounded rationality or non-stationarity. 
7. Numerical implementation of these models introduces additional imprecision. 
The following sub-sections are an elaboration on how these sources introduce 
imprecision into the design process. 




5 Most of this section was previously published in a workshop paper and presentation 
(Aughenbaugh and Paredis 2006b)  
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2.4.1 Sequential decision making 
As noted in Section 1.1.2, the complexity of the design problem makes it 
impossible to arrive at an optimal design in one step.  Instead, the process is divided into 
a sequence of decisions.  This process is illustrated using a simple design problem with 
two design variables: vehicle type and engine type.  There are two options for vehicle 
type: car or bike.  There are three options for engine type: gasoline engine, diesel engine, 
or electric motor.  If the DM chooses the design in one step, he or she would choose from 
the set of six design alternatives shown in Figure 2.2.  In the context of this example, 
each of these design alternatives is a fully detailed design of a final product.   
In order to choose the best design out of these six, the DM would need to evaluate 
and compare all six.  While easy in this simple example, it is impractical to enumerate 
and evaluate all design alternatives by considering all possible combinations of all 
solution principles for all the subsystems of a complex product.  Consequently, the 
decisions are broken down into sequences to allow for efficient exploration of the design 
space.  For example, in the previous vehicle design example, a DM can follow a 






























Figure 2.3.  Sequential decisions 
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type, as shown in Figure 2.3.   
Note that it is important here to distinguish clearly between decision alternatives 
and design alternatives.  A design alternative is one of the possible complete product 
design specifications (recall Figure 2.2), while each decision alternative is a specific 
option for a specific decision and corresponds to a set of design alternatives.  For 
example, when choosing the vehicle type, the DM has two decision alternatives: car or 
bike.  Each of these decision alternatives actually corresponds to a set of design 
alternatives, as shown in Figure 2.4.   
The choice of decision alternative car for vehicle type includes the gas car, diesel 
car, and electric car design alternatives, because the decision about vehicle type will be 
followed by the decision about engine type.  Once a decision is made to pursue, for 
example, a car design rather than a bike, the DM does not need to consider explicitly the 
design alternatives of gas bike, electric bike, and diesel bike; these design alternatives are 
eliminated from consideration. 
One limitation of a sequential decision process is that decisions often are coupled.  
In general, one really needs to know the outcome of future decisions to select the best (or 
most preferred) decision alternative for the current decision.  For example, a fully 
designed car will have a certain maximum horsepower, but this certain value is unknown 
when the vehicle type decision is made (Figure 2.3), because it depends on the future 
 









Figure 2.4.  Decision alternatives and sets of design alternatives 
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design decision of engine type.  The set of car designs in Figure 2.4 has multiple 
horsepower maxima, each corresponding to a sub-design (gas car, electric car, and diesel 
car).  Thus, when selecting type car rather than bike, a DM is not selecting a precisely 
characterized horsepower, but rather a set or interval of horsepower.  In a more complex 
problem, imprecision will remain once the engine type is chosen because a particular 
engine type is a set of designs.  For example, even if a gas engine is chosen, 
characteristics such as horsepower, torque, mass, and fuel efficiency will be inherently 
imprecise because they depend on additional details of the design. 
The inherent existence of sets in sequential decision making demonstrates the 
need to compute with intervals, sets, or information that otherwise is characterized 
imprecisely.  However, other sources of imprecision are independent of the existence of 
sets of design alternatives.  These may have different characteristics and may affect the 
design process differently, as described in the following. 
2.4.2 Limited statistical data 
In order to support decisions, engineers frequently gather statistical data about 
uncontrollable factors such as the environment.  Such quantitative data gives an illusion 
of being well-characterized, but actually it is inherently imprecise.  Assume one needs to 
design a pressure vessel, and the vessel will be made of a new type of steel for which the 
yield strength X  is not well characterized.  Engineers have strong theoretical evidence 
that the material strength is normally distributed, but they do not know the mean μ  or 
variance 2σ  of the distribution.  Because the material is new and testing is relatively 
expensive, the engineers have only measured the yield strength in a set Σ  of n  
independent tension tests, where n  is a relatively small number due a high cost of testing.  
These tests can at best give an estimate of the true distribution, so in addition to inherent 
randomness (irreducible uncertainty), engineers also face imprecision—they cannot 
characterize the parameters of the random variable precisely.   
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For example, assume the engineers have a set of 30 material strength 
measurements.  They could use the 30 samples to estimate the true mean and variance of 
the distribution using standard statistics.  However, these estimates ( μ̂  and 2σ̂ ) are 
exactly that—estimates.  The resulting distribution 2ˆ ˆ~ ( , )X N μ σ  in general is not the 
true distribution.  Alternatively, confidence intervals can be constructed on the true mean 
and variance at the α  confidence level as follows, where n  is the number of samples and 
s  is the sample standard deviation (Hines, et al. 2003), / 2, 1ntα −  is the t -statistic and 
2
2, 1nαχ −  the Chi-squared statistic (tables of these statistics are found in most statistics 
books, such as (Devore 1995, Hines, et al. 2003): 
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⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ = − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (2.1) 








n s n s
α α
σ σ
χ χ− − −
⎡ ⎤− −⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. (2.2) 
These confidence intervals for the parameters represent imprecision in the 
knowledge of their true values.  Returning to the definition of imprecision, the parameters 
are not defined exactly or sharply, but rather imprecisely using intervals.  With finite data 
(a definite practical constraint), theses parameters can never be known exactly, although 
an engineer may decide to model them as such.  Common practice frequently does just 
this, assuming away imprecision; this dissertation shows that this assumption can 
sometimes be costly (0). 
In this section, the focus was on statistical data, emphasizing a rather frequentist 
interpretation of probability—an interpretation in which a probability represents a long-
run relative frequency.  Often, a subjective interpretation is more applicable.  The specific 
meaning of frequentist probabilities and subjective probabilities, as well as other 
interpretations of probabilities, is discussed in much greater depth in Section 3.3.3.  
Section 3.3.3 also contain a discussion of the appropriateness of various interpretations.  
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For now, it suffices to state that if either interpretation is adopted, there can be 
imprecision in the knowledge of the probabilities. 
2.4.3 Imprecise subjective probabilities 
Proponents of a subjective interpretation of probability assert that there is no such 
thing as a true or objective probability, but rather probabilities are an expression of belief 
based on an individual’s willingness to bet (de Finetti 1974, Lindley 1982b, Winkler 
1996) (see also Section 3.3.3.3).  One of the subjectivists’ primary arguments against a 
frequentist perspective is the absence of truly repeatable events, especially in practical 
problems.  For example, the probability that Team A beats Team B in a basketball game 
has no real meaning under a frequentist interpretation, because that event—that particular 
game—will occur exactly once; there is no long-run relative frequency.  In this context, 
the notion of a long term frequency, and even random events, is meaningless (de Finetti 
1974).  However, many people are willing to express their belief of who will win in terms 
of bets.  When framed appropriately, such bets can be taken as subjective probabilities. 
In order for subjective probabilities to be precise, the decision maker (DM) must 
fully elicit his or her betting behavior.  In other words, for any given gamble, the DM 
must be able to state his or her fair price—the price at which the DM is willing to take 
either side (selling or buying) of the bet.  For example, consider the toss of  thumbtack 
(Walley 1991).  A DM is asked to state the probability that the tack lands pin-up.  This 
may require the DM to think very hard about the gamble.  The DM may also want to 
collect additional information about the problem before making a decision.  These steps 
cost time and other resources.  However, the DM may easily be able to state the 
probability of the tack landing pin-up is between 0.2 and 0.8.  This interval is a form of 
an imprecise probability, an uncertainty model introduced in Section 3.4. 
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2.4.4 Expert opinion 
A significant source of information in engineering design are experts who use 
their knowledge and experience to form judgments, beliefs, and estimates (Cooke 1991, 
Ayyub 2001, Coolen 2004).  Information from expert opinions is inherently imprecise.  
First, opinions may not always be cited precisely, especially when expressed in vague 
linguistic terms, such as unlikely, large, or poor, a case in which fuzzy set theory may 
have a role (Zadeh 1965, Ayyub 2001) (see also Section 3.2.1).  Because an opinion 
about the world is not necessarily the truth of the world, opinions also can differ from 
person to person.  Often, these opinions will conflict.  For example, two experts are asked 
the probability that a quantity X is below 5; that is, { 5}P X < .  The first expert says that 
{ 5} 0.3P X < =  (and consequently { 5} 0.7P X ≥ = ).  The second expert states that 
{ 5} 0.6P X < =  (and consequently { 5} 0.4P X ≥ = ).  Does { 5} 0.3P X < =  or does 
{ 5} 0.6P X < = ?  Maybe the best characterization of the expert knowledge is to say that 
0.3 { 5} 0.6P X≤ < ≤ , or it is imprecisely known that { 5} [0.3,0.6]P X < = .  The 
combination of such evidence, especially when conflicting, is an important research area, 
often focused on Evidence Theory (Dempster 1967, Shafer 1976, Yager, et al. 1994b, 
Oberkampf and Helton 2002, Mourelatos and Zhou 2005a) [see also Section 3.2.3].  This 
issue arises for all information theories and uncertainty models.     
2.4.5 Imprecise analysis models 
An important step in decision making and design is to determine the DM’s 
preferences over design alternatives.  The DM’s preferences are determined by attributes 
(e.g. performance) of the design alternatives.    As illustrated back in Figure 1.3, the 
determination of the DM’s preferences between design alternatives involves the 
application of multiple models: simulation models that predict the performance of the 
alternatives, models for the uncertain inputs to these behavioral models, and models of 
the DM’s preferences.   
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Behavioral models predict the performance of design alternatives in terms of 
attributes that are important to the DM, such as physical behavior, cost, and reliability.  
Since these models, like all models, are only an abstraction of reality, they are imprecise 
(Parry 1996).  Specifically, although the laws of physics are known very precisely, one 
often makes significant assumptions when applying the laws of physics to complex 
geometries, or one omits certain known—but less significant—physical phenomena from 
the model to reduce the complexity.   
For example, a model for an internal combustion engine is often abstracted into an 
algebraic relationship between engine speed and torque.  The detailed physical 
phenomena (including airflow, gas-mixture combustion, friction, and inertia) are reduced 
into one simple algebraic relationship.  This simple relationship is an idealization that 
may contain a significant error—the unknown or unmodeled relationships between a 
variety of parameters that play a role in the engine performance, such as air density, 
acceleration, or engine temperature.  The lack of knowledge of the influence of these 
parameters on engine performance results in imprecision in the model’s predictions.  
Since there is no probability distribution associated with such modeling and systematic 
errors, one cannot express the likelihood of occurrence for a particular error but can at 
best bound the size of the error, in which case the errors should be represented in terms of 
interval-based uncertainty. 
In addition to the imprecision in the behavioral models themselves, there is often 
also significant imprecision in the parameter values or inputs to these models.  For 
example, the air resistance model of a car may include a drag coefficient, which can only 
be determined precisely through experimentation that is more extensive.  Given the 
limited resources (cost, time, etc.) available for experimentation, the coefficient is only 
determined up to certain error bounds, which introduces additional imprecision in to the 
model predictions.  There may also be stochastic environmental noise parameters; in 
addition to the inherent variability of such parameters, they will be imprecisely 
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characterized, as described in the preceding sections for statistical data or subjective 
probabilities. 
2.4.6 Imprecise preferences 
Once the performance attributes of a particular design alternative have been 
determined, they are combined in a preference model to form a measure (such as 
expected utility) of the DM’s overall preference for the specific alternative, as is 
illustrated in Figure 1.3.  Keeney and Raiffa (1993) propose a method for developing 
such a preference model by eliciting preferences with respect to single attributes, 
expressing the preferences under uncertainty in utils, and then combining the utility 
functions of the multiple attributes into an overall utility function.  Due to resource 
constraints, such a complete elicitation and precise characterization is unachievable in 
practice.  Instead, the preference model is an imprecise abstraction based on limited 
preference elicitations.  Other literature has examined incomplete or partial information 
[see (Weber 1987) for a review] in the context of imprecisely characterized preferences 
(Otto and Antonsson 1992, Carnahan, et al. 1994, Seidenfeld, et al. 1995) and unknown 
weights for tradeoffs between objectives in multi-attribute decision making (Kirkwood 
and Sarin 1985).   
There is also evidence that people cannot express their preferences well in a 
rational fashion.  When presented with choices between which a rational decision maker 
should be indifferent, even knowledgeable experts with a strong background in decision 
theory often judge the choices differently  (Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  This 
psychological evidence suggests that the environment and manner in which a choice is 
posed affects the elicited action, and thus choices are not a perfect indication of 
preference.  It is also possible that preferences are non-stationary, meaning they vary over 
time.  Even if they are reasonably stationary over a relevant time horizon, practical and 
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psychological evidence strongly suggest that preferences can only be modeled 
imprecisely. 
2.4.7 Numerical calculations 
This source of imprecision is probably the most familiar in engineering design, 
but possibly the least significant.  The calculations implemented on a digital computer are 
only precise up to the machine’s numerical precision.  In practice, modern computers 
have a very high precision, and this effect is generally not important, especially in 
comparison to the other sources of imprecision in engineering design.  For example, 
consider the use of a model to calculate some parameter.  It often does not matter whether 
the numerical solution of this model is within 10-10 or 10-15 of the model’s “true” answer, 
because the model being used is already imprecise; moving to 10-15 accuracy just means 
that one would know the model’s wrong answer better; it provides no further insight into 
the true answer for the real system. 
Imprecision also can arise with the use of numerical methods, which are used to 
approximate analytical solutions when analytical methods are unavailable.  Some of these 
methods are not guaranteed to converge on the exact solution for certain problems, and 
thus introduce considerable uncertainty that an analyst must explore.  Other methods 
converge on the true solution, but this convergence is not exact in most algorithms; there 
is usually a tolerance set in them as a stopping criterion.  For example, an iterative 
method may terminate when the solution changes by less than some small amount over 
several iterations.  Consequently, the solution is known imprecisely.  While these 
computational issues are of some interest, it is again believed that the imprecision they 
introduce often is inconsequential compared to imprecision from other sources.   
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2.5 Summary 
The first motivating question of the dissertation asks what are the fundamental 
characteristics of uncertainty in the context of engineering design?  The recognition of a 
lack of information, including recognition of the opportunity to reduce that lack of 
information, is an important motivation for recognizing two characteristics of uncertainty.  
Essentially, if imprecision is ignored, then everything appears to be precise—exactly or 
sharply defined.  If everything is always known precisely, then there is never a need to 
collect information.  It then follows that everything is already known, a clear 
contradiction with reality.  Consequently, the recognition of imprecision in information is 
a necessary step in uncertainty and information management.   
The remainder of this dissertation contains a search for methods to incorporate 
imprecision into engineering decision making and a demonstration of the value of so 
doing.  An important step in the process is establishing a mathematical model of 
uncertainty that allows distinctions between irreducible uncertainty and imprecision to be 
made, such that the two characteristics of uncertainty to be considered separately.  This is 











In the previous chapter, the nature and sources of uncertainty in engineering 
design were considered.  If engineers are to make good design decisions, they need 
means for representing these uncertainties and incorporating them into the decision 
process.  Along these lines, this chapter contains a preliminary answer to the second 
motivating question of the dissertation: 
What is the most appropriate and general model of 
uncertainty for engineering design? 
Section 3.1 contains a discussion of the importance, in addition to clearly defined 
axioms and calculi, of well-defined interpretations for any mathematical representation or 
model.  Section 3.2 contains introductions and discussions of several uncertainty model, 
specifically fuzzy sets, possibility theory, and evidence theory.  In Section 3.3, traditional 
probability theory is introduced.  Specific attention is paid to interpretations of 
probability and the applicability of these interpretations to engineering design.  In Section 
3.4, the theory of imprecise probabilities is described and an argument is made in favor of 
imprecise probabilities as a useful, general model of uncertainty.  Finally, Section 3.6 
contains a development of a general mathematical formulation of decision making under 
uncertainty.   
3.1 The importance of well-defined interpretations 
An important distinction to make when modeling uncertainty is between a 




Smith (2001) define four distinct levels that must be addressed for a theory of any type of 
uncertainty to be complete: 
1. Define an appropriate mathematical representation of that uncertainty 
2. Develop a calculus by which that uncertainty can be manipulated 
3. Define a meaningful way of measuring the uncertainty in any situation 
formalizable by the theory 
4. Develop methodological aspects of the theory, including procedures for 
making the various uncertainty principles operational within the theory 
For example, consider traditional probability theory.  This is a specific theory of 
uncertainty with clearly defined axioms (definition of representation) and a clearly 
defined calculus that is consistent with those axioms (see Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for 
more).  To many scientists and engineers, the combination of these axioms and this 
calculus are probability; anything that satisfies these axioms and obeys this calculus can 
be considered a probability.  But how can the probability of some event be measured?  
What does a particular probability mean?   These questions are not answered by the 
axioms and calculus.   
Most engineering design literature focuses on the mathematical representations 
and calculus of methods, with much less attention given to the interpretation of the results 
of these calculations.  However, if one does not know what something is or how to 
measure it, then he or she cannot use it to help make a decision, regardless of how well 
the  mathematics are defined. 
In order for a formalism to be acceptable for practical use, it is not necessary that 
only one interpretation be consistent with the axioms and calculus.  However, it is 
necessary that at least one unambiguous interpretation is consistent with the axioms and 
the calculus. This interpretation must be clearly defined such that when the formalism is 
used, the interpretation can be clearly stated and clear meaning conveyed.  According to 




process of measuring it—step 3 in Klir and Smith (2001)—is defined, as explained in the 
following subsection. 
3.1.1 Operational definitions in science 
In order for a model of uncertainty to be complete, a clearly defined operational 
interpretation what that model captures is necessary.  The notion of an operational 
definition was first formalized by Bridgeman (1927).  Bridgeman’s work was primarily 
in the area of the philosophy and logic of “modern” physics, where “modern” at the time 
(ca. 1927) meant resolving the issues that existed between classical physics and the newer 
theories of relativity.  For example, Einstein’s exposition of relativity called into question 
traditionally held notions of length and time.  Physicists were left asking, “what is 
length?” 
Bridgeman writes the following: 
We evidently know what we mean by length if we can tell 
what the length of any and every object is....To find the 
length of an object, we have to perform certain physical 
operations.  The concept of length is therefore fixed when 
the operations by which length is measured are fixed:  that 
is, the concept of length involves as much as and nothing 
more than the set of operations by which length is 
determined.  In general, we mean by any concept nothing 
more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous 
with the corresponding set of operations. 
Stevens (1935, 1936, 1939) [see (Hardcastle 1995) for a synopsis of this work], in 
writings focusing on psychology rather than physics, developed a similar notion of 
operationism that emphasized the need for agreement in science as to what something is.  




an operational definition of a quantity is a set of operations, or a procedure, by which that 
quantity can be measured.  If a procedure is clearly defined, then the quantity is uniquely 
determined by that procedure. 
If a concept is defined using multiple procedures, then there is a chance of 
ambiguity and confusion, because different procedures may lead to different results—one 
procedure may measure one length, and another procedure may lead to a different length 
Bridgeman (1927) uses an example of measuring length of an object using a pole of set 
length versus measuring the object’s length using light and optics; the optical method can 
deviate from the pole approach due to relativistic effects from the motion of Earth’s 
rotation.  When conveying a length measurement, absolute rigor requires conveying the 
operational definition to which the length corresponds.  
3.1.2 The role of the observer in science 
A clearly stated operational definition does not remove all ambiguity.  For 
example, assume that the definition of length included an operation such as “count the 
number of times your left foot fits linearly along a side of the object.”  Although simple, 
this is an operational definition of length, but confusion can arise when two people 
attempt to measure the length of an object.   
For example, Analyst 1 measures a box and determines it is a cube with sides of 
length 2 feet.  Analyst 2 measures the same box and determines it is a cube with sides of 
length 2.2 feet.  How can the same box have different lengths?  It turns out that each 
analyst uses his (or her) own left foot as the base unit.  Is this an operational definition?  
In a sense it is operational, but it is not absolute.  Based on this definition, the length of 
an object varies based on who measures it. 
The introduction of the theory of relativity into physics emphasized the role of the 
observer in science.  This was a consequence of Einstein’s analysis of the meaning of 




“…the operations which enable two events to be described as simultaneous involve 
measurements on the two events made by an observer, so that ‘simultaneity’ is, therefore, 
not an absolute property of the two events and nothing else, but must also involve the 
relation of the events to the observer.”  It is thus clear that observers play a role in 
science, a fact that is frequently overlooked.  Many researchers seek a purely objective 
view of science in which all observers observe the same events and reach the same 
conclusions.  However, the role of the observer in a measurement actually does not 
exclude that measurement from a scientific process. 
3.1.3 Standards of measurement 
The example definition of length in terms of one’s own left foot is operational and 
theoretically defensible, but practically it is not very useful due to a lack of transferability 
and difficulty in repetition of measurements.  Analyst 1 could repeat Analyst 2’s 
measurement of length, assuming that Analyst 1 has access to Analyst 2’s measuring 
stick, i.e. his or her left foot.  To be more practical, physical quantities usually are 
operationally defined in terms of standard reference materials, such as those maintained 
in the United States by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.  These 
standard reference materials are certified as having specific characteristics and are used 
as calibration standards for other measuring devices.  In essence, a standard reference 
material for length would define exactly what a “foot” is, and all length measurements 
reported in units of feet should match the prescribed operations for measuring length in 
term of this standard.   
It is noted that a quantity could have multiple operational definitions and even 
multiple standards; for example, anyone can define their own operations for measuring 
length, but this definition will not be understood—and worse, could be misunderstood as 
something else—by most other people.  Over time, this definition could become the new 




meter has changed over time, variously being defined as the length of pendulum with 
period of 2 seconds, one ten-millionth of the length of the earth’s meridian along one-
fourth the polar circumference, a particular platinum metre bar placed in the National 
Archives in France, and the length of the path traveled by a particular wavelength of light 
in vacuum during a time interval of 1/299,792,458 of a second (2006).  To be precise, 
someone must declare what standard meter he or she is using.  However, only the 
existence of operational definitions and standards makes such clarity possible. 
3.1.4 Operational definitions for uncertainty models 
Cooke (2004) provides an clever example of the importance of clear definitions.  
He begins his paper with the following anecdote: 
I asked Didier Dubois at a 1996 meeting of the European 
Fusion work group in Lecoutre, France: “How many legs 
does a squizzel have?” 
He answered: “First tell me what a squizzel is.” 
Right answer. But instead of telling him, I said: “Well, just 
use your own idea of what you think a squizzel is, and tell 
me how many legs it has.” 
Interpreting this example, if Cooke and Dubois have entirely different definitions 
of what a squizzel is, then Dubois’ answer (regarding the number of legs) is useless to 
Cooke.  Perhaps Dubois defines a squizzel as a type of spider, and Cooke defines a 
squizzel as a type of primate; then Dubois’s belief in the number of legs a spider has is of 
absolutely no help to Cooke’s goal of determining the number of legs a primate has.  




important decision, because Cooke has no idea of what Dubois was thinking when he 
answered Cooke’s question.   
This example focused purely on the semantics of language, but the same holds for 
the semantics of formalisms: if two individuals cannot communicate a particular meaning 
of information, then the information is useless.  Consider the following survey questions: 
 What is the probability that it rains tomorrow? 
 What is the possibility that it rains tomorrow? 
 What is your belief that it will rain tomorrow? 
How likely is it to rain tomorrow? 
Perhaps the responses given are, respectively: 0.6, 0.8, I think it will rain, and 
likely.  What do these mean?  How might they affect a decision maker’s (DM’s) actions? 
 Consider another example inspired by Cooke’s squizzel example.  A DM 
is presented with two gambles: 
•  Gamble 1 pays $100 if event A occurs, zero dollars otherwise. 
•  Gamble 2 pays $150 if event B occurs, zero dollars otherwise. 
The decision maker is also told that the fadizzle of event A is 0.6 and the fadizzle 
of event B is 0.3.  Which gamble should the DM choose?  Clearly that depends at least in 
part on what a fadizzle is.  If the DM, the reader, and the author all have different 
operations for measuring fadizzles, then a fadizzle is not a useful measurement unit or 
description of an event.  If a clear, operational definition is developed, then the DM, 
reader, and the author could all adopt the same definition.   Then we would all know how 
to measure a fadizzle with respect to a particular observer and might be able to use this 





In summary, whatever representation of uncertainty is chosen for use in 
engineering design, it must have both a well defined mathematical representation and a 
well defined operational definition of its currency, or metric (e.g. foot, meter, 
probability).  In this dissertation, a quantity will be considered to have a sufficient 
operational definition if there is an unambiguous way to determine the value of that 
quantity in a given scenario.  Also, the operational definition used to express the value of 
a quantity should be conveyed with the value.  If no operational definition exists, 
communication of meaning is impossible.  In this case, the representation has no use in 
decision making, and by extension, no use in engineering design (until an operational 
definition is described).   
3.2 Survey of uncertainty representations 
The most familiar and commonly used theory of uncertainty is the probability 
theory that satisfies the axioms of Kolmogorov (1956).  Given its widespread use, 
probability will be taken as the baseline method for mathematically modeling uncertainty 
in engineering design.  A more extensive overview and discussion of probability theory is 
given in Section 3.3.  Initially, it is sufficient to say that probability theory has a well 
defined calculus and at least one well-defined, operational interpretation.   
However, various other methods have been developed for representing 




1978, Nikolaidis, et al. 2004, Mourelatos and Zhou 2005b), fuzzy measures6 (Sugeno 
1977), the transferable belief model (Smets 1990), Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory 
(Shafer 1976, 1992), various theories of imprecise probabilities (Sarin 1978, Good 1983, 
Kyburg 1987, Walley 1991, Weichselberger 2000), and theories of (credal) sets of 
probabilities (Tintner 1941, Hart 1942, Levi 1974).  The question addressed in this 
chapter is, “do these methods have significant advantages over probability theory?”  This 
section contains a summary of the applicability of some of the most commonly 
considered methods, specifically fuzzy sets, possibility theory, and evidence theory.  
Subsequent sections contain discussions of probability theory and imprecise probability 
theory. 
3.2.1 Fuzzy sets 
Lotfi Zadeh introduced fuzzy set theory as an extension of classical set theory 
(1965).   This section is not a detailed mathematical description of fuzzy set theory, but 
rather it is intended only to provide a high-level introduction to the concepts.   
In classical set theory, an element’s membership in a set is binary; it is either in 
the set (in which case the membership is 1), or it is not in the set (in which case the 
membership is 0).  Fuzzy set theory allows for partial membership, meaning an element’s 
membership in a set can be any real-value in the closed interval [0, 1].   




6 Fuzzy measures are a generalization related to monotone measure theory; the presence 
of the word “fuzzy” in the term “fuzzy measure” is a bit unfortunate, as it does not rely 
on fuzzy set theory for its rigor.  Fuzzy measures are mentioned for completeness but 
are not necessary for understanding this dissertation and do not provide a model of 
uncertainty, but require refinement into particular fuzzy measures such as probability 
theory and possibility theory.  See (Mourelatos and Zhou 2005b) for a good summary of 




Fuzzy set theory is tightly coupled with fuzzy logic.  In traditional Boolean logic, 
a statement is true (and has truth value 1), or it is false (and has truth value 0).  Fuzzy 
logic extends the notion of truth and falsehood, such that a statement can “sort of” be true 
and take a truth value between zero and one.  The connection between fuzzy logic and 
fuzzy sets is relatively straightforward at a high level.  In classic logic, the proposition 
“Element b  is a member of set F ” would have a truth value of either zero or one, but in 
fuzzy logic, it can take a fuzzy truth value of any real number in the interval [0, 1].  For 
example, if one states that the fuzzy truth value of 0.3 is assigned to the proposition 
“Element b  is a member of set F ”, then one is stating that element b  is partially a 
member of set F , thus making the set F  in some way fuzzy since the boundary of 
membership is not clearly demarcated. 
The clearest application of fuzzy set theory is in linguistics.  Language is inherent 
vague, where vague means not clearly expressed or not having precise meaning 
(Merriam-Webster 1993).  Language can also be considered ambiguous, where 
ambiguous means capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or ways 
(Merriam-Webster 1993).  For example, if a man is described as being tall, what is his 
height?  What is the minimum height that he can be and qualify as tall?  There is no 
universally accepted answer.  Different people will provide different answers.   
In a classroom setting, the concept of fuzzy memberships is often introduced via 
an experiment.  Each member of the class receives a piece of paper containing a table 
similar to the one shown in Table 3.1.  Each student is asked to place a checkmark in row 
2 under each height that he or she considers “tall”, and do the same in row 3 for each 
height he or she considers “short,” such as shown in the table.  The instructor then 
compiles the results into a second table that displays the fraction of the class that checked 




The values shown in Table 3.2 approximate the membership function of heights 
into the set “tall” and the set “short”.  For example, height “5 feet, 6 inches” has a 
membership of 0.3 in short, and a membership of 0.0 in tall.  Height “5 feet, 9 inches” 
has a member of 0.1 in short and a member of 0.05 in tall.  This is an interesting aspect of 
fuzzy set theory—an element can have partial membership in multiple sets, including sets 
that are generally thought of as mutually exclusive.    
Fuzzy logic has been used with great success in the form of fuzzy controllers that 
generalize expert controllers (Lee 1990).  A common example in this area is an inverted 
pendulum.  In order to stabilize an inverted pendulum in the upward position, a control 
force must be applied to overcome disturbances and gravity.  A simple expert rule might 
say something like, “if the pendulum is moving quickly in the counterclockwise 
direction, hit it hard in the clockwise direction.”  Another simple rule might say, “if the 
pendulum is moving slowly in the counterclockwise direction, hit it softly in the 
clockwise direction.”  What exactly is meant by quickly, hard, slowly, and softly?  Even 
if these speeds and forces are defined, what about values in between?  Fuzzy logic is 
 
Table 3.1.  Fuzzy set example, human height survey example response 
height 4’6’’ 4’9’’ 5’ 5’3’’ 5’6’’ 5’9 6’ 6’3’’ 6’6’’ 6’9’’ 7’ 
tall?         √ √ √ 
short? √ √ √ √        
 
 
Table 3.2.  Fuzzy set example, tabulated frequencies from human height survey 
height 4’6’’ 4’9’’ 5’ 5’3’’ 5’6’’ 5’9 6’ 6’3’’ 6’6’’ 6’9’’ 7’ 
tall? 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.15 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.0 





often used to interpolate between these already vaguely defined values. 
Despite the value of fuzzy set theory in control applications and linguistics, it is 
limited in its applications to representing uncertainty in general.  To date, there has been 
no general, operational definition given to membership values when there is no linguistic 
population to sample—what does it mean to say that the membership of b  in set F  is 0.3 
rather than 0.4?  How can the membership of  b  in set F  be measured?  It is true that for 
a particular set F , a scale could be constructed.  For example, the membership function 
for tall was constructed using a particular method.  In this linguistic context, a loosely 
operational definition of the membership of an element in a particular set was given; the 
membership of a particular height in the set tall was defined as the fraction of people in a 
control group who say that a man of that height is tall.  No clear generalization of this 
definition is available, and many publications use fuzzy membership functions without 
making any effort to form a general interpretation.   
3.2.2 Possibility theory 
Possibility theory was first advanced by Zadeh (1978) as a tool for representing 
information expressed in terms of fuzzy measures, and has since been examined most 
fully by Dubois and Prade (1988).  Useful overviews of possibility theory in engineering 
applications are given in (Nikolaidis, et al. 2004, Joslyn and Booker 2005).  Three views 
of possibility theory have been advanced.  The first is Zadeh’s fuzzy set basis for 
possibility (1978).  Another view is that possibility is the limit of the plausibility of 
nested bodies of evidence [for example (Klir 1992)], an aspect of Evidence Theory 
addressed in Section 3.2.3.  A third view, given by (Giles 1982), is that a possibility is an 
upper probability, similar to the upper probabilities formalized by Walley (1991) and 
introduced in Section 3.4 of this dissertation.   
The first of these interpretations (Zadeh’s) is the most commonly adopted.  Some 




their analysis, only to ignore this interpretation when it becomes convenient—but 
incorrect—to do so.  The third interpretation is not seen in the engineering literature, and 
it is generalized by the imprecise probability theory discussed in Section 3.4. 
3.2.2.1 Basics of possibility theory 
Possibility theory was first advanced by Zadeh (1978) as a tool for representing 
information expressed in terms of fuzzy measures.  Possibility theory defines a mapping 
: 2 [0,1]ΩΠ →  called the possibility measure, defined on a space Ω  with ( )AΠ  for 
A⊆Ω  being the degree of the possibility that A  occurs (or is true, if A  is a logical 
proposition).   Possibility theory is defined such that for two sets, A  and B : 
 ( ) max( ( ), ( ))A B A BΠ ∪ = Π Π  (3.1) 
 ( ) min( ( ), ( ))A B A BΠ ∩ = Π Π  (3.2) 
One of the arguments advanced in favor of using possibility theory in engineering 
design is the simplicity of these operations [see for example (Du and Choi 2006)]; they 
are concise and quick, and they involve no joint distributions or other complicated 
relationships.  Some papers also argue that there is a clear relationship between 
probability and possibility theory, and that possibility theory is justified when there is 
little information and probability theory is useful when there is more information (for 
example (Du and Choi 2006)).  This clearly describes a spectrum, with the two theories at 
opposite ends.  However, this relationship is doubtful on two levels, one based on the 
interpretations of the models and one based on the calculi of the two models.   
3.2.2.2 Lack of operational definition of possibility 
First, what is a possibility?  Unless possibilities are given an operational 
definition, it is impossible to use them consistently.  Some authors have advanced a 




which states that anything that is probable must be possible.  This can be interpreted to 
mean that the possibility of any event must be greater than or equal to the probability, or 
that the possibility of any event with non-zero probability is one.  The latter condition is 
often deemed to be too conservative, and thus the former interpretation is adopted by 
default. 
The existence of two interpretations of the possibility-probability consistency 
principles redirects attention of the key open question: what is possibility?  What does it 
mean?  What consequences should it have on behavior?  These issues are frequently 
overlooked in the engineering design literature considering possibility theory, but they 
are essential questions.  Until these questions can be answered, any reasoning in favor of 
possibility theory is specious.   
3.2.2.3 The limitations of the calculus of possibility 
The second objection focuses on the calculus of possibility.  Granted, it is difficult 
to criticize a calculus for numbers that have no operational definition, but the argument 
that possibility theory is an easier way to perform calculations normally performed using 
probability can be countered easily.  Consider two events, A  and B .  These two events 
are not independent, meaning: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )P A B P A P B∩ ≠ ⋅  (3.3) 
Instead, the law of total probability must be used: 
 ( ) ( ) ( | )P A B P B P A B∩ = ⋅  (3.4) 
The relevant question is, how can Equation (3.4) ever reduce to Equation (3.2)?  
This question will be revisited from a different perspective in Section 3.2.3.8 in the 
context of Evidence Theory.  However, the comparison of Equations (3.2) and (3.4) leads 
to the conclusion that possibility theory and probability theory are different, and hence 




correct.  The next subsection contains an expansion of this argument.  However, one 
should note that the failure of possibility to perform probability operations is not 
necessarily a fundamental flaw in the theory, but it does undermine most applications of 
possibility theory to engineering design that have been published to date. 
3.2.2.4 Lack of connection between probability and possibility 
In (Geer and Klir 1992), operations for converting between probabilities and 
possibilities (and back) are defined.  In principle, there is nothing wrong with converting 
one thing into another and using a different calculus for operations in the transformed 
domain than are used in the original domain.  This is the basic idea of mathematical 
techniques such as Fourier or Laplace transform methods.  However, these are analytical 
transforms with rigorous mathematical grounds.  The methods proposed by Geer and Klir  
are merely currency transforms.  By analogy, it is as if the methods tell a DM how to 
convert from dollars to yen and back, but with the conversion being more complicated 
than purely multiplicative.  The transformations of Geer and Klir provide no motivation 
for how the operations shown in Figure 3.1 could ever, let alone always, yield the same 
results.   
 
P (A) P (B)
π(A) π(B)
P( A ∩ B)=P(B)P(A|B)
π(A ∩ B)=min(π(A), π(B))
Transform











The process shown in Figure 3.1 consists of defining three events, A , B , and 
C A B= ∩ .  The probabilities of events A  and B  are known, and the goal is to calculate 
the probability of event C .  Doing this using probabilities requires the use of Equation 
(3.4).  However, if the probabilities are converted to possibilities using methods from 
(Geer and Klir 1992), then it should be possible to calculate the possibility of event C  
using Equation (3.2) and convert this possibility back to a probability, avoiding the use of 
Equation (3.4).  However, this result would imply that no matter what the relationship 
between events A  and B  is (no matter what P(A|B)  equals), the probability of event 
C A B= ∩  remains unchanged, contradicting Equation (3.4). 
3.2.2.5 Comparison between probability and possibility in a design application 
Nikolaidis and co-authors (Nikolaidis, et al. 2004) have directly compared 
probability theory and possibility theory in the context of design against catastrophic 
failure.  They conclude that the two methods attempt to minimize failure in “radically 
different ways”, especially when more than one failure event is involved.  They provide 
one particularly revealing example: 
Consider a highly redundant system that fails only if many 
unfavorable events occur simultaneously. The system 
failure region is usually small, which tends to make the 
probability of failure small, whereas the possibility of 
failure can be still high.  For example, the probability of 
failure of a system of n nominally identical, independent 
components connected in parallel decreases exponentially 
with n, whereas its possibility is equal to the possibility of 
failure of a single component, regardless of n, which is 





The behavior described is a direct consequence of Equations  (3.2) and (3.4), and 
that ( | ) ( )P A B P A=  when events A  and B  are independent. . 
According to arguments such as in (Geer and Klir 1992), it should be possible to 
map the probabilities of failure of each component into possibilities of failure for each 
component (an expanded version of the process in Figure 3.1).  Each of these possibilities 
could then be transformed back into probabilities, but this is mostly irrelevant.  The real 
question is whether such transformations hold through mathematical operations in each 
domain, which it is relatively clear from the Nikolaidis and co-authors example 
(Nikolaidis, et al. 2004) is in general not true.  Until such difficulties are resolved, any 
work drawing relationships between probabilities and possibilities is highly questionable.  
Nikolaidis et al. emphasize this point in one direction, but as described above, the 
converse clearly holds, too: 
Possibility and probability calculi are fundamentally 
different.  We cannot simulate the results of possibility 
calculus using probability calculus by properly selecting 
the parameters of the probabilistic models. 
The inability of possibility theory to reach an accord with probability theory is not 
a reason to reject the theory in its entirely.  It could be that possibility theory is capable of 
representing a particular type of uncertainty that cannot be modeled accurately with 
probability theory.  However, this returns to the question of what is possibility?  The 
existing literature has not reached a clear operational definition of possibility.  As such, 
uses of possibility theory in design as the only model of uncertainty are certainly 
unjustifiable.   
3.2.2.6 Positive results of using possibility theory in design, existing literature 
Nikolaidis and co-authors (Nikolaidis, et al. 2004) and others (Mourelatos and 




possibility theory in design.  However, of the papers known to the author, only Nikolaidis 
and coauthors have shown this in a rigorous manner with clearly defined assumptions.  
The remainder of the known work, such as (Du and Choi 2006), are fundamentally 
flawed, primarily due to the irresponsible or undefined transforms between probability 
and possibility measures.   
The results of Nikolaidis and coauthors (Nikolaidis, et al. 2004)  indicate that 
possibility theory can sometimes lead to much more conservative or less conservative 
results than probability theory, depending on the circumstances: 
Possibility can be less conservative than probability in risk 
assessment of systems with many failure modes. Possibility-
based methods tend to underestimate the risk of failure of 
such systems, especially if the number of modes is large.  
Possibility tends to yield more conservative estimates of the 
risk of failure for systems for which many unfavorable 
events have to occur simultaneously in order to produce 
failure. An example is a parallel system. 
Nikolaidis and coauthors reach the final conclusion: 
 
If we have enough information about uncertainties and 
accurate predictive models, then probability is 
advantageous. On the other hand, when making design 
decisions under limited information or using crude 
predictive models it may be useful to consider both the 
probability and possibility of failure of a system. 
Phrased differently, the conclusion is basically that when a large amount of 
information is available, probability theory is the best approach.  On the other hand, when 




theory based analysis should be performed, and the design based on the most 
conservative result.   
If a “more conservative of the two” design approach is adopted, the resulting 
design may be overly conservative when the possibility theory model yields the more 
conservative result.  This is a consequence of possibility not having a clearly defined 
operational definition.  If it is not clearly defined, there is no way to determine if the 
result with possibility of failure of x  is too conservative, not conservative enough, or just 
right. 
3.2.2.7 Summary of the value of possibility theory as an uncertainty model 
Until a clear, operational definition is given that is applicable in engineering 
design applications, there is little value in forming design methods based on possibility 
theory.  In the extreme, with no operational definition given to possibilities, an engineer 
can assume whatever values he or she wants, as the values have no intrinsic connection to 
the environment or his or her own beliefs and behaviors. 
3.2.3 Evidence theory 
Evidence theory, also referred to Dempster-Shafer theory, was introduced by 
Glenn Shafer (1976) when he expanded the work  of his advisor, Arthur Dempster 
(1967).  However, its roots go back to George Hooper, James Bernoulli, and Johann-
Heinrich Lambert (Shafer 1978, 1986).   
3.2.3.1 Basic set operations 
Evidence theory takes the n  possible outcomes (or states of nature) and forms a 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive set 1{ ,..., }na a  of n -outcomes.  This set is called the 
frame of discernment Θ, and the members of the set are called focal elements.  This is not 
any different from the probability formulation of n  mutually exclusive and exhaustive 




evidence or probability is assigned across these outcomes.  Rather than assigning 
probabilities or belief purely to individual mutually exclusive events, evidence theory 
assigns belief to any element in the power set of outcomes. 
For example, consider the case with 3n = .  Then 1 2 3{ ,  ,  }a a aΘ = , the full list of 
subsets in the power set is 1{ }a , 2{ }a , 3{ }a , 1 2{ ,  }a a , 1 3{ ,  }a a , 2 3{ ,  }a a , 1 2 3{ ,  ,  }a a a .  
Depending on the available evidence, each of these subsets will be supported to some 
degree.  For example, there could be evidence that supports both 1{ }a  and 2{ }a  but not 
3{ }a  and also does not distinguish between 1{ }a  and 2{ }a .  Thus the evidence is for the 
subset 1 2{ ,  }a a  and is assigned using the basic belief mass function. 
3.2.3.2 The basic belief mass function 
The basic belief mass function, also called an m-value and sometimes a basic 
probability assignment, is the amount of evidence specifically and exclusively for a 
particular subset of the frame of discernment.  Similar to probabilities, the sum of the m-
values across all subsets must equal one.  Thus for all subsets A  of the frame Θ : 





The value ( )m A  for a given set A  can be thought of as the fraction of all relevant 
and available evidence that supports a particular member of the frame that belongs to set 
A  but to no particular and distinguishable subset of A .  If no evidence is available, then 
1 2 3({ ,  ,  }) 1m a a a = ; all that is known is that the outcome is in the frame of discernment.   
The additivity rule of evidence theory is shown in Equation (3.5) for 3n = .  
 1 2 3 1 2 1 3 2 3 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( ) ( ,  ) ( , ) ( ,  ) ( ,  ,  ) 1m a m a m a m a a m a a m a a m a a a+ + + + + + =  (3.5) 
For comparison, the additivity rule for probability theory is shown in Equation 
(3.6).   




Unlike basic belief mass, probability must be assigned to a particular focal 
element or basic event.  Basic belief can be assigned to sets of outcomes 1 2{ ,  }a a , 
1 3{ ,  }a a , 2 3{ ,  }a a , 1 2 3{ ,  ,  }a a a as well as the individual outcomes 1{ }a , 2{ }a , and 3{ }a  
to which probability theory is limited.  This added expressiveness can more accurately 
reflect ambiguity. 
3.2.3.3 The belief function 
The belief function is different from the basic belief mass function.  The belief 
function essentially states (for a particular outcome) the minimum possible amount of 
belief in the outcome that could remain after all ambiguity is fully resolved.  
Mathematically, the belief in subset A is given as: 
 ( ) ( )
B A
Bel A m B
⊆
= ∑  (3.7) 
For example, the 1 1({ }) ( )Bel a m a= , since the only subsets of 1{ }a  are 1{ }a  and 
{ }∅ , and ( ) 0m ∅ = .  However, 1 2 1 2 1 2({ , }) ( ) ( ) ({ , })Bel a a m a m a m a a= + + .   
3.2.3.4 The plausibility function 
In contrast to the belief function, the plausibility function is the maximum amount 
of belief that could support an outcome or subset if all ambiguity is resolved in a way that 
supports that outcome or subset.  Mathematically, if A¬  is defined as the set complement 
to the set A , then 
 ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
A B
Pl A m B Bel A
∩ ≠∅
= = − ¬∑  (3.8) 
For example, 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 3({ }) ( ) ({ , } ({ , } ({ , , })Pl a m a m a a m a a m a a a= + + +  because 
the evidence that supports any set containing 1a , such as 1 2{ , }a a , may in fact actually 
support 1{ }a , but the analyst is unsure.  The second equality in Equation (3.8) reflects 
that the plausibility of A  is equal to the fraction of the evidence that is not explicitly 




evidence specifically against A   can never support A .  In other words, a plausibility 
function measures the degree to which evidence does not contradict the belief in an 
outcome. 
3.2.3.5 The ambiguity function 
As explained above, the belief in A , ( )Bel A ),is a minimum or lower bound on 
the evidence for A , and the plausibility, ( )Pl A , is an upper bound.  The lower bound of 
( )Bel A  and upper bound of ( )Pl A  reflect the extremes of how the ambiguity can be 
resolved—either entirely for A  or against A  respectively.  The ambiguity function is 
defined as the difference between the plausibility of A  and the belief in A . 
 in   = ( )  ( )Ambiguity A Pl A Bel A−  (3.9) 
3.2.3.6 Combination of evidence 
One of the original contributions of Dempster and Shafer was a system for 
combining evidence from multiple sources.  The original rule proposed by Dempster 
(1967) is a generalization of Bayes’ rule.  This rule illustrates some of the fundamental 
challenges in combining evidence or subjective information.  Dempster’s Rule, as it is 
called, states that two independent basic-belief functions ( 1m  and 2m ) are combined 
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Dempster’s Rule of Combination has come under significant scrutiny because of 
its seemingly irrational results in the following example, originated by Lotfi Zadeh 




Suppose that a patient is seen by two physicians regarding 
the patient’s neurological symptoms. The first doctor 
believes that the patient has either meningitis with a 
probability of 0.99 or a brain tumor, with a probability of 
0.01. The second physician believes the patient actually 
suffers from a concussion with a probability of 0.99 but 
admits the possibility of a brain tumor with a probability of 
0.01. Using the values to calculate the (brain tumor)m  with 
Dempster’s rule, we find that 
(brain tumor)= (brain tumor)=1m Bel . Clearly, this rule of 
combination yields a result that implies complete support 
for a diagnosis that both physicians considered to be very 
unlikely.  
For the purposes of this dissertation and for comparing uncertainty models, it is 
important to note that the combination of evidence is a separate issue from the 
representation of uncertainty and arises in all uncertainty models (Kacprzyk and Fedrizzi 
1990, Yager, et al. 1994a, Oberkampf and Helton 2002).  It is therefore important not to 
throw the baby out with this bath water; just because Dempster’s rule of combination is 
sometimes invalid does not mean that Evidence Theory is unsuitable as an uncertainty 
model. 
3.2.3.7 Interpretations of basic belief function 
Some people think of evidence theory as merely upper and lower bounds on 
probabilities.  While the results of applying evidence theory are a lower measure and an 
upper measure, they are in general not bounds on probabilities.  Shafer renamed the lower 
measure “belief” in order to avoid this confusion (1992), because Dempster had 
originally introduced a system of “lower probabilities” (Dempster 1967).  Shafer makes it 




probability, because they are not always constructed using probability measures.  While 
there are cases in which the bounds are on probabilities, the power of evidence theory is 
in its generality.  Evidence theory can represent many types of evidence, including 
complete experimental frequency data (such as probabilities), sparse experimental results, 
or expert opinions.  Evidence theory does not define what belief is, but merely provides 
the most general framework for set operations on any units of measurement.  While the 
units of belief do not need to be probabilities, they can be probabilities, as discussed in 
the next subsection. 
3.2.3.8 Probability theory and possibility theory as special cases of Evidence 
Theory 
Probability and possibility theory can both be viewed as special cases of evidence 
theory.   The key is the limitation of the sets and subsets allowed in the problem.  
Consider a case with three focal elements.  In general evidence theory, these three 
elements 1{a } , 2{a } , and 3{a } are assumed to be disjoint, meaning 
i j{a } {a } ,  i j∩ =∅ ≠ .  Probability makes a similar assumption.  In Evidence Theory, 
basic belief mass can be assigned to the power set of these focal elements, meaning all of 
the sets 1 2{ ,  }a a , 1 3{ ,  }a a , 2 3{ ,  }a a ,  in addition to the individual singletons 1{ }a , 2{ }a , 
and 3{ }a .  Probability theory only allows probability to be assigned to the individual 
outcomes 1{ }a , 2{ }a , and 3{ }a .   
For convenience, the notation is now defined such that for a set b , | |b  represents 
the  number of disjoint focal elements in the set.  For example, 1|{ } | 1a =  and 
1 3|{ ,  } | 2a a = .  If it is the case in evidence theory that ( ) 0m b =  for all sets b  such that 
| | 1b > , then evidence theory reduces to probability theory, assuming basic belief is given 
the same operational definition as probability. 
Possibility theory can also be viewed as a special case of evidence theory.  




is nested if (using the example of three focal elements), it is true that the elements can be 
ordered such that 1 2 3c c c⊆ ⊆ .  Taking the power set of evidence theory, if it is defined 
that 1 1{ }c a= , 2 1 2{ , }c a a= , and 3 1 2 3{ , , }c a a a= , then this relationship holds.  If the set 
1 2 3{ , , }C c c c=  is defined, then evidence theory reduces to possibility theory if ( ) 0m b =  
for all b  such that b C⊄  and if possibility is defined as plausibility. 
For example, 1 2 1 2( ) max( ( ), ( ))c c c cΠ ∪ = Π Π .  In Evidence Theory, the 
plausibility of 2 1 2{ , }c a a=  is given by Equation  (3.11), which is found recalling 
Equation (3.8) and the restriction that 2( ) 0m a = , since 2{ }a  is not a subset of C .  
 
2
2 1 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
c b
Pl c m b m a m a a
∩ ≠∅
= = +∑  (3.11) 
Since 1 2c c⊆ , then 1 2 2( ) ( )c c cΠ ∪ =Π .  With possibility defined as plausibility, 
then 1 1( ) ( )c Pl cΠ =  and 2 2( ) ( )c Pl cΠ =  and 1 2 1 2( ) max( ( ), ( ))c c Pl c Pl cΠ ∪ = .  Since 
1
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
c b
Pl c m b m a
∩ ≠∅
= =∑ , from Equation (3.11) it is clear that 1 2( ) ( )Pl c Pl c≤ , and 
hence 1 2 2max( ( ), ( )) ( )Pl c Pl c Pl c= .   
In summary, restricting the focal elements to be nested sets and defining the units 
of possibility to be units of plausibility reduces Evidence Theory to possibility theory.  
Similarly, restricting focal elements to disjoint sets and defining probability as basic 
belief reduces the general Evidence Theory to the specific probability theory.  In this 
context, the stark differences between probability theory and possibility theory are 
revealed in yet another way, once again calling into question transformations between the 
two (Geer and Klir 1992) and existing applications of possibility in engineering design 
such as (Du and Choi 2006). 
3.2.4 Summary of uncertainty representations 
This section has discussed three alternatives to probability theory that have been 
advanced in the literature, and in some cases used successfully in specialized 




established operational interpretation for the units of the measures.  Until such 
interpretations are firmly established and demonstrated, there is little use in considering 
the methods for the complex decision making under uncertainty required in engineering 
design.   
3.3 Probability theory  
Probability is the most generally used model of uncertainty (Winkler 1996), and 
some authors would argue is the only acceptable way to represent and propagate 
uncertainty, as cited in (Cox 1946, Lindley 1982b, Cheeseman 1988, Ferson and 
Ginzburg 1996, Lindley 2000).   
The term “probability” is used informally in common speech to mean many 
things.  It also has several meanings within the uncertainty research community.  
However, when most people refer to probability in a mathematical sense, they are 
referring to one formalization based on Kolmogorov’s axioms (1956).  This is the 
probability theory introduced in most undergraduate probability and statistics courses, 
and this probability theory is clearly an acceptable formulation of the mathematics of 
aleatory uncertainty (inherent randomness).  Other valuable references in foundations of 
probability are DeFinetti (1974, 1975, 1980) and Savage (1972).   
3.3.1 Axioms of probability 
Probability theory is formalized as follows.  In an experiment, the set of all 
possible outcomes is the sample space S .  The outcomes are called events iE , such that 
iE S⊆ .  A probability assigns a number ( )iP E  to the event, such that ( )iP E  is a 
measure of the “probability” that event E will occur.  The assignments of the probability 
function ( )P ⋅  must satisfy three axioms 




 ( ) 0iP E ≥  (3.1) 
2. Normalization:   
 ( ) 1P S =  (3.2) 
3. Additivity: If 1E , 2E ,….are disjoint events (disjoint subsets of S ), then: 











∑∪  (3.3) 











∑∪  (3.4) 
The first two axioms are primarily matters of convenience that have become 


















P E P E
=
≠
= −∑ . (3.6) 
Equivalently, this last equation can be written as ( ) 1 ( )i iP E P E= − ¬ .  Stated in words, 
this means that the probability of event iE  occurring is one minus the probability of 
event iE  not occurring.  This is because { } { } { }i iE E S∪ ¬ =  and due to the normalization 
axiom of Equation (3.2). For clarity, it may help to recall Equation (3.2) and note that for 
disjoint events:  




3.3.2 Basic calculus of probability theory 
The basic calculus of probability for the set operations of union and intersection 
are given in Equations (3.8) and (3.9).  Since these relationships are quite familiar to most 
engineers and are covered in basic probability and statistics courses and books, such as 
(Devore 1995, Hines, et al. 2003), no further details are given here. 
 P(A B)=P(B) P(A|B)∩ ⋅  (3.8) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )P A B P A P B P A B∪ = + − ∩  (3.9) 
3.3.3 Interpretations of probability 
Most engineers are familiar with the mathematics of probability, but many have 
not been formally exposed to the competing interpretations of probability.  The 
philosophical arguments for or against different interpretations can be quite passionate.  
The most important interpretations are the classical, logical, frequentist, propensity, and 
subjective interpretations.  Each of these is described in the following. 
3.3.3.1 Classical interpretation 
The classical interpretation of probability was the original interpretation and 
formalization of probability.  Probability has its roots in games of chance and was first 
developed when gamblers asked Pierre Fermat and other mathematicians to calculate 
exact probabilities in games of chance (Carnap 1950).  Classical probability was most 
formally developed in the writings of Jacob Bernoulli (1713), Thomas Bayes (1764), and 
Pierre Simon de Laplace, with Laplace’s treatise (1951) being the most complete.  A 
fundamental assumption in classical probability is what is often called Laplace’s 
Principle of Insufficient Reason or Principle of Indifference.  This principle states that all 
outcomes are equally probable (Ferson and Ginzburg 1996, Winkler 1996).   
The classical view is more than just an interpretation of probability, it is more 




The theory of chance consists of reducing all the events of 
the same kind to a certain number of cases equally possible, 
that is to say, to such as we may be equally undecided 
about in regard to their existence, and in determining the 
number of cases favorable to the event whose probability is 
sought. The ratio of this number to that of all the cases 
possible is the measure of this probability, which is thus 
simply a fraction whose numerator is the number of 
favorable cases and whose denominator is the number of all 
the cases possible.  
Various objections to this interpretation have been raised, not the least of which is 
the impracticality of requiring equi-probable events.  Various paradoxes and 
inconsistencies have also been raised, including Bertrand’s paradoxes.  As explained by 
von Fraassen (1989), the following example illustrates a paradox.  A factory produces 
cubes with sides of lengths between 0 feet and 1 foot.  The question asks, “What is the 
probability of a given cube having a side-length between 0 and 0.5 feet?”  The immediate 
answer appears to be ½.  However, the scenario can be recast equivalently as follows.  A 
factory produces cubes with surface area per face between 0 and 1 square feet.  The 
question now becomes, “What is the probability that a given cube has face-area of 0.25?”  
The immediate answer now appears to be 0.25.  Is this reasonable?   
As stated, the two scenarios are actually identical.  A cube with side-length 
between 0 and 1 foot has face-area between 0 and 1 square feet.  A cube with side-length 
between 0 and 0.5 feet has face-area between 0 and 0.25 square feet.  So depending on 
how the question is framed, the classical interpretation of probability can yield different 
probabilities for exactly the same problem.  Should the probabilities of the same events 
vary depending on how they are named or described?  This inconsistency is a definite 




A version of the classical interpretation is often adopted in practice when there is 
little or no information available about the probabilities.  With no information suggesting 
an uneven allocation of probabilities, each event is allocated an equal probability.  For 
example, consider the roll of a six-sided die.  Nothing is known about the fairness of the 
die, so how should the probabilities be allocated?  According to the Principle of 
Insufficient Reason, the probabilities should be allocated equally, as in Equation (3.10). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 1/ 6P P P P P P= = = = = =  (3.10) 
Notice that this is the same result as in the case of full knowledge that the die is 
fair.  In variations of classical probability, it is impossible to distinguish complete 
ignorance from complete knowledge of truly equally probable events.  These two 
extremes are modeling the same way, meaning the true state of knowledge is not 
expressed.  In cases where nothing is known, the knowledge is severely overstated, and 
the model is not conservative.   
Carnap argues that the Principle of Insufficient Reason should at most be used in 
cases of obvious symmetry in the problem, such as the faces of a die or the sections of a 
roulette wheel (Carnap 1950).  Otherwise, the probability of unknown events is rarely 
even, such as an example Carnap cites from Jeffreys (1939) in which he argues that 
according to the Principle of Insufficient Reason, the probability that there is life on Mars 
is 0.5, because there is (or at least was not in 1939) neither sufficient evidence for nor 
against the proposition. 
An argument frequently made for the Principle of Insufficient Reason is that it is 
the most “uncertain” of all distributions, since it has the highest Shannon entropy 
(Shannon 1948).  However, in this example it is clear that this is a very special case of the 
world—a case in which the game is fair.  It is arguable that this is not the null-hypothesis 




unless there is evidence that it is fair, since many people who run games of chance are out 
to make a profit by luring in un-savvy gamblers. 
3.3.3.2 Frequentist interpretations 
The frequentist interpretation, also known as objective or relativist, is based on 
the notion of relative frequencies of outcomes.  von Mises (1939) and Reichenbach 
(1949) were among the founders of the frequentist interpretation.  Under a frequentist 
interpretation, a probability represents the limit of ratio of times that one outcome occurs 
compared to the total number of outcomes in an endless series of identical trials (Winkler 
1996).   
For example, an experiment is repeated for n  identical and independent 
replications.  The number of times, ( )iN E , the experiment’s outcome is a particular 
outcome iE  is counted.  The relative frequency is defined as ( ) /iN E n .  In practice, this 
ratio tends to stabilize as n  gets large, such that the relative ratio approaches a limiting 
value.  The frequentist interpretation of probability takes this limiting ratio as the 
probability of iE , denoted ( )iP E  as in Equation (3.11).   
 ( ) lim( ( ) / )i inP E N E n→∞=  (3.11) 
The frequentist interpretation is considered to be an objective interpretation 
because it is based on experimental outcomes rather than interpretations of individual 
observers.  For experiments such as die tossing, the outcomes are objective.  The result is 
indisputably 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6; there is no subjective interpretation of the result.  In 
theory, two observers will record the same result for a particular replication and thus 
calculate the same relative frequencies.   
The frequentist interpretation fails when there are no examples from which to 
determine frequencies (Pate-Cornell 1996).  For example, consider the design of a 




be chosen during detail design.  What is the ratio of times that a particular bolt will be 
used to fasten two components of a satellite?  This particular satellite design task is 
novel—it has never been done before.  How can designers construct relative frequencies 
about something that has never happened before?  They might be able to look at all past 
satellites and construct frequencies that way, but are those trials really identical since 
each satellite has a novel purpose?   
The frequentist interpretation defines probability as the limiting relative frequency 
of an outcome in a sequence of identical and independent experiment replications.  In 
general, engineers turn to probability theory in the very cases in which the events or 
experiments of interest are not repeatable.  The design process itself is not repeatable.  
Even if designers follow a rigorous, systematic design process with stable objectives, the 
results will not be identical due to human factors.  For example, the same idea will not 
necessarily come along at the same time.  Other examples of non-repeatable events to 
which people often try to assign probabilities are election results, sports events, and 
contract negotiations (Devore 1995, Hajek 2003).  In the real world, none of these exact 
events happens more than once. 
Philosophically, even if an event can be repeated, a particular set of replications is 
still only a sample of the true frequency.  No matter how large the number of replications 
n  is, the relative frequency can only be calculated to the granularity of 1n  (Hajek 2003).  
Going even further, for a particular n , the set of outcomes can be thought of as one 
experiment, in which the experiment itself is to take n  samples.  This one replication of a 
calculation of the relative frequency is clearly not a good estimate of the true relative 
frequency.  Although in theory the relative sample frequency approaches the true relative 
frequency as the sample size goes to infinity, an infinite sample size is impossible to 
acquire in practice due to resource constraints.  Consequently, engineers will always face 




In most engineering situations, agreement on convergence is not an issue for large 
data sets.  The problem is more often that only limited data exists.  If only 10 data points 
are available, assessment of a limiting frequency involves imprecision.  For a fair coin-
tossing experiment, the odds of getting 7 heads out of 10 flips are 0.117.  This means that 
when the true probability is 0.5, there is a 0.117 chance of estimating it to be 0.7.  Given 
10 data points, engineers cannot be sure whether they know the true probability, but they 
do have some information that can guide decision making.  The open question is how to 
model this information and the related uncertainty appropriately in order to support 
decision making.   
As the number of replication decreases, the knowledge of the probabilities 
decreases and becomes more uncertain.  In the extreme case already noted in the context 
of novel satellite design, there may be no existing data about a particular experiment.  
From a purely frequentist perspective, in this scenario nothing can be said about the 
probabilities.  As suggested earlier, engineers may look at similar designs and allocate 
probabilities based on those outcomes, but those trials are not identical.  The engineers 
are taking a leap of faith when they extrapolate from past designs to current designs.    
Why should the new design have the same probabilities?  If the new design has different 
probabilities, how close might they be to past designs?  These questions cannot be 
answered objectively or in a frequentist framework.  
The basic lesson is that the true frequency of an can never be known, and the 
assignment of a frequentist probability requires certain assumptions to be made, such as 
assuming or judging whether frequency has converged “close enough.” Such assumptions 
are ultimately subjective in nature (Gelman, et al. 1995).  Other researchers recognize this 




3.3.3.3 Subjective interpretation 
This section is begun with a few historical notes.  The subjective interpretation of 
probability has its foundations in work by Borel (1909) and Ramsey (1926).  Lindley 
(1982b) provides an excellent overview of the subjectivist view, both in terms of 
probability and decision making.  The greatest extensions of the theory were made by 
Savage (1972)[the most general] and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) [the most elegant 
and complete, though less general].  The subjective interpretation is sometimes referred 
to as the Bayesian interpretation, though the interpretation is entirely separate from Bayes 
rule and is applicable even when not using a Bayesian analysis approach such as in 
(Berger 1985). 
A strict subjective interpretation of probability asserts that there are no true or 
inherent probabilities (or that they cannot be known), but rather probabilities are 
constructed from individual opinions.  In this sense, probability is a degree of belief.   
Each person has their own belief in a given situation.  These beliefs are based on the 
individual’s knowledge, assumptions, preferences, and biases.  A person’s beliefs are 
reflected by his or her betting behaviors.  Based on the work of de Finetti (1980) and as 
discussed in (Hajek 2003), belief has the following paraphrased meaning: 
Your degree of belief in outcome E is p  if and only if p  
units of utility is the price, known as a fair price, at which 
you are indifferent between buying or selling a bet that 
pays 1 unit of utility if outcome E  occurs, and 0 units of 
utility if E  does not occur.  Assuming a linear (risk 
neutral) utility function and no endowment effects in this 
problem, p  then represents the individual’s probability that 




 A more complete and theoretically correct definition would phrase things 
in terms of different lotteries of payoffs.  For example, consider the following example 
adapted from Cooke (2004). 
 
• Two events are defined: 
S: Slovakia wins the next Olympic Men’s Hockey Gold Medal. 
U: The USA wins the next Olympic Men’s Hockey Gold Medal. 
• Two lottery tickets are available: 
LS: worth $1000 if S occurs, worth $10 otherwise. 
LU: worth $1000 if U occurs, worth $10 otherwise 
A person (Jane) is offered one of these lotteries, and she may choose whichever 
she prefers.  The truth proposition “Jane’s degree of belief in S is at least as great as her 
degree of belief in U” is operationalized (or observable) as the event “Jane chooses 
lottery LS.”  In Savage’s formalization (1972), Jane’s choice of lottery LS over lottery 
LU also implies that her subjective probability that Slovakia wins the gold, ( )P S , is no 
smaller than her subjective probability that the USA wins the gold, ( )P U .  
Mathematically, ( ) ( )P S P U≥ . 
Notice that a subjective interpretation of probability is also a behavioral 
interpretation.  In a behavioral interpretation, a probability model must have implications 
concerning an individuals behavior (Walley 1991).  This is a reasonable requirement for 
probability models used in decision making; if a probability has no connection to an 
individual’s behavior in decision making, how can a probability guide decision making?   
There are several complications with the subjective interpretation of probability.  




utility a person derives from an outcome depends on his or her preferences and his or her 
current state of wealth.  Thus choices reflect not just beliefs but also preferences.  This is 
the reason that Savage axiomatized preferences and belief (utility and probability) 
simultaneously (Savage 1972).  Second, people are inherently bad at assessing 
probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman, et al. 1982).  Finally, there are 
other objections such as people having multiple prices at which they would enter a bet, 
and that your fair price p  also measures your belief in the bet actually being paid, given 
that you win (Hajek 2003).  
Despite some limitations, the subjective interpretation is often used in practice.  
For example, in the satellite bolt design problem of the previous section, the subjective 
interpretation of probability is probably better than the frequentist interpretation.  Even 
though frequency data for the novel design is not available, an experienced designer 
might be able to make a subjective judgment about historical frequencies of past designs.  
The result would be subjective probabilities regarding the novel design.   
For example, assume past historical data shows a log-normal distribution with 
mean 5 and variance 1 for a particular dimension. The designer also knows that the new, 
high-strength, light-weight composites used in this design will reduce the stress seen on 
the bolt below past averages.  He may combine this knowledge with the past frequencies 
and come to a conclusion on how he would be willing to bet on the outcome of the novel 
design.  He may conclude that he would bet according to probabilities defined by a 
lognormal distribution with mean 4 and variance 1.   
One of the primary arguments against a frequentist interpretation and for a 
subjective interpretation of probability is the absence of truly repeatable events, 
especially in practical problems.  For example, the probability that Team A beats Team B 
in a basketball game has no real meaning under a frequentist interpretation, because that 
event—that particular game—will occur exactly once.  In this context, the notion of a 




However, people are often still willing to bet on the outcome of a game.  This betting 
behavior reveals information about people’s beliefs, which in turn can be connected to 
probabilities using subjective probability theory.  In this way, subjective probabilities 
could in theory be found for any problem, though in practice this requires the expenditure 
of resources and may be impractical. 
3.3.3.4 Other  interpretations of probability 
The logical interpretation, also known as the necessary view, of probability was 
first proposed by Keynes (1921) and later advocated by Jeffreys (1939) and Carnap 
(1950).  Carnap has argued for logical probabilities in addition to statistical (e.g. 
frequentist) probabilities, while Keynes and Jeffreys, who were writing when the 
frequentist interpretation was in its own infancy, claimed that logical probabilities were 
the only legitimate probabilities.   
Under the logical interpretation, the probability of a hypothesis is uniquely 
determined given a particular body of evidence (Walley 1991).  This interpretation has 
some inherently attractive qualities to it—such as implying a universally correct answer.  
However, the logical interpretation has met with many challenges, including how anyone 
could ever know the correct or “logical” probability for a particular body of evidence.  
Consequently, it is generally regarded as dead (Cooke 2004).   
A final interpretation that deserves mention is the propensity interpretation.  Like 
the frequentist and logical interpretations, the propensity interpretation asserts that 
probabilities are properties of the world rather than of the decision maker.  Thus, they are 
entirely objective in nature.  According to Popper (1957, Popper 1959b), a probability is 
an inherent tendency—a propensity—of a system to produce a particular result with some 
frequency.   The propensity is a fundamental attribute of the system, rather than a 
reflection of other empirically observable attributes.  The propensity itself is 




test the value of a propensity, so it is impossible to develop an operational theory of 
propensities and probabilities for use in decision making. 
3.3.3.5 Adopted interpretation of probability 
Given the failures of the classical, frequentist, logical, and propensity 
interpretations of probability to be useful in engineering design decisions, a subjective 
interpretation is the most applicable of existing theories.  In comparison to a frequentist 
interpretation, a subjective interpretation is applicable to a broader class of problems, as it 
is not limited to repeatable events.  The subjectivist interpretation advocated here is not 
as strict as the traditional views (Lindley 1982b), because it admits imprecisely known 
subjective probabilities, as described in Section 3.4.  The traditional school claims that by 
definition, subjective probabilities are known to a decision-maker, because they are his or 
her beliefs.  Section 3.4 describes the advantages of an interpretation that acknowledges 
the practical difficulties (Weber 1987, Walley 1991, Groen and Mosleh 2005) in arriving 
at a precise characterization of such beliefs.  Fundamentally, the interpretation advocated 
is subjective in that probabilities are defined in terms of beliefs and betting behavior. 
The use of subjective probabilities is often troubling to many engineers and 
scientists, as they often have a preference for the objective.  Intuitively, there should be 
some connection between available evidence and beliefs, but this connection is not 
identical for all people, and there is rarely a way to enforce consistency.  Walley (1991) 
suggests a rationalist interpretation that requires probabilities to be consistent in certain 
ways with the evidence, without requiring that they be uniquely determined (as was 
required by the logical interpretation).  For example, subjective probabilities should be 
consistent with observed relative frequencies when such frequencies are available.  
However, the exact correlations between these observed frequencies and the subjective 




incomplete and hence not suitable for adoption as a strict approach, but more as a vaguely 
defined heuristic.   
Fundamentally, there is nothing wrong with using subjective probabilities.  After 
all, preferences are clearly subjective and vary from person to person.  When beliefs 
(probabilities) and preferences are combined in decision making (as is the case with 
expected utility theory), why should the probabilities be objective when the utilities, and 
hence the optimal decision, is subjective anyway?  For the reasons addressed through out 
this Section (3.3.3), the subjective interpretation of probability is adopted throughout this 
thesis.  In certain problems, such as the example problem presented in Chapter 5, these 
subjective probabilities appear very “frequentist” in nature, because it is assumed that the 
decision-maker’s beliefs are based on observed frequencies and statistical analysis, as 
explained in more detail in that chapter. 
3.3.4 Traditional statistical decision theory and utility theory 
The most commonly adopted method for making decisions with uncertainty 
represented by probabilities is traditional statistical decision theory.  In traditional 
statistical decision theory (Pratt, et al. 1995), utility analysis, as formalized by von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), is used for making decisions under uncertainty.  von 
Neumann and Morgenstern originally derived their theory using objective probabilities, 
but Savage (1972) later extended utility theory to subjective probabilities, a theory 
referred to as subjective expected utility (SEU).  For extended discussion of expected 
utility theory, see references (Raiffa 1968, Fishburn 1982) for the foundations or 
references (Thurston 1990a, Thurston 2001, Scott 2004) for summaries in the context of 
engineering design. 
In general, utility expresses preference—more preferred decision outcomes are 
assigned higher utility values.  Utility theory has been studied extensively by economists 




of applying utility methods to engineering problems (Thurston 1990a, Hazelrigg 1998, 
Fernández, et al. 2001, Thurston 2001, Scott 2004).  If chosen correctly, utilities reflect 
the decision-maker’s preferences, even under uncertainty.  By applying the expected 
value operator, the decision-maker weights all possible outcomes according to their 
likelihood of occurring, and then chooses the action that maximizes the expected utility. 
Utility theory is a normative theory.  Essentially, it described how a rational 
individual should act.  The notion of rationality is encoded into the axioms of the theory.  
As a normative theory, it does not need to be confirmed by all observations or 
descriptions of human behavior.  There is actually substantial evidence that humans do 
not act rationally according to utility theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Kahneman, et 
al. 1982).  The goal of a normative theory is not to replicate current practice, but to 
provide an ideal for which to strive.   
A primary assumption of utility theory is that probabilities, alternatives, and 
preferences are fully known by the decision maker.  In practice, a decision maker could 
lack knowledge about all of these (Weber 1987).  In this dissertation, the emphasis is on 
probabilities, which leads to the question as to whether probability theory can appropriate 
capture the lack of knowledge, or imprecision (defined in Chapter 2), faced in 
engineering design decisions.     
3.3.5 Ability of probability theory to represent imprecision 
A traditional probability distribution is precise in nature.  There is exactly one 
probability associated with every event.  For example, one can write ( ) 0.6P A = , or 
( ) 0.7P A = , but not both.  There is no way to express a lack of knowledge or imprecision 




normalization and additivity axioms, Equations (3.2) and (3.3).  For example, if 
( ) (0.6 or 0.7)P A = , then ( ) (0.3 or 0.4)P A¬ = .  This could lead7 to the expression 
( ) ( ) 0.7 0.4 1.1P A P A+ ¬ = + = , a violation of the axioms.   
Consider the distribution shown with a solid line in Figure 3.2.  This distribution 
is a best-fit normal distribution based on 15 samples of a random process.  Since this 
distribution is based on a small number of samples, there is a great deal of imprecision in 
addition to the irreducible uncertainty from the random process.  How can this 
imprecision be represented using probability?   
In order to use traditional probability theory, a designer is forced to eliminate 
imprecision, ignore imprecision, or confound imprecision with a different aspect of 
uncertainty.  Eliminating imprecision requires the designer to expend resources to acquire 
more information, thus increasing the costs of the design process.  Ignoring imprecision 
involves overstating the true current state of information by making assumptions.  This is 
equivalent to forcing a decision-maker to make an exact statement or choice, even if he or 
she has not yet reached an exact belief of judgment (Weber 1987).   




7 Assuming that just the probabilities are considered without carrying additional 




Common practice is to force imprecision into the representation by proxy by 
increasing the variance of the distribution, such as shown with the dashed line in Figure 
3.2.  In a way, this change does increase the total uncertainty (if uncertainty is equated 
with Shannon entropy (Shannon 1948)), but it confounds two different aspects—
imprecision and irreducible uncertainty—of the problem, and therefore makes it difficult 
to draw useful insights from the resultant distribution (Helton 1994).  For example, there 
is no way to distinguish the dotted distribution, which is now an imprecise representation 
of the true (but unknown) distribution, from a distribution that is precisely known to be 
the dotted distribution.  An additional example further illustrates this point. 
  When traditional probability theory is used to represent both irreducible 
uncertainty and imprecision, no information for problem formulation and information 
collection decisions is provided, as illustrated with the following example.  Consider a 
scenario in which two experimenters perform the same experiment and find the best-fit 
normal distributions shown in Figure 3.3.  Which is the better fit?  Actually, one of the 
experimenters performed 20 tests, and thus one of the distributions represents data from a 
sample size of 20.  The other represents a sample size of only 5.  Which is which?  
Traditional probability theory gives no indication as to how much information a 



















distribution is based on.  By extension, it gives no indication as to how useful additional 
information could be. 
Bayesian analysis (Berger 1985) takes a slightly different approach.  It starts with 
a prior distribution and update this distribution as information is received.  The priors are 
chosen to be non-informative, meaning they contain as little information as possible.  As 
information is acquired, the distributions become more informative.  As was the case 
with the example in Figure 3.2, variance is again used as a proxy for imprecision in this 
method.   
The choice of priors in Bayesian analysis is not unique (Walley 1991).  Empirical 
Bayes methods have the goal of using Bayesian analysis without fully specifying the 
prior distribution or its parameters (Robbins 1955, Efron and Morris 1973).  Bayesian 
sensitivity analysis (Berger 1985) considers a set of priors.  Each prior (or input) 
distribution yields a different posterior (or output) distribution.  The decision maker is 
thus left with a set of distributions to consider.  If the decision is robust (e.g. does not 
change) across this set of priors, then the uncertainty in the choice of an appropriate prior 
does not matter for that particular decision.  However, the problem remains regarding any 
reflection of the amount of information on which the distribution is based, as was 














illustrated using Figure 3.3.   
In conclusion, if probability can capture both imprecision and irreducible 
uncertainty, it does so in a way that confounds the two, making independent insights into 
either impossible.  This in turn makes it difficult to make efficient decisions regarding 
information collection, as there is no indication as to the information already in the 
distribution.  In the extremes, there is no way to distinguish a case with no knowledge, 
e.g. a uniform prior distribution, from a case of precise knowledge, e.g. a perfectly known 
uniform distribution.  Consequently, in order to consider imprecision explicitly and 
separately from irreducible uncertainty, it is necessary to consider a different model of 
uncertainty.  The remaining core of this dissertation (the remainder of this chapter plus 
most of Chapter 5 through Chapter 7) presents such models—called imprecise 
probabilities and the sub-theory of probability bounds analysis—and then establishes the 
practical value of using such models that in general separate imprecision and irreducible 
uncertainty. 
3.4 The theory of imprecise probabilities 
Some alternatives to precise probabilities, such as fuzzy sets, possibility theory, 
and the some interpretations of Dempster-Shafer Evidence Theory, abandon the notion of 
probability entirely.  This opens them up to significant criticism, at least in part due to 
their unfamiliarity to practicing engineers, but more importantly due to their lack of a 
clear operational or behavioral interpretation that was discussed earlier in this chapter.   
On the other hand, theories based on imprecise probabilities (Sarin 1978, Good 
1983, Kyburg 1987, Walley 1991, Weichselberger 2000) or sets of probabilities (Tintner 
1941, Hart 1942, Levi 1974) are an extension of traditional probability theory and 
therefore have clear operational and behavioral interpretations.  For this reason, attention 




remainder of this section, imprecise probabilities are motivated, defined, and advanced as 
a useful model of uncertainty. 
3.4.1 Motivation for imprecise probabilities 
The general motivation for imprecise probabilities is that the more evidence on 
which a probability estimate is based, the more confidence a decision-maker can have in 
it.  Thus, the imprecision in the probabilities should be expressed explicitly in order to 
signal the appropriate level of confidence to ascribe to them.  For example, a decision 
maker would like to place more confidence in the distribution in Figure 3.3 that is based 
on 20 samples than the one based on just 5 samples.  However, the distributions do not 
reflect such information.   
It is more straightforward to motivate and introduce imprecise probabilities using 
discrete events rather than continuous random variables.  Adapting an example from 
Walley (1991), consider the exercise of determining the probability that a tossed 
thumbtack lands pin-up.  Three experimenters perform this exercise, as follows:  
• Experimenter A is in a hurry and does not even look at the thumbtack.  Experimenter 
A employs a non-informative prior distribution (e.g. uses the principle of 
indifference or insufficient reason) and assumes that the probability of the tack 
landing pin-up is equal to the probability it lands pin-down, thus ascribing a 
probability of 0.5 to both outcomes. 
• Experimenter B tosses the thumbtack 10 times and gets 6 pin-ups.  Experimenter B’s 
estimated precise probability of the tack landing pin-up is thus 0.6. 
• Experimenter C tosses the thumbtack 1000 times and gets 400 pin-ups.  
Experimenter C’s estimated precise probability of the tack landing pin-up is thus 0.4. 
If the three experimenters are three analysts that could provide the DM with 




estimate was based on more data, it is more precise than Experimenter B’s estimate.  
Experimenter A’s estimate was based on no data, so it does not seem reasonable to place 
much confidence in it.  Nevertheless, the precise probability estimates of 0.5, 0.6, and 0.4 
appear equally credible.  By not expressing the imprecision in these estimates, one is 
arbitrarily eliminating it by assuming precision that has no justification in the available 
evidence.  This problem can be overcome by allowing analysts to state imprecise 
probabilities. 
3.4.2 Definitions of upper and lower previsions and 
probabilities 
A full discussion of Walley’s formalization of imprecise probabilities (1991) is 
outside the scope of this dissertation, but a summary is necessary.  In the context of the 
probability interpretations discussed in Section 3.3.3, Walley’s imprecise probabilities are 
subjective.  Walley defines upper and lower probabilities as special cases of upper and 
lower previsions (de Finetti 1980).   In simple terms, a DM’s lower prevision is the 
highest price at which the DM is sure he or she would buy a gamble, and the upper 
prevision is the lowest price at which the DM is sure he or she would buy the opposite of 
the gamble (which is equivalent to selling the original gamble).    If the upper and lower 
previsions are equal, then they jointly represent the DM’s fair price for the gamble, the 
price at which the DM is willing to take either side of the gamble.  The existence of a fair 
price leads to precise probabilities, as described in Section 3.3.3.3.  Previsions are 
equivalent to probabilities if the stakes of the gamble are one unit of currency, such as 
one dollar or one util.   
Adopting Walley’s notation, lower previsions are denoted P , and upper 
previsions P .  The set of possible states of the world is denoted Ω .  A gamble X  
represents a bounded, real-valued function on Ω  that is interpreted as an uncertain 




consequences of the gamble affect each different.  The seller sells the gamble to the buyer 
for some price, with the price being transferred from the buyer to the seller at the time the 
gamble is bought.  A gamble X  will pay the buyer a reward of x  if a particular event 
happens, and a reward of zero otherwise.  A gamble X  will cause the seller to incur a 
penalty of x  if the event occurs and a penalty of zero otherwise. 
A DM’s lower prevision ( )P X  for gamble X  represents the maximum price at 
which the DM is willing to buy the gamble X .  In other words, the DM will readily 
purchase the gamble for any price less than ( )P X .  More specifically, if ( )P X μ= , then 
μ  is the supremum buying price for which it is asserted than the gamble X μ−  is still 
desirable to the decision maker.  The quantity X μ−  is considered because if the payout 
of a gamble is the uncertain quantity X  and the DM pays μ  to enter the bet as a buyer, 
then the net payoff to the DM is X μ− , where X x=  if the event occurs, and 0X =  
otherwise.  A rational, risk-neutral DM will only enter into this gamble if the expected 
payoff of [ ]E X μ−  is greater than zero.  For eliciting previsions, it is noted that small 
gambles (gamble for which x  is much smaller than the DM’s wealth) are more suitable. 
The connection to probabilities is made as follows.  First, the possible payoff of 
the gamble X  is defined as 1X x= =  if a particular event, say A , occurs, and 0X =  
otherwise.  Then the lower prevision on gamble X  becomes the lower probability of 




















[ ] ( )E X p Aμ μ− = − , since μ  is a constant and [ ] ( ) 1 ( ) 0E X p A p A= ⋅ + ¬ ⋅ .  As such, a  
rational, risk-neutral DM will require that ( )p A μ≥  in order to enter the bet, and thus the 
highest price μ  that the DM is willing to pay for the gamble represents the highest 
lower-bound on the DM’s probability that event A  occurs. 
For a particular lower prevision P , Walley defines the conjugate upper prevision 
P  as ( ) ( )P X P X= − − .  ( )P X  is the infimum selling price for the gamble X , meaning 
that if ( )P X α= , then α  is the smallest price for which the DM is willing to sell the 
gamble X .  Note that when the DM sells the bet for α , the net payoff to the DM is 
Xα − , since the DM now gains α  when the bet is sold, and pays out—a loss—the 
uncertainty quantity X  when the gamble is realized.  The definition of an upper 
probability is made by extension from an upper prevision in the same way that a lower 
probability was an extension of a lower prevision (i.e., in terms of a gamble with payoff 
of 1X x= =  to the buyer if a particular event, say A , occurs, and 0X =  otherwise). 
If a DM spends the time and effort to collect complete evidence and fully elicit 
his or her beliefs, then the imprecise probabilities will collapse into precise probabilities, 
such that α μ=  and  ( ) ( )P X P X= .  Traditional probability requires that ( ) ( )P X P X=  
(and hence α μ= ), meaning the DM is indifferent between selling and buying the 
gamble at price α μ= , the so-called fair price.  If the gamble is offered at a price higher 
than α μ= , the DM will sell the gamble.  If the gamble is offered at a price lower than 
α μ= , the DM will buy the gamble.  If the bet is offered at exactly α μ= , then the DM 
is willing to take either side. 
There is a difference between being willing to take either side of a gamble and 
neither side.  The case of taking neither side is not allowed in traditional probability 
theory, which requires that a DM be able to state, given a price, his or her willingness to 
the buy or sell the gamble; the DM is not allowed to refrain from gambling entirely.  In 
Walley’s theory of imprecise probabilities, at any price ρ  such that μ ρ α< < , the DM 




3.4.3 Axioms of coherence and avoidance of sure loss 
Walley begins his formulation of imprecise probabilities with the same 
fundamental notion of rationality as de Finetti (1974, 1980)—avoidance of a sure loss 
(also known as a Dutch Book).  Walley’s axioms of coherence assure that if a DM’s 
imprecise probabilities satisfy them and the DM makes decisions consistent with these 
probabilities, then the DM is not subject to a sure loss.  His primary deviation from 
axioms of precise probabilities such as de Finetti’s is the allowance for a range of 
indeterminacy—prices at which the DM will not enter a gamble as either a buyer or a 
seller.  By not entering a gamble at prices between his or her upper and lower previsions, 
the DM will not subject himself or herself to a sure loss. 
Walley’s axioms for coherent lower previsions are as follows: 
P1: ( ) infP X X≥  (accepting sure gains) 
P2: ( ) ( ),   0P X P Xλ λ λ= >  (positive homogeneity) 
P3: ( ) ( ) ( )P X Y P X P Y+ ≥ +  (super-linearity) 
 
The axioms for coherent upper previsions are defined as follows: 
P1a: ( ) supP X X≤ (accepting sure gains) 
P2a: ( ) ( ),   0P X P Xλ λ λ= >  (positive homogeneity) 
P3a: ( ) ( ) ( )P X Y P X P Y+ ≤ +  (sub-linearity) 
 
As noted earlier, it is also required that ( ) ( )P X P X= − − , or equivalently 
( ) ( )P X P X= − − .  Combined, the axioms also require that 
inf ( ) ( ) supX P X P X X≤ ≤ ≤ .  It is also true that ( ) ( ) 1P A P A+ ¬ =  , meaning the total 
probability of events in the universe must add to one.  Walley asserts and then 
demonstrates that any set of upper and lower previsions satisfying these axioms will 




The avoidance of sure loss is a weaker condition than coherence, but it is a 
necessary condition.  As Walley writes, “Incoherence [i.e. a violation of his axioms] 
reflects a kind of ignorance about the consequences of Your [e.g. the DM’s] judgments, 
whereas failure to avoid sure loss reflects a fundamental irrationality or error in 
judgment.”  For reference, Walley continues (in his Section 2.5-2.6) to develop 
consequences of avoiding sure loss and basic properties of coherent previsions.  He then 
covers the generalization to probabilities (in his Section 2.7) and the relationship to 
traditional probabilities (in his Section 2.8).   
3.4.4 Eliciting and assessing 
Basic definitions, properties, and axioms of imprecise probabilities are a starting 
point, but they are of no use to designers unless there are ways to determine the 
probabilities.  In Chapter 4 of his book, Walley tackles the issue of assessing and eliciting 
probabilities.  According to Walley, elicitation is the process by which beliefs (pre-
existing behavioral dispositions) are measured, through explicit judgments and choices.  
Assessment is the process by which probabilities are constructed from the available 
evidence.   
Walley presents some basic elicitation procedures.  These begin with direct 
judgments of desirability (comparative judgments) and proceed to more complicated 
judgments.   Walley also addresses the issue of natural extension, or the process of 
updating the models that results from your previous elicitations with evidence from new 
elicitations, which can be viewed as part of the assessment process.  For example, an 
increase in a DM’s lower probability for an event has particular consequences on his or 
her upper probability for the complement of that event, since ( ) ( ) 1P A P A+ ¬ = . 
Despite the rigor of the foundations, the elicitation and assessments of imprecise 
probabilities may be a large obstacle to the widespread use of imprecise probabilities.  




in which rational behavior under uncertainty is defined under the assumption that utility 
functions and precise probabilities can be found.  While procedures for eliciting utilities 
are defined (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Keeney and Raiffa 1993), the use of 
these procedures in practice can be challenging and resource intensive (Seepersad 2001). 
3.4.5 Imprecise probability distributions 
In the previous sections, imprecise probabilities were described in terms of 
discrete probabilities.  However, imprecise probability theory can be extended to 
probability distributions.  A probability density function ( )f x  is defined such that 
( ) ( )
b
a
p x dx P a x b= ≤ ≤∫ , or the probability that x  is between a  and b .  The event that x  
is between a  and b will now be defined as event A , and thus   ( ) ( )
b
a
p x dx P A=∫ .  Then 
upper and lower bounds on the density function could be defined as ( ) ( )
b
a
p x dx P A=∫  and 
( ) ( )
b
a
p x dx P A=∫ .  However, this is somewhat limiting in that it established relationships 
using bounding distributions.   
A more general approach is to think of a set of distributions.  If one assumes that 
the information available for a particular decision at a given point in time is given by I , 
then one can define the set ( )P I  as the set of all probability density functions that are 
consistent with the given information I .  The notion of consistency is somewhat loose.  
Something is consistent with the available information if the available information does 
not rule it out.  For example, if the evidence is only that 5x <  and x  is limited to positive 
integers, then ( 4) 1P x = =  and ( 4) 0.3P x = =  are both consistent with the available 
information, but ( 6) 0.2P x = =  is inconsistent with the available information. 
All of the distributions in the set (all ( ) ( )ip x P I∈ ) are distributions that the DM 
cannot rule out as being the true distribution, just as in the discrete case the DM cannot 




only buy or sell gambles for which the expected payoff is positive for all probabilities in 
this interval.  In the continuous case, the DM will only buy or sell gambles for which the 
expected payoff is positive for all distributions in the set.  If the DM accepted a gamble 
that had a negative expected payoff for some distribution (say ( )jp x ) in the set, it could 
turn out that that distribution ( ( )jp x ) is the true distribution and the DM would have 
accepted gamble with an expected loss, which contradicts rational, risk-neutral behavior.   
3.4.6 Discussion of objections to imprecise probabilities 
As noted earlier, at a price between the upper and lower previsions, the DM is not 
willing to enter the bet on either side, at least not without collecting more information and 
updating his or her previsions.  One objection to the use of imprecise probabilities is that 
they can lead to such indeterminacy of action during decision-making.  That is, given 
imprecise probabilities, there may not be a single, clear “best” solution according to 
standard decision theories.   
This argument is countered by stating that if the available evidence does not 
clearly suggest a particular course of action, then the representation of this evidence 
should not arbitrarily pretend that it does.  An approach that demands precise 
probabilities necessitates an arbitrary resolution of the indeterminacy.  Such an approach 
does not differentiate well-grounded probabilities (such as Experimenter C’s in the tack-
tossing example of Section 3.4.1) from arbitrary ones (such as Experimenter A’s).   By 
admitting imprecise probabilities, one can abstain from these arbitrary judgments during 
analysis and support better decision-making, as follows. 
It is true that in order for a single solution to be chosen, any indeterminacy will 




characterization of uncertainty allows for the direct management of the imprecision in the 
context of a decision.  For example, if a decision is not sensitive to the current level of 
imprecision, a robust decision can be made using arbitrary rules8 such as arbitrary choice 
(Walley 1991), Γ-maximin (Berger 1985), or the Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 
1972).  On the other hand, if the decision is sensitive to the existing imprecision, one can 
decide to collect more information (such as more tack tosses in the earlier example), 
perhaps managing the set of alternatives according to policies of E-admissibility (Levi 
1974) or maximality (Walley 1991).  These topics are discussed at greater length in 
Chapter 8. 
Another frequently levied objection to imprecise probabilities is the Dutch Book 
Argument that they are irrational (de Finetti 1974, Lindley 1982a, Walley 1991).  The 
general idea of a Dutch Book is that if a DM’s probabilities violate certain rules, a group 
of bets can be constructed, all of which the DM is willing to accept, but the combination 
of which results in a sure loss; the DM will lose money under any outcome.  This 
argument is often presented in favor of precise probabilities and the axioms of 
Kolmorogov (1956).  However, as described in Section 3.4.3, Walley (1991) presents 
axioms of coherence for imprecise probabilities that also avoid sure loss.  Key in this 
proof is the assumption that a decision is not mandated; that is, indecision is an 
acceptable conclusion.  The idea is that if the available information does not support a 
clear choice, any choice made is arbitrary.  
Arbitrary decision policies may encounter problems because it is difficult to 
employ these arbitrary rules consistently across multiple decisions.  The use of arbitrary 




8 These rules are arbitrary in nature, meaning the distinction is not made based on rational 
guidance; according to rational principles and the available information, the decision-




choice across a sequence of decisions may in fact lead to the possibility of a Dutch Book 
and sure loss.  However, the use of imprecise probabilities in situations in which choice is 
not mandated and arbitrary choice is avoided cannot lead to a Dutch Book.  Policies for 
decision making in the presence of imprecise information are discussed in Chapter 8. 
3.4.7 Computational limitations of imprecise probabilities 
In general, computing with imprecise probabilities is computationally demanding, 
especially in the case of imprecise probability distributions.  Most methods are based on 
mathematical programming.  However, one can think of an abstraction of what is 
required.  In this abstraction, the most basic, brute-force means for computing involves a 
second-order, or double-loop Monte Carlo process.  Recall that a set of distributions 
( )P I  that are consistent with the available information is defined (see Sections 3.4.5 and 
3.6.2 for more).  A second-order Monte Carlo procedure contains two loops, one nested 
inside the other.  In the outer loop, the set of distributions ( )P I  is sampled, where each 
sample is a particular distribution ( ) ( )ip x P I∈ .  In the inner loop, a more traditional 
Monte Carlo sampling is performed by sampling points from the currently sampled 
( )ip x .  These points are used to estimate the integral of interest for the analysis (e.g. 
expected value of a function) for the chosen ( )ip x .  The process then repeats to the outer 
loop, in which a different distribution is sampled, such as ( ) ( )jp x P I∈ .  By repeating 
this process, a set of output values corresponding to the sampled input distributions can 
be found; each output corresponds to one of the consistent input distributions in ( )P I .   
It is important to note that the outer loop is not being used to estimate a robust 
statistical parameter (such as mean or median).  If that were the case, then the set ( )P I  
could be sampled heavily and the parameter estimated by averaging the results.  
However, the goal is to determine the set of output values corresponding to the possible 




into a summary such as an interval that shows the range of values that can occur for the 
output given the imprecision in the inputs.   
This double loop process is very computationally expensive.  For example, 
assuming there are N  distributions in the set ( )P I , the outer loop must be repeated N  
times in order to be exhaustive.  The inner loop requires M  samples from each 
distribution, where M is often a number between 100 and 50,000 (Ferson and Ginzburg 
1996).  Defining F  as the cost of one evaluation of the function or model of interest, the 
cost of the double loop process is ( )O N M F⋅ ⋅ .   
In general, there could be an infinite number of distributions in ( )P I .  In this 
situation, the double loop process is prohibitively expensive. There is no way to 
systematically narrow a general set ( )P I  to a finite number of representative 
distributions to consider.  However, one could place restrictions on the set ( )P I , 
essentially creating a sub-set of imprecise probability theory.  This is essentially what is 
done in probability bounds analysis (PBA) (Ferson and Donald 1998), a method of 
modeling uncertainty that is described in detail in Chapter 4.   
PBA puts relatively mild restrictions on ( )P I  but leads to computations of the 
order 2( )O K F , where K  is the number of discretization bins used in the computational 
algorithm9 and K is generally less than 1000 and often less than 100 (Ferson and 
Ginzburg 1996).  Probability bounds analysis essentially limits ( )P I  to the set of 
probability density functions ( ) ( )if x P I∈  for which the corresponding cumulative 
distribution functions ( ) ( )
x
i iF x f t dt
−∞
= ∫  are such that ( ) ( ) ( )iF x F x F x≤ ≤ —in other 




9 There are actually multiple algorithms and heuristics for computing in PBA.  These 
results use the original method, called dependency bounds convolution.  Additional 




words, distributions for which the cumulative distribution function (CDF) is bounded 
from below by a particular CDF defined as ( )F x  and from above by the CDF defined as 
( )F x .  A much more complete discussion of PBA is presented in Chapter 4, but this brief 
discussion has motivated why PBA is a reasonable model; it is much more convenient for 
computing and only slightly less expressive than general imprecise probability theory.   
3.5 Hierarchical uncertainty models 
One can view imprecise probability theory as a type of hierarchical uncertainty 
model.  In an hierarchical uncertainty model [about which a good review is presented in 
(de Cooman and Walley 2002)], uncertainty is expressed about another uncertainty.  The 
most basic hierarchical uncertainty model is a second-order uncertainty model.  These 
methods apply when it is assumed that there is some ideal uncertainty model describing a 
phenomenon of interest, but there is uncertainty as to which model is the correct model.  
For example, a set ( )P I  of distributions that are consistent with the available information 
was defined in Section 3.4.5.  Each of these distributions is a particular model of the first-
order uncertainty.  One of the distributions in ( )P I  is the true or ideal distribution, but 
the DM is unsure which.  In a second-order uncertainty approach, the DM would model 
this uncertainty about the uncertainty, perhaps even using as second-order probability, as 
described in the following. 
3.5.1 Second-order probabilities 
In a second-order probability model in the Bayesian community, probability 
measures are defined over a set of probabilities or other probability measures (Good 
1980, Berger 1985).  One simple model is just to assume that each of the probability 
distributions in ( )P I  is equally likely to be the true distribution.  In this example, the 




particular probabilities to each of the probability distributions, which is can be called a 
second-order probability model (Utkin and Augustin 2003). 
In theory, if second-order probabilities are embraced, then third-order, fourth-
order, and so on probabilities can also be embraced.  Each higher-order probability 
describes the likelihood of some particular lower-order probability being the correct 
description of that order probability.  Each level becomes less precise, because if a 
higher-order probability were more precise, it could readily be collapsed to a lower order.  
For example, if the second-order probabilities were zero for all ( ) ( )jp x P I∈  except for 
some ( )ip x  for which the second-order probability were one, then the first order 
probability is known precisely to be ( )ip x  and there is no need for higher order 
probabilities. 
In the context of decision making with expected value maximization (e.g. 
expected utility maximization), the use of second-order probabilities provides little 
benefit.  The result of taking the expectation over the two probabilities distributions is 
still a single point estimate of the value.  Consequently, the second-order probability 
model could be collapsed into some first-order probability model that is equivalent 
(Walley 1991, Utkin 2003). 
From an elicitation perspective (meaning the process of determining subjective 
probabilities), it may be useful to consider second-order probabilities even though they 
could collapse into a single first-order probability.  For example, it may provide a useful 
way of thinking about the problem.  It may be easier for a DM to first define a set of 
candidate probabilities, and then express relative beliefs about them.  These “second-
order” beliefs really reflect a “first-order” belief about the problem, since the higher order 
distributions could be collapsed to a first-order probability, but the process may be a 
useful construct for eliciting this information.  These comments are speculative in nature, 
and as such the value of higher-order probability models in elicitation is an area for future 




hierarchical model has been found useful, especially when one individual (the “modeler”) 
is modeling the beliefs of another individual (the “subject”).   
3.5.2 Imprecise probabilities as a second-order uncertainty 
model 
An interval is a specific model of uncertainty.  An interval provides upper and 
lower bounds on some value, but provides no information about where in the interval a 
value falls or is likely to fall.  An interval clearly the best model of at least one source of 
uncertainty; specifically, the uncertainty related to a non-detection (Ferson, et al. 2002a).   
More specifically, Ferson and coauthors describe how many measuring devices 
have a particular detection threshold.  In an environmental risk assessment, a DM may be 
interested in the concentration x  of some chemical in a sample.  However, more 
measurement devices have some threshold—a detection limit below which the device 
will not detect the presence of the chemical.   
If the detection limit is D  and the device does not detect the chemical in a 
sample, then all that can be said about the sample is that the concentration x  is in the 
interval [0, ]D .  Nothing can be said about the probability of where x  falls in the interval.  
A rigorous analysis must be based on the entire interval, such that all of the points are 
considered, because all of those points could be the true one.  In order to be sure to 
consider the true one, all must be considered.   
Imprecise probability theory adopts a similar view towards the interval of 
probabilities that are consistent with the available information.  Because the DM cannot 
be sure where in this interval the true probability lies, his or her actions must be 
consistent with all probabilities in the interval. 
An interval is a particular type of set, specifically a bounded neighborhood of real 
numbers.  Imprecise probability theory works in this more general setting, in which the 




For example, if upper and lower probabilities are stated for some uncertain quantity X , 
then [ ( ), ( )]P X P X  represent the set of probabilities that are consistent with the available 
information. 
The key distinction between imprecise probability theory and second-order 
probability models is that no probabilities are assigned over the members of the set ( )P I .  
This is considered the most basic expression of imprecision; the DM lacks the 
information necessary to identify exactly which probability is the most appropriate or the 
true probability.  However, other researchers have explored the issue of expressing non-
interval second-order uncertainties. 
3.5.3 Other hierarchical uncertainty models 
Researchers have proposed other hierarchical uncertainty models, including fuzzy 
probabilities (Watson, et al. 1979, Zadeh 1984a, Pan and Yuan 1997), second-order 
possibility distributions (Walley 1997), the “confidence-weighted” upper and lower 
probabilities of Nau (1992), and the “reliability measures” of Gärdenfors and Sahlin 
(1982, 1983).  More recently, de Cooman and Walley (2002) have developed a model 
that includes aspects of these other models, but also has a behavioral interpretation.   
de Cooman and Walley note that both a Bayesian hierarchical model (second-
order probability) and a possibilistic hierarchical model can be useful, concluding that 
[quoting a reference to (Walley and De Cooman 2001) that appears in (de Cooman and 
Walley 2002)]: 
In summary, the Bayesian hierarchical model appears to be 
appropriate when the modeler has extensive information 
about a Bayesian subject’s uncertainty, whereas the 
possibilistic hierarchical model seems to be appropriate 
when the modeler has little information about the subject’s 




which commonly arises from vague probability 
assessments. 
de Cooman and Walley (2002) note that the normal situation falls between those 
two extremes, and as such a more general model is needed.  For example, Walley (1991) 
Section 5.10 contains a general hierarchical model in which coherent upper and lower 
previsions are used to represent both first-order and second-order uncertainties.  Upper 
and lower previsions are the core measures in the theory of imprecise probabilities, and 
as such, it appears that the theory summarized in Section 3.4 is a rigorous and general 
starting point for building a generalized uncertainty model that captures both imprecision 
and irreducible uncertainty. 
3.6 A general mathematical representation of 
decisions under uncertainty 
Given the conclusion that imprecision is an important component of uncertainty 
and that imprecise probabilities are a promising model of uncertainty, it is useful to 
formulate a mathematical model of the design problem.  While this model is not widely 
used in the dissertation outside of Chapter 6, the consideration of its construction 
provides valuable insight into the nature of the problem. 
The model is built in three stages, beginning with a traditional, precise model.  In 
the development of the model, certain concepts are more easily grasped in the continuous 
case, while others are more easily understood in terms of the discrete, finite case.  The 
models developed in this subsection are not meant to be complete or universally 
applicable.  They are presented primarily to form a context for the discussion in the 
remainder of this thesis. 
3.6.1 Precise model 
A DM has a set of alternative actions 1{ ,..., }mA a a=  (assumed finite for 




by some uncertain future state of the world.  This state is one of the (assumed finite) set 
1{ ,..., }rS s s=  of all possible states of the world.  Each state of the world has a probability 
( )jp s  associated with it.  For a given pair of an action and a state, the DM will receive a 
single consequence ( , )i jg a s .  The DM’s preferences are modeled by a utility function 
( )u g .  According to von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern 1944), the DM should choose the action *a  that maximizes the expected 
utility, given by Equation (3.12) for the discrete case. 
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E u p s u g a s
=
= ⋅∑  (3.12) 
If the state of the world is expressed with a continuous variable, Equation (3.13) 
can be used instead. 
 [ ] ( ) ( ( , ))iE u p s u g a s ds= ⋅∫  (3.13) 
The normative model of utility theory is appropriate if the probabilities, utility 
functions, and consequences are known perfectly.  However, the preceding chapters have 
shown that such assumptions are not always reasonable. 
3.6.2 Basic imprecise model 
The model presented in this section is based on the general model for decision 
making with incomplete information developed by Weber (1987).  The first change from 
the basic precise model of Section 3.6.1 is the allowance for imprecise probabilities.  In 
the continuous case, this means that rather than being represented by a single distribution 
( )p s , the probability density of the state of the world is given by a class, or credal set 
(Levi 1980), of distributions.  In the discrete case, this would mean that ( )ip s  would 
equal a set (e.g., interval) of values rather than a single value. 
More generally, if one assumes that the information available (which includes 




preferences ) for a particular decision at a given point in time is given by I , then one can 
write that ( ) ( )p s P I∈ , meaning that ( )P I  is the set of all probability density functions 
that are consistent with the given information I , as was done in Section 3.4.5.  
Furthermore, a DM can have incomplete information about more than just probabilities.  
While this dissertation focuses on probabilities, the decision model derived here will be 
more general. 
In addition to imprecise probability information, a DM may not have full 
knowledge of his or her preferences, and consequently may not be able to identify an 
appropriate utility function.  It is therefore useful to define ( )U I  as the set of all utility 
functions consistent with the available information.  Note that a particular utility function 
will naturally be a function of the design alternatives, but the admissibility of a particular 
function into ( )U I  is theoretically independent of the available alternatives.  The 
admissibility of a function into ( )U I  is purely a function of the DM’s preferences and the 
available information about them.  It may be possible in practice to further limit the set 
( )U I  based on information about the alternatives.  For example, if no alternative 
produces dangerous air contaminants, then there is no reason to model the DM’s 
preferences for air pollution into the utility model. 
One can define ( )G I  as the set of all consequences that are consistent with the 
available information.  The utility functions are then defined such as ( ( , ))u g a s , where 
( )u U I∈  and ( , ) ( )g a s G I∈ .  A consequence ( , )g a s  is a function of the action taken, 
a , and the state of the world, s . Possible causes for the existence of only imprecise 
knowledge about the consequences of a particular action-state pair include the use of 
simplified models or an incomplete understanding of physical phenomena, as was 




3.6.3 Generalized imprecise model 
The preceding model is reasonably complete assuming that the state of the world 
and all of the consequences of an action can each be summarized with a single parameter.  
In many cases, engineers do not develop their analysis models in these terms, but rather 
consider multiple types of consequences and multiple uncertainties. 
3.6.3.1 Multiple types of consequences 
More generally, engineers are concerned with multiple consequences.  These 
consequences are often measured in quantities such as mass, cost, and performance.  It is 
therefore necessary to generalize the consequence function into a vector of consequences, 
1( , ) { ( , ),..., ( , )}hg a s g a s g a s= .  In this model, ( )G I  becomes the set of consequence 
vectors that are consistent with the available information.  In the general model, it is 
important to note that the individual ( , )ig a s  do not necessarily represent analytical 
functions.  In fact, the form of the ( , )ig a s  may change depending on the alternative 
chosen.  For example, the function ( , )ig a s  that calculates the volume of a container 
depends on the geometry, so if alternative 1a  is a sphere and alternative 2a  is a cube, 
clearly 1 1( , )ig a s  will be evaluated using a different formula than 2 1( , )ig a s  will be.  It is 
thus crucial to think of the ig ’s as consequence types rather than functions.   
3.6.3.2 Multiple utilities 
The expansion to multiple consequence types requires a change in the utility 
formulation.  Specifically, the problem is now a multi-attribute utility problem (Keeney 
and Raiffa 1993, Thurston 2001, Scott 2004).  In this model, it is assumed that a utility 
function can be defined for each consequence, such that if ig  represents the mass of the 
design, a utility function ( )i iu g  can be created that reflects the DM’s preference for 
mass.  It is assumed that the individual utilities can be aggregated into a single utility 
measure, for example by using the additive independence form shown in Equation (3.14).  




Multiplicative relationships are also possible.  See (Keeney and Raiffa 1993, Thurston 
2001, Scott 2004) for more information. 
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u g a s k u g a s
=
= ⋅∑  (3.14) 
3.6.3.3  Multiple uncertain parameters 
The preceding models assume that the uncertain state of the world is captured by 
a single parameter s .  Engineers rarely think in these strict terms but rather view things 
in terms in of multiple uncertain parameters.  For example, the mass of a rectangular 
block is given by Equation (3.15). 
 mass density length width height= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  (3.15) 
Due to manufacturing imperfections and measurement errors, none of the 
parameters can be determined precisely.  In a strict sense, any combination of 
uncertainties in these four parameters represents a single state of the world, but engineers 
generally think of them as separate (though not necessarily independent) events.  
Engineers may specify intervals, probabilities distributions, or even p-boxes (see Chapter 
4) for each parameter.  In order for the mathematical model to describe such approaches, 
the notion of a state must be extended. 
A state is now defined to consist of a vector of uncertain quantities, such that 
1{ ,..., }ns x x= .  For example, perhaps { , , ,..}s mass volume strength=  The uncommon 
pre-subscripts are used to avoid confusion with common notation in which ix  represents 
a particular outcome of an uncertain quantity.  For example, a particular realization of the 
uncertain quantity 1 x  can be written as 1 ix .   
The consideration of separate uncertain quantities is practical because the 
uncertainty in different parameters often has different sources and specific effects, and 




However, the separation of uncertainty into different quantities also necessitates the 
aggregation of uncertainty from these constituent parts back into an overall uncertainty in 
order to consider things such as expected consequences or expected utilities.  This need 
to perform such calculations and to propagate uncertainty through engineering models 
and decisions motivates much of this dissertation.  
Associated with each i x  is a true probability distribution ( )i ip x .  In general this 
true distribution is not known precisely, and it is more general to define  ( ) ( )ij i ip x P I∈  
where ( )iP I  is the set of probability distributions for i x  that is consistent with the 
available information. 
3.6.3.4 Separating probabilistic and imprecise parameters for comparisons to 
existing methods 
The uncertain quantities { }i x  are a more general class than random variables 
because they can represent both probabilistic and imprecise quantities.  While a 
probability bounds analysis can usually represent this combined information, other 
approaches cannot, so it is useful to make an additional restriction on the mathematical 
model that allows for comparison to traditional approaches. 
As an example of a general uncertain parameter that is both probabilistic and 
imprecise, it may be that 2 x  is known to be normally distributed, but the mean of the 
distribution may not be known precisely; the mean is itself an uncertain quantity, 1 x  for 
example.  If the variance is known to be 2σ , one can then write 22 1( , )x N x σ∼ .   
In some uncertainty models, such as probability bounds analysis, the DM could 
represent the uncertain quantity 2 x  directly.  However, for comparison to formalisms that 
do not generalize both probability and interval theory, it is necessary to decompose the 
problem into purely probabilistic and purely imprecise parameters.  For clarity, it is now 
useful to assume that the set of uncertain parameters is grouped, such that 1 x  through k x  




parameters.  It is thus assumed that there are k  imprecise parameters and n k−  purely 
probabilistic parameters.  Associated with each of the n k−  probabilistic parameters 
{   1,..., }i x i k n∀ = +  is a precise distribution function ( )i ip x  whose parameters may or 
may not be known.  If ( )i ip x  involved imprecise parameters, then really ( )i ip x  
represents a set of distributions ( )iP I  that are consistent with the available information.  
If the parameters of ( )i ip x  are not known precisely, then these parameters must be 
expressed as uncertain, imprecise quantities i x (such that 1,...,i k= ) in the model. 
A necessary assumption of using this method is that the structure of the 
probabilistic uncertainties, that is, the forms of the probability distributions (such as 
Normal, Weibull, Gamma) are known precisely, but the parameters are not.  The ability 
of probability bounds analysis to relax this assumption10 is one of the advantages 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
In general, the probabilistic parameters could be inherently random or based on 
subjective probabilities.  The key distinction is how well the uncertainty is characterized.  
The determination of whether to represent the uncertainty using subjective probabilities 
or intervals is admittedly left to the discretion of the DM.  However, one advantage of 
PBA methods is that they allow for both types of uncertainty to be represented in a well-
defined manner, and an expert can even construct a p-box without explicitly making this 
decision.  For example, the DM could construct a p-box by thinking directly about the set 
of distributions that he or she feels are consistent with the available information and his 
or her beliefs.   




10 A general p-box (defined in Section 4.1) relaxes this constraint.  A parameterized p-box 





This chapter contains an overview of several uncertainty models, a step in 
answering the second motivating question posed in Section 1.5.  The need for operational 
definitions was presented, and several uncertainty models were described.  Probability 
theory and imprecise probability theory were discussed in detail, and a motivation for 
probabilities that are most generally imprecise and subjective was provided.  Finally, the 
nature of an imprecise decision problem was captured by defining a general mathematical 
description of the problem.  The next chapter describes probability bounds analysis 
(PBA) in more detail, and the following chapters discuss the application of PBA to 
design problems, including validating the answers to motivating questions 1 and 2 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3 via example and general argument, and addressing 







PROBABILITY BOUNDS ANALYSIS (PBA) 
 
In the previous chapter, several uncertainty models were explored, and it was 
suggested that engineers model uncertainty using probabilities that are most generally 
subjective and imprecise.  It was also noted that computing with general imprecise 
probabilities is extremely expensive, relying on difficult mathematical programming 
problems.  It is therefore useful to place additional constraints on the set of allowable 
distributions ( )iP I  for each uncertain parameter.  One approach to further constraining 
the problem is called probability bounds analysis (PBA), in which the set ( )iP I  is limited 
to distributions that are contained in a probability box, or p-box.   
P-boxes are introduced and defined in Section 4.1.  The expressivity of the p-box 
uncertainty model is discussed in Section 4.2, particularly focusing on how p-boxes 
generalize traditional probability theory.  Section 4.3 is an examination of methods for 
constructing p-boxes from available information.  In Section 4.4, the interpretation of a p-
box is considered.  Methods for computing with p-boxes are presented in Section 4.5.  
Finally, Section 4.6 contains a preliminary description of decision-making with p-boxes, 
focusing on the calculation of the expected value of an uncertain parameter that is 
described by a p-box. 
4.1 Probability boxes (p-boxes) 
In probability bounds analysis (PBA), uncertainty is represented in a structure 
called a probability box, or p-box (Ferson and Donald 1998).  A general p-box is defined 




above and below.  The CDF for a traditional random variable X  is written as  ( )XF x  and 
is defined in Equation (4.1).  ( )XF x  represents the probability that the value of the 
uncertain quantity X  is less than some set value x . In this dissertation, this notation is 
directly extended for all uncertainty quantities11 X . 
 ( ) ( )XF x P X x= ≤  (4.1) 
As defined by Bruns and Paredis (2006), the formal definition of the general p-
box X  of some uncertain quantity X is a set of non-decreasing (cumulative probability) 
distribution functions (CDFs) constrained by the bounds in Equation (4.2). 
 { }( ) : ,  ( ) ( ) ( )X X X XX F x x F x F x F x= ∀ ∈ ≤ ≤  (4.2) 
In Equation (4.2), ( )XF x  and ( )XF x  are respectively the lower and upper 
cumulative probability bounds, and ( )XF x  is non-decreasing with x. Graphically, a p-box 
is a region bounded by two CDFs, as shown in Figure 4.1(a).  Any distributions (such as 
those shown in Figure 4.1(b)) entirely inside the general p-box are considered consistent 
with the available information and possibly the true distribution.  Any distribution that 
falls even partially outside of the p-box is considered inconsistent with the available 
information. 




11 The distinction is purely one of nomenclature.  The use of the term “random variable” 
suggests inherent randomness.  An uncertain quantity can reflect random behaviors, 




By definition, any CDF that does not violate the bounds in Equation (4.2) is 
acceptable and “contained” in the general p-box.  As shown in Figure 4.2(a), these 
distributions could take any (non-decreasing) functional form.  It is therefore useful to 
also define a parameterized p-box, such as shown in Figure 4.2(b), which limits the 
contained distributions to particular admissible types. 
A parameterized p-box assumes a particular distribution type but leaves the 
parameters as imprecise quantities.  For example, if uncertain parameter X  is known to 
be normally distributed but with an imprecise mean, [ , ]μ μ μ∈ , and an imprecise 























































( )P X x≤
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( )P X x≤
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Figure 4.2.  General and parameterized p-boxes with the same bounding functions but 




standard deviation, [ ],σ σ σ∈ , then this total uncertainty could be written as 
~ ([ , ],[ , ])X N μ μ σ σ . This imprecise probability distribution corresponds to the 
parameterized p-box given in Equation (4.3), which is specific to a normal distribution.   
 [ ]{ },( ; , ) ( ) : , , ,P XX F x xμ σμ σ μ μ μ σ σ σ⎡ ⎤= = Φ ∈ ∈⎣ ⎦  (4.3) 
In Equation (4.3), the superscript P  denotes that the p-box is parameterized.  The 
difference between general and parameterized p-boxes is displayed in Figure 4.2.  Both 
of these p-boxes have the same bounds, in the sense that for all ix , the cumulative 
probability ( )X iF x  will have the same bounds, meaning that ( ) ( ) ( )X i X i X iF x F x F x≤ ≤ .  
However, the general p-box in Figure 4.2(a) contains an infinite number of non-
decreasing functions that are not found in the parameterized p-box in Figure 4.2(b).  A 
parameterized p-box will not contain all non-decreasing functions between its lower and 
upper bounding functions. The bounds themselves may not even be in the p-box, because 
the bounds on the cumulative probabilities are not guaranteed to have a functional form 
that is allowable.     
For example, a parameterized p-box for a normal distribution with imprecise 
mean and variance is shown in Figure 4.3.  The bounds of the p-box are not CDFs 
corresponding to normal distributions, as is readily concluded given the discontinuity in 
each bound at a cumulative probability of 0.5.  This occurs because the bounds are 
formed by what are actually several allowable distributions, as shown in Figure 4.4.  
Recalling that the bounds on the mean are [ , ]μ μ μ∈  and the bounds on the standard 
deviation are [ , ]σ σ σ∈ , and accounting for the independence between the imprecision in 
the mean and standard deviation (meaning the smallest value of the mean could 
correspond to either the highest standard deviation or the lowest standard deviation), the 
actual bounds on the p-box correspond to the envelope of four distributions: ( , )N μ σ , 
( , )N μ σ , ( , )N μ σ , and ( , )N μ σ .  Any normal distribution with [ , ]μ μ μ∉  and/or 




























































Figure 4.3. Resulting p-box Figure 4.4. Forming bounds of the p-box 
4.2 Expressivity of a p-box 
A p-box is a more expressive generalization of both traditional probability 
distributions and interval representations, as is illustrated in Figure 4.5.  The p-box 
incorporates both imprecision and probabilistic characterizations by expressing interval 
bounds on the cumulative probability distribution function (CDF) for a random variable.  
In this way, a p-box explicitly expresses both probability (represented by the shapes of 
the boundary CDFs) and imprecision (represented by the separation between the upper 




































The p-box is general enough to represent intervals, scalars, and probability 
distributions, as well as imprecise probability distributions. An interval [ , ]X a b=  






















A scalar a  corresponds to the degenerate bounds shown in Equation (4.6).  
 
0,  
( ) ( )
1,  X X
x a
F x F x
x a
<⎧
= = ⎨ ≥⎩
 (4.6) 
As an example of a precise probability distribution, a normally distributed random 
variable, ~ ( , )X N μ σ , corresponds to the p-box containing only one CDF, in which 
,( ) ( ) ( )X XF x F x xμ σ= = Φ ,  where , ( )xμ σΦ  is the cumulative distribution function of the 
normal distribution with mean μ  and standard deviation σ .  
The ability of p-boxes to reduce to traditional probability distributions is a major 
advantage of p-boxes over other uncertainty models such as imprecise probabilities.  In 
cases in which a decision-maker (DM) has a large amount of information, a p-box 
approaches a precise probability distribution.  For example, if * ( )XF x  is the true, precise 
distribution, then *( ) ( )X XF x F x→  and 
*( ) ( )X XF x F x→   as the amount of information 
increases towards infinity. 
A p-box is less expressive than a general imprecise probability because of the 
restrictions the type of distributions that can be considered consistent with the available 
information.  In a general theory of imprecise probabilities, the only constraint placed on 
the set of distributions consistent with the available information is that the distributions 




be captured using the bounds shown in Equation (4.2) or as a parameterized p-box such 
as shown in Equation (4.3) for a normal distribution.   
The bounding distributions of a p-box define intervals of (cumulative) 
probabilities.  Walley (1991, 1996, 2000) has provided an example that shows how 
bounds on probabilities (e.g. p-boxes) cannot capture all possible states of imprecise 
information (the most concise description is Example 2 in (Walley 2000)).  In Walley’s 
example, the DM is asked to consider a football game with three possible outcomes for 
the home team, labeled as W (win), D (draw), and L (loss).  The DM makes three 
qualitative judgments about his or her uncertainty in the outcome of the game: 
i. ‘not win’ is at least as probable  
ii. win is at least as probable as draw 
iii. draw is at least as probable as loss 
Judgment (i) can be represented in terms of upper and lower probabilities as either 
1
2( )P W ≤  or 12( )P D L∪ ≥ .  The other judgments cannot be expressed in terms of upper 
and lower probabilities.  Walley notes that the statement ( ) ( )P W P D≥  is too strong for 
judgment (ii).  The reason is that the intervals for ( )P W  and ( )P D  can actually overlap.  
For example, assume that (ii) is the only constraint.  Then the following are possible 
intervals: ( ) [0,1]P W =  and ( ) [0,1]P D = .  For any value in ( ) [0,1]P W =  it is possible to 
find at least one value in ( ) [0,1]P D =  such that “win is at least as probable as draw.”  
However, the true value must satisfy the following relations: ( ) ( ) ( ) 1P W P D P L+ + =  
and ( ) ( )P W P D≥ .   
Rather than being expressible as ordered upper and lower probabilities, the three 
judgments should be seen as constraints on a coherent lower prevision of the form: (i) 
1
2( )P W ≤ ; (ii) ( ) ( )P W P D≥ ; and (iii) ( ) ( )P D P L≥ .  Naturally, the constraint 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1P W P D P L+ + =  also exists.  This set of constraints defines a closed convex 





4.3 Constructing p-boxes 
There are several ways to construct p-boxes (Ferson, et al. 2002b, Ferson, et al. 
2005), depending on the type of information available.  In this dissertation, a procedure is 
presented that constructs p-boxes from statistical data samples using 95% confidence 
intervals on the parameters of a known distribution type.  While the distribution type will 
not always be known, in engineering applications it is common that some theoretical 
knowledge can guide the selection of a distribution type  (Utkin and Augustin 2003).  
However, such knowledge is not a requirement for using PBA.  Probability boxes also 
can be constructed based on distribution-free methods, such as using just statistical data 
or moments (Ferson 2002) or by using the empirical distribution and the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic to form bounds on the true distribution (Ferson, et al. 2005).  If the 
engineer believes that several distributions are consistent with the available information, 
he or she could assume different types of distribution, construct p-boxes for each, and 
then take the envelope of all of these to form the most general p-box. 
As noted above, the method of constructing a p-box from statistical data 
developed and used in this thesis assumes that the underlying probability distribution type 
for an uncertain quantity is known.  The p-box is constructed in order to reflect the DM’s 
lack of information (imprecision) about the parameters of this distribution.  The method 
is developed and demonstrated with the assumption that the true distribution is a normal 
distribution (i.e. Gaussian).  The generalization of this method to other distributions is 
addressed in Section 4.3.3.   
4.3.1 Constructing p-boxes for normally distributed uncertain 
parameters 
In this example, the DM assumes the uncertain quantity X  is normally 
distributed, but with unknown mean and standard deviation: 




The DM estimates the true but unknown μ  and σ  using the unbiased point 
estimates shown in the following equations, in which the ix ’s are the sample 









= = ∑  (4.8) 






s x xσ −
=
= = −∑  (4.9) 
These quantities are called respectively the sample mean (4.8) and sample 
variance (4.9) and are commonly used in pure probabilistic approaches.  In order to 
construct a p-box, the point estimates of the parameters are broadened into confidence 
intervals.  In this development, a 95% confidence level is used, but any confidence level 
is allowable, as noted in the next  section. 
Since the set 1 2{ , ,..., }nx x x  is a random sample from a normal distribution,  the 
sampling distribution of the statistic shown in Equation (4.10) is the t distribution with 






=  (4.10) 
Letting 2, 1ntα −  be the upper 2α  percentile of the t distribution with 1n −  degrees 
of freedom, Equation (4.11) can be found. 
 { }2, 1 2, 1 1n nP t t tα α α− −− ≤ ≤ = −  (4.11) 
Substituting for t  from Equation (4.10) into Equation (4.11) and solving for the 
mean μ , t a ( )1 100%α−  confidence interval for the mean is found, given in the 
following equation.   




Since 1 2{ , ,..., }nx x x  is a random sample from a normal distribution,  it can be 
shown that the sampling distribution for the variance is chi-square with 1n −  degrees of 
freedom, as shown in Equation (4.13), where n  is the sample size and 2s  is the sample 









=  (4.13) 
To develop the confidence interval, Equation (4.14) is noted. 
 { }2 2 21 2, 1 2, 1 1n nP α αχ χ χ α− − −≤ ≤ = −  (4.14) 
Substituting for 2χ  from Equation (4.13) into Equation (4.14) and solving for the 
variance 2σ , one arrives at a ( )1 100%α−  confidence interval for the variance, given in 
Equation (4.15). 








n s n s
α α
σ σ
χ χ− − −
⎡ ⎤− −
⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (4.15) 
A table of t  and 2χ  values is found in most probability and statistic books, such 
as (Hines, et al. 2003).  
4.3.2 Choosing the confidence level for p-box construction 
In general, there is no rule for selecting the confidence level at which to construct 
a p-box.  However, a confidence level has a clear interpretation; if something, such as 
confidence interval on a point estimate, is constructed at the 95% confidence level, it 
means that if the experiment were repeated many times and a 95% confidence interval 
constructed for each repetition, then 95% of those intervals would contain the true value.  
An individual DM must understand the consequences of confidence levels and choose 
one that is appropriate for the problem and preferences at hand.    
In this way, the selection of a confidence level has some of the same limitations as 




using confidence levels and p-boxes instead of Bayesian analysis.  The first is the 
separation of imprecision and irreducible uncertainty, as discussed in Section 3.3.5.  The 
second is that confidence levels have a clear meaning and are consistent, in that (for a 
given uncertain quantity) the 99% confidence interval always contains the 95% 
confidence interval which always contains the 90% confidence level and so on.  
Conversely, the use of different prior (i.e. input) distribution in Bayesian analysis can 
lead to very different posterior (i.e. output) distributions, yet it is not obvious in a 
posterior distribution what the initial assumptions were.   
4.3.3 Constructing p-boxes for other distributions 
In Section 4.3.1, the construction of p-boxes was illustrated under the assumption 
that the true distribution is normal.  In order to construct p-boxes for other distributions 
using this method, it is only necessary to find the appropriate statistical descriptions for 
confidence intervals on the distribution’s parameters.  For example, if the true 
distribution is assumed to be a Weibull distribution, then one needs to create confidence 
intervals for the parameters of the Weibull distribution.  More specifically, if Z  follows a 
Weibull distribution, then ~ ( , )Z Weibull α β , and the parameters of concern are α  and 
β .  These parameters are not easily defined in terms of sample statistics, and their 
relationships to the mean and variance are given in Equations (4.16) and (4.17). 
 1(1 )μ β α −= ⋅Γ −  (4.16) 
 2 2 1 2 1(1 2 ) (1 )σ β α α− −= ⋅Γ − −Γ −  (4.17) 
One way of estimating α  and β  is using maximum likelihood (or log-likelihood) 
estimates.  Confidence intervals can then be constructed using bootstrapping methods 
(Efron and Tibshirani 1993).  These methods are not explicitly tested in this dissertation.  
This section discusses how it is possible in principle to construct such p-boxes, and the 




assuming the uncertain parameter is normally distributed.  The actual use of maximum 
likelihood estimates and bootstrapping techniques to create p-boxes for non-normal 
uncertain parameters is left for future work.   
4.4 Interpreting a p-box 
For illustration, it is easiest to consider a p-box as constructed at the 100% 
confidence level, though in most practical problems such a p-box would be infinite.  In 
this case, the p-box expresses the range of all CDFs that are still deemed possible based 
on existing information.  For example, assume that for all practical purposes, X  is a 
random variable, and engineers have strong theoretical information that X  is normally 
distributed with known variance 2 =1σ .   However, the engineers can only characterize 
the mean imprecisely, bounding it in the interval µ=[0,1] .  Extending the notation of 
probability, one can write  
 2X~N(µ, )=N( [0,1] , 1)σ . (4.18) 
The corresponding p-box is shown on page 118 in Figure 4.1.  In this case, the 
bounds on the p-box are defined by the two distributions, F~N(0,1)  and F~N(1,1) .  The 
true CDF is unknown, and any of the infinite number of normal CDFs inside the p-box 
with variance of one could be the true distribution.  However, any distribution that falls 
partially or entirely outside of the p-box is inconsistent with the present state of 
information. 
Vertical slices of the p-box yield intervals on the cumulative probability for a 
particular realization.  For example, a vertical slice at zero yields the interval for the 
cumulative probability of [0.1587, 0.5].  This means that the probability that X  is less 
than zero is between 0.1587 and 0.5, but one does not have enough information to specify 




on the quantiles of the cumulative probability. For example, a slice at the median 
(cumulative probability =0.5) gives the interval [0,1] for the median.   
4.5 Computing with p-boxes 
Although not quite as expressive as imprecise probabilities, p-boxes have the 
advantage that relatively efficient algorithms have been developed to compute with p-box 
uncertainties.    For examples of p-box propagation algorithms in the literature, see the 
work of Williamson and Downs (1990), Ferson and co-authors (Ferson and Ginzburg 
1996, Ferson and Donald 1998, Oberkampf, et al. 2002a, Ferson and Hajagos 2004), and 
Berleant and coauthors (Berleant 1993, Berleant and Goodman-Strauss 1998, Berleant, et 
al. 2003, Berleant and Zhang 2004).  The method of Ferson and co-authors is based on 
the work of Williamson and Downs and uses interval-based operations to propagate 
uncertainty.    Berleant’s method uses optimization rather than interval-based operations.  
Together, these methods can be called dependency bounds convolution (DBC) methods.  
This method is taken as the base case in this dissertation.  Several recent methods for 
computing with p-boxes are explored and developed by Bruns, Paredis, and Ferson 
(2006).  These methods are mentioned briefly in Section 4.5.2.  Much of this section is 
adapted from this paper and work included in the master’s thesis of Bruns (2006). 
4.5.1 Dependency Bounds Convolution (DBC) 
Dependency bounds convolution (or DBC) (Ferson and Donald 1998, Ferson 
2000, Tucker and Ferson 2003, Ferson and Hajagos 2004) is a term used to describe a 
class of rigorous methods for propagating p-boxes through mathematical models.  The 
results of DBC are rigorous in the sense that the resultant probability bounds are 
guaranteed to contain the true probability distribution of the uncertain quantity for any 
possible dependence relationship between the inputs—assuming that the input p-boxes 




can also be described as best-possible in the sense that they are as tight as possible given 
the information provided in the input p-boxes, assuming there are no repeated variables 
(see Section 4.5.2 ).  Finally, DBC calculations are applicable towards non-parameterized 
p-boxes.  This means that no assumptions are made about the true probability distribution 
other than that it is contained within the p-boxes bounding functions.   
Two methods for DBC were developed independently by Williamson and Downs 
(Williamson 1989, Williamson and Downs 1990) and Berleant and co-authors (Berleant 
1993, Berleant and Goodman-Strauss 1998, Berleant and Zhang 2004).  The method of 
Berleant is also referred to as Distribution Envelope Determination (or DEnv), but in this 
dissertation the two methods are grouped under the name DBC.  Regan, Ferson, and 
Berleant have shown that the method of Williamson and Downs and DEnv are equivalent 
for binary operations of p-boxes defined on the positive real numbers (Regan, et al. 
2004). 
Although it is unnecessary to fully describe mathematical details of the methods 
for DBC that are developed elsewhere (Williamson 1989, Williamson and Downs 1990, 
Ferson and Donald 1998), it is helpful to sketch in outline how these methods function.  
The DBC calculation begins with a bounding discretization of the input p-boxes.  This is 
done by partitioning the p-box into a set of n  horizontal slices.  Each slice is fully 
described by a probability mass (the vertical height of the slice) and an interval 
corresponding to lower and upper bounds on a subset of the domain of the uncertain 
quantity.  For example, the p-box X  shown in Figure 4.6 is discretized into four slices, 
each of probability mass 0.25.  The discretized p-box contains the true p-box.  The 
second slice from the bottom is associated with the closed interval [ ]2 2,x x . 
The algorithms of Williamson and Downs (1990) provide deterministic and 
rigorous approximations of binary functions of discretized p-boxes.   Any binary function 
of p-boxes can be analyzed in the context of a Cartesian product of the input p-boxes.  




convolution of Dempster-Shafer structures.  Consider some binary function of uncertain 
quantities, ( ),Z f X Y= .  If the uncertain inputs, X  and Y , are discretized into m 
and n slices, respectively, then the resultant Cartesian product is an mn-element list of 
interval-mass pairs.   
Suppose that the discretization slices for the two inputs are evenly distributed 
along the cumulative probability axis.  Then every slice for  X  has probability mass 
1 m , and every slice for Y  has probability mass 1 n .  Also, the slices of X  are labeled 
as the intervals [ ], , 1,...,i i ix x x i m= =  and the slices of Y  as , , 1,...,j j jy y y j n⎡ ⎤= =⎣ ⎦ .  
Then the ijth-element of the Cartesian product for ( ),Z f X Y= , assuming statistical 
independence between the inputs, is ( )1 1( , ),i j m nf x y ×  where ( , )i jf x y  is the interval 
extension of the intervals ix  and jy .  The resultant p-box,  Z , in the case of 
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Figure 4.6.  A discretized p-box. 
Although this result for the statistically independent case is useful, a more 
powerful quality of DBC methods is the ability to determine probability bounds in the 
case of unknown dependence between the inputs.  Although engineers often lack 
knowledge about the true dependence between uncertain quantities, they still tend to 
assume independence in their models—an assumption that likely results in incorrect 




assumptions of independence or dependence.  Essentially, a p-box can be computed that 
covers all possible dependency scenarios. 
4.5.2 Limitations of DBC methods 
DBC methods are rigorous and efficient, but they must overcome at least two 
obstacles before they can be used effectively in engineering design. First, both of these 
approaches depend strongly on the methods of interval arithmetic for which the presence 
of repeated variables can result in over-conservative (i.e. not best-possible) solution 
bounds.   
In general, DBC are rigorous but not best possible.  In interval arithmetic (and by 
extension in probability bounds analysis), upper and lower bounds are best possible if the 
upper bound is as low as possible and the lower bound is as high as possible without 
conflicting with the true state of uncertainty.  Bounds are rigorous as long of the best 
possible bounds are included between them.   
Repeated variables in an expression often lead to bounds that are not best possible 
with interval arithmetic and DBC.  This can be summarized by the failure of the 
distributive law (Ferson 2002, Muhanna and Mullen 2004), which means, among other 
things, that in interval arithmetic it is not always true that ( )A B A C A B C⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ +  
(Ferson 2002).  This is a definite limitation of interval methods and PBA.  However, it is 
very useful that the methods are rigorous, meaning that the true interval ( )A B C⋅ +  is 
always contained in the calculated interval A B A C⋅ + ⋅ , so the calculated bounds are 
true, but not best possible.  Although overly conservative results can be avoided using 
sub-interval reconstitution methods (Moore 1979, Ferson and Hajagos 2004, Ferson, et 
al. 2004b), such methods are prohibitively expensive in realistic engineering problems 
with a large number of imprecise quantities.  
A second limitation of DBC is that it is not application to engineering problems 




model that is not an easily accessible, closed form algebraic equation.  For example, a 
simulation is a black-box from the perspective of analysis, as the interactions between the 
uncertainty analysis and simulation can only be through input and output behavior; an 
uncertainty analysis tool cannot interact with the inside (e.g. code) of the simulation.  It 
may be possible to recode these models using languages and methods that are suitable for 
p-box computations, but this would be prohibitively costly in most industry problems, 
where often legacy code is the rule rather than the exception.   
If a model is algebraic, it is easily translated into a white-box such that a p-box-
based or other uncertainty analysis method can interact directly with the core content of 
the model.  Some black-box propagation methods for interval propagation have been 
developed.  Trejo  and Kreinovich (2001) and Kreinovich and Ferson (2004) have 
developed a randomized algorithm for propagating interval uncertainty through black-
box models, but the method assumes that the black-box model is broadly linear in the 
region of sampling.  
Bruns and co-authors (Bruns 2006, Bruns and Paredis 2006, Bruns, et al. 2006) 
have summarized other methods and developed a new method called p-box convolution 
sampling (PCS).  These methods fall roughly into two classes: methods for parameterized 
p-boxes and methods for general p-boxes.  The four methods compared are DBC, PCS, 
optimized parameter sampling (OPS), and double loop sampling (DLS).  The three newer 
methods (PCS, OPS, and DLS) all involve sampling of the distributions in some way.  As 
a result, the rigor of DBC (in terms of the true distribution being guaranteed to be inside 
the resultant bounds) is lost.  However, the newer methods are all applicable to black-box 
models. 
OPS and DLS apply only to parameterized p-boxes.  Significant savings are 
possible when dealing with parameterized p-boxes because the function form of the 
CDFs is well defined, so the sampling in some sense is a sampling of the parameters of 




infinite number of distribution types included in the p-box.  This is value of the PCS 
method; it extends the application of PBA to black-box models when the uncertainty is 
described using a general p-box.     
The ability of PBA to be used with black-boxes is significant.  Bruns and co-
authors have shown (Bruns 2006, Bruns and Paredis 2006, Bruns, et al. 2006) reasonable 
performance of these methods in relatively simple engineering examples.  For this 
dissertation, the existence of methods for propagating p-boxes through black-box models 
is taken as sufficient to warrant the continued study of the benefits of using p-boxes in 
engineering design.  Once the potential benefit is established, future work can re-examine 
the computational costs and issues associated with applying the methods to more 
complex problems.  The demonstration of potential benefit is necessary to warrant 
additional research into improved computational methods; unless the potential benefit is 
identified, there is no reason to expend resources researching the computational methods. 
4.6 P-boxes and decision making 
P-boxes are a set of probability distributions describing some quantity.  Using the 
methods described in Section 4.5, it is possible to propagate uncertainty and p-boxes 
through calculations until a p-box for some end objective results.  For example, a p-box 
for the expected utility of a design alternative can be constructed.   
Such a p-box for utility would express the set of CDFs that could possibly 
describe the utility of a decision alternative given the available evidence.  In this 
dissertation, it is assumed that the utility functions are known precisely (i.e. can be fully 
elicited).  In the context of the general model described in Section 3.6, this means that the 
set ( )U I  contains only one function (recall that I  represents information available to the 
DM). 
In general, the utility function will not be known precisely and the set ( )U I  will 




probability distributions or the set ( )P I , so the more general and complicated case of 
imprecise probability distributions and imprecise utility functions is deferred for future 
work.  Like many things, engineering design uncertainty must be addressed one piece at a 
time, with a hopeful unifying theory emerging in the future from the components. 
4.6.1 Intervals of expected utility 
Utility theory defines the optimal decision as the selection of the alternative with 
the greatest expected utility.  When uncertainty is represented using a p-box, there is in 
general no single expected utility associated with an alternative.  This can be seen by 
revisiting the definition of mathematical expectation of a random quantity X .  In 
traditional statistics, the expected value is defined as the following: 
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[ ] ( )       (continuous random variable)
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Considering just the continuous case for now, if there are multiple PDFs ( )jp x , 
then there are multiple expectations, such as defined in Equation (4.20). 
 [ ] ( )  for all  such that ( ) ( )j j jE X x p x dx j p x P I
∞
−∞
= ⋅ ⋅ ∈∫  (4.20) 
When the set of allowable distributions ( )P I  is those distributions for which the 
CDF falls entirely inside the p-box of the uncertain quantity X , then there are an infinite 
number of ( )jp x , and consequently an infinite number of [ ]jE X .  However, this set of 
expected values forms an interval, given by Equation (4.21).  Using Equations (4.20) and 
(4.21), the notion of expected value is extended from a single random distribution to a 
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4.6.2 Calculating the expectation of a p-box 
The interval in Equation (4.21) can be found easily, as the it can be shown that the 
bounds on the expected value are found using the bounding distributions of the p-box.  
Before developing the proof, the mathematical notations from the general model and for 
the p-box definitions of Section 4.1 are revisited.  Recalling Equation (4.2) a p-box X  
for uncertain quantity X  is defined in terms of bounding CDFs, namely ( )XF x  and 
( )XF x .  Now, two particular PDFs ( )Xf x  and ( )Xf x  are defined in Equations (4.22) and 
(4.23). 
 
 ( ) ( ),  such that ( ) ( )
x
X X Xf x P I F x f t dt
−∞
∈ = ⋅∫  (4.22) 
 ( ) ( ),  such that ( ) ( )
x
X X Xf x P I F x f t dt
−∞
∈ = ⋅∫  (4.23) 
With these distributions defined, the bounds on expected value can be re-defined 
in terms of the bounding distributions as in Equation (4.24).  A proof follows. 
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Equation (4.24) is proved using reasoning based on first-order stochastic 
dominance and the definition of a p-box.  The proof of first order dominance is based on 
that by Levy (1998), but the extension to the p-box problem is a new contribution12.  The 
proof begins with a few definitions.  Let ( )F x  and ( )G x  represent two cumulative 
distribution functions, and let ( )f x  and ( )g x  represent the corresponding probability 
mass functions, such that ( ) '( )f x F x=  and ( ) '( )g x G x= .  The mathematical expectation 
is defined with a subscript indicating the distribution with which the expectation is to be 
calculated.  For example, assume some function ( )h x .  Then define 
[ ( )] ( ) ( )FE h x f x h x dx= ∫  and [ ( )] ( ) ( )GE h x g x h x dx= ∫ .   
A set 1N  is defined as the set of non-decreasing functions, such that for all 
1( )N x N∈ , '( ) 0N x ≥  for all x  in the domain of ( )N x  (the derivative with respect to x  
is non-negative).  The condition of first degree stochastic dominance can be summarized 
in Equation (4.25), which holds for all x  and all 1( ) NN x ∈ , with strict inequality for at 
least one 0x  and at least one 0 1( )N x N∈ . 
 ( ) ( )     [ ( )] [ ( )]F GF x G x E N x E N x≤ ⇔ ≥  (4.25) 
The proof is conducted with the additional assumption that x  is bounded from 
above and below.  This means that there exists some a  and b , b a≥  for which 
a x b≤ ≤ .  An extension of the proof of Equation (4.25) to unbounded random variables 
is given in Hanoch and Levy (1969)  and Tesfatsion (1976).  The following proof is made 
in two parts.  First, the consequences of Equation (4.25) with respect to calculating the 
expected value of a p-box are demonstrated.  Second, Equation (4.25) is proved. 




12 Huber (1981) and Walley (1981) have proved similar relationships for lower previsions 




4.6.2.1 Bounds on expected value correspond to bounds on a p-box 
Consider what Equation (4.25) means for the distributions in Figure 4.7, in which  clearly 
( ) ( )F x F x≤ , a relationship which is also guaranteed by the definition of a p-box in 
Equation (4.2).  Then by Equation (4.25), [ ( )] [ ( )]F FE N x E N x≥  for any 1( )N x N∈ .  
Expanding with the definition of the mathematical expectation results in Equations (4.26) 




E N x f x N x dx= ⋅ ⋅∫  (4.26) 




E N x f x N x dx= ⋅ ⋅∫  (4.27) 
 





























Figure 4.7. Calculating expected value of a p-box 
 
The goal of this proof is to show bounds on the expectation of the actual random 
variable X .  In this case, ( )N x x= , which is a non-decreasing function; that is, 1x N∈ .  
This can be seen by comparing Equations (4.26) and (4.27) respectively with Equations 
(4.28) and (4.29). 












E X f x x dx= ⋅ ⋅∫  (4.29) 
Combining Equations (4.26)-(4.29) with the relationship that ( ) ( )F x F x≤ , it 
must be that [ ] [ ]F FE X E X≥ .  This result orders the expected value of the two bounding 
distributions.  What about the distributions inside the p-box?  By definition in Equation 
(4.2), any distribution inside the p-box, such as iF , must obey the relationship 
( ) ( ) ( )iF x F x F x≤ ≤ .   Based on this relationship, ( )iF x  stochastically dominates ( )F x , 
and consequently [ ] [ ]
iF F
E X E X≥ .  In other words, the expected value of X calculated 
using the upper-bounding cumulative distribution ( )F x  must be less than or equal to the 
expected value calculated using any distribution inside the p-box.  As such, [ ]FE X  must 
be the lower bound on the expected value of X , thus proving the second line of Equation 
(4.21).  Notice this holds for any distribution, even one such as 1( )F x  in Figure 4.7 that is 
mostly coincident with ( )F x , but for which the relationship 1( ) ( )F x F x≥  holds for all x  
and 0 1 0( ) ( )F x F x>  for some 0x . 
Since it is also true by definition in Equation (4.2) that ( ) ( )iF x F x≤ , it is also 
true that ( )F x  stochastically dominates ( )iF x , which implies that [ ] [ ]iF FE X E X≥ .  In 
other words, the expected value of X  calculated using the lower bounding distribution of 
( )F x  is greater than or equal to the expected value calculated using any distribution 
inside the p-box.  As such, FE X  must be the upper bound on the expected value of X , 
thus proving the third line of Equation (4.21).  Notice that this relationship holds for any 
( )iF x inside the p-box, included a distribution such as 2 ( )F x  in Figure 4.7 that is mostly 
coincident with ( )F x  but for which the inequality 2( ) ( )F x F x≤  holds for all x  and 
0 2 0( ) ( )F x F x<  for some 0x .   
A slight refinement of the proof would be required to change the inequalities of 
the equations into strict inequalities.  However, this is not necessary for the current proof.  
The goal was to show that the lower (upper) bound on expected value can be calculated 




show that those are uniquely the lowest (greatest), but only that there are no distributions 
lower (greater).  Based on the proof given, there could be other distributions inside the p-
box that yield the same values as the bounding distributions.  In practice, this cannot 
happen for ( )N x x= , but a more detailed proof is unnecessary because the claim that the 
bounding distributions yield bounds on the expected value holds with the less strict proof. 
In summary, the condition of first degree stochastic dominance shown in Equation 
(4.25) leads directly to a proof of Equation (4.21).  For completeness, a summarized 
proof of Equation (4.25) is now provided. 
4.6.2.2 Proof of first degree stochastic dominance relationship 
In the previous proof, the implication in Equation (4.25) is only used in one 
direction, as shown in Equation (4.30).  As such, only this relationship is proved. 
 ( ) ( )     [ ( )] [ ( )]F GF x G x E N x E N x≤ ⇒ ≥  (4.30) 
The proof, based on that by Levy (1998), begins by noting that if 
1( ) ( ) ( )I x G x F x≡ − , then ( ) ( )F x G x≤  for all x  implies that 1( ) 0I x ≥  for all x , as 
given in Equation (4.31).   
 1( ) ( ) ( ) 0I x G x F x≡ − ≥  (4.31) 
Similarly, the consequence [ ( )] [ ( )]F GE N x E N x≥  implies that 
[ ( )] [ ( )] 0F GE N x E N xΔ ≡ − ≥ .  The quantity Δ  can be expanded as in Equation (4.32), 
which can be rewritten as Equation (4.33). 




E N x E N x f x N x dx g x N x dxΔ ≡ − = −∫ ∫  (4.32) 
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This integral is now evaluated using integration by parts.  Recall that integration 
by parts evaluates an integral according to Equation (4.34). 
 udv uv vdu= −∫ ∫  (4.34) 
Letting ( )u N x=  and ( )( ) ( )dv f x g x dx= − , one finds '( )du N x=  and 
( ( ) ( ))v f x g x dx= −∫ .  Recalling that ( ) ( )F x f x dx= ∫  and ( ) ( )G x g x dx= ∫ , 
( ) ( )v F x G x= − .  Thus, Equation (4.33) can be rewritten as Equation (4.35). 





N x F x G x N x F x G x dxΔ = ⋅ − − −∫  (4.35) 
Based on the assumption that x  is bound from below by a  and above by b , 
( ) ( ) 0F a G a= =  and ( ) ( ) 1F b G b= = .  Consequently, ( ) [ ( ) ( )] | 0baN x F x G x⋅ − = .  This 
reduces Equation (4.35) to Equation (4.36) by removing the first term and distributing the 
negative sign. 
 '( )[ ( ) ( )]
b
a
N x G x F x dxΔ = −∫  (4.36) 
Recalling Equation (4.31),  ( ) ( ) 0G x F x− ≥ .  Also, '( ) 0N x ≥  since 1( )N x N∈ .  
Since the integral of any non-negative number is non-negative, it must be that 0Δ ≥ , thus 
proving that [ ( )] [ ( )]F GE N x E N x≥ , the required consequence of Equation (4.30). 
4.6.3 Decision making with intervals of expected utility 
In this section, the focus is on one important consequence of imprecision and the 
existence of interval of expected utility—namely, that it can result in indeterminacy in 
decision making.  Indeterminacy means that based on the available information, one 
cannot determine which decision alternative is most preferred.  A complete discussion of 
the issue of resolving indeterminacy is left for Chapter 8.  This section merely introduces 




In general, there are three possible scenarios of preference between alternatives A 
and B: A is preferred to B, B is preferred to A, or the DM is indifferent between A and B.  
Note that indifference implies a strict equality in preference, meaning the DM would 
willingly trade A and B.  When utilities are used to reflect preference, these relationships 
can be determined by the inequality or equality of the expected utilities (von Neumann 
and Morgenstern 1944).  However, when imprecision exists, the expected utilities 
become intervals (as described in Section 4.6.1), and such comparisons become more 
complicated. 
For example, consider the intervals of expected utility for two alternatives (A and 
B) shown in Figure 4.8(a).  Because the intervals do not overlap, a clear choice can be 
made.  Specifically, alternative A is clearly the better.  In the example in Figure 4.8(b), 
the intervals overlap.  Since the true expected utility of B can lie anywhere in the given 
interval, the point labeled 1b  is possible.  Similarly, both 1a  and 2a  are possible true 
values for the expected utility of A.  Notice that 1a  is greater than 1b , but 2a  is less than 
1b .  Consequently, the available evidence is indeterminate; the DM cannot determine 
which alternative is the most preferred, nor can the DM determine that he or she is 
strictly indifferent.  In order to make elimination decisions in the presence of imprecision, 
different methods are needed. 



































considering additional information that is not directly captured in the representation.  
Such methods are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.  In other cases, new information 
can be collected, a process addressed in Chapter 9.  However, in some cases, a decision 
maker may elect to make an arbitrary choice.  Arbitrary in this sense does not necessarily 
imply without guidance or random.  Several policies are possible to guide arbitrary 
choice, including Γ -maximin (Berger 1985) and the Hurwicz-criterion (Arrow and 
Hurwicz 1972).  A Γ -maximin policy says that given indeterminacy in a maximization 
problem, a DM should select the alternative with the highest lower-bound.  This is a 
conservative policy in that it seeks to mitigate the worst-case. 
The policies are referred to as arbitrary because the choices they lead to are not 
determined by a strict normative, rational theory such as utility theory.  The overlapping 
intervals of expected utility actually imply that based on the available information, there 
is no clear rational choice.  Essentially, the problem falls outside of the domain of utility 
theory and alternative methods are needed, as discussed in Chapter 8.   
4.7 Summary 
In this chapter, a particular sub-class of imprecise probabilities was introduced.  
This method, called probability bounds analysis (PBA) and developed by other 
researchers, is slightly less expressive than general imprecise probability theory, but it is 
more intuitive and easier to compute with.  The definition and interpretation of PBA and 
its model of uncertainty, called a p-box, were presented.  Also, the relationship between 
p-boxes and intervals of expected utility, the creation of p-boxes, and the use of p-boxes 
in decision making were discussed.  In the remaining chapters of the thesis, the value and 








COMPARING DIFFERENT METHODS FOR REPRESENTING 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
In the preceding chapters, the nature of uncertainty was discussed, several models 
of uncertainty were considered, and one model selected as the most promising.  This 
model was subsequently refined and explained in Chapter 4.  The subject of the next 
three chapters of this dissertation is the question: how useful is this model to engineering 
designers?  This is an important step in validating the answers advanced for motivating 
questions 1 and 2.  If there is value in representing both imprecision and irreducible 
uncertainty using imprecise probabilities and p-box models, then this information 
combines with the theoretical arguments advanced in Chapter 2 through Chapter 5 to 
form a strong argument for the validity of the answers.   
The first section of this chapter discusses the third motivating question of the 
dissertation: how should engineers compare alternative models of uncertainty?  In 
Section 5.3, a specific experiment is described that compares two uncertainty models 
(best-fit, precise probabilities and p-boxes in PBA) in terms of practical value of the 
outcome of the design process.  The remainder of the chapter, much of which was 
previously published in a conference paper (Aughenbaugh and Paredis 2005) and a 
forthcoming journal paper (Aughenbaugh and Paredis 2006a), is a discussion and 
explanation of the results of this experiment, as well as an analysis of the implications for 
engineering design.  In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, more general comparisons are made 
between PBA and a particular sensitivity analysis approach to accounting for 




5.1 Demonstrating the value of an uncertainty 
model 
One way of showing the value of a model is by demonstrated that it is a 
generalization of another model, meaning that it can represent everything the other model 
can and then some.  For example, it was already discussed that imprecise probabilities 
generalize precise probabilities in that precise probabilities are a specific case of 
imprecise probabilities.  Another question is whether one model allows designers to 
rationally answer the same types of questions as another model, and in addition provides 
information that is not available using the other model.  In Chapter 6, an argument is 
presented that probability bounds analysis generalizes specific aspects of sensitivity 
analysis procedure of decision analysis.    
A second way to demonstrate the value of one model involves refocusing on the 
actual goal of engineering design: a profitable product.  From this perspective, one model 
of uncertainty is better than another model is the first model enables the designer to 
create better designs than can be created using the second model.   
Due to the obvious presence of uncertainty, it may be necessary to consider the 
worst case, best case, or average value of one model over another for a particular 
application.  A procedure for making such comparisons using average value is presented 
in this chapter using the specific comparison of a best-fit, precise probability model to a 
p-box model in the context of limited statistical data using a design scenario described in 
the next section.  The contributions of this chapter are thus both the general comparison 
method and the particular results of the comparison. 
In the next chapter, a different approach is taken towards validating answers 1 and 
2.  This argument is built by showing how PBA generalizes a commonly used approach 
to uncertainty modeling in engineering design.  This argument, unlike the one presented 
in this chapter, is therefore independent of any particular scenario.  However, general 




must be taken together in order to validate PBA and imprecise probabilities as an 
acceptable approach to uncertainty modeling in engineering design that is often 
preferable to other uncertainty models. 
5.2 Example design scenario 
Assume a decision maker (DM) needs to design a pressure vessel that is to 
contain 0.15 m3 of gas under 7 MPa of pressure.  Due to space limitations, certain 
maximum dimensions are imposed.  The goal is to determine the dimensions (radius R, 
wall thickness t, and length L) of the vessel, shown in Figure 5.1, for which the overall 
utility, defined in Equation (5.1), is maximized.  The vessel will be made of a new type of 
steel for which the yield strength is not well characterized.  The material production 
process produces variations in the material properties such that the material yield strength 
is well modeled by a normally distributed random variable.   
Because the material is new and testing is relatively expensive, variations in yield 
strength have only been measured in a set Σ  of n  independent tension tests, where n  is a 
relatively small number due cost considerations.  These tests can at best give an estimate 
of the true distribution, so in addition to inherent randomness (irreducible uncertainty), 
DM also faces imprecision—he or she cannot characterize the parameters of the random 
variable precisely.  The number of samples n  can be varied to explore different levels of 
imprecision, as discussed in Section 5.4.2. 
Since the vessel will be used in a human-occupied location, the consequences of 









explicitly in a utility function based on payoff in dollars and shown in Equation (5.1).  
This is a very simplified utility function, in which the single attribute of concern is net 
payoff, and the relationship between payoff and utility is assumed to be linear.   
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This formulation allows the DM to recognize that risk, and more specifically the 
pressure vessel’s probability of failure (meaning the probability that the yield strength is 
less than the maximum stress in the walls of the pressure vessel), plays a very important 
part in design decisions.  It thus seems important to characterize these probabilities 
appropriately. 
5.3 Experiment comparing uncertainty models 
The goal of the experiment is to compare the utility of the design solutions that 
result when different approaches for representing uncertainty are applied to the same 




assumed that overseeing the experiment is a supervisor who is in a state of precise 
information about the steel’s material properties.  From the supervisor’s perspective, only 
irreducible uncertainty exists—uncertainty about the yield strength of the material that is 
precisely characterized by a normal distribution with a mean of 180 MPa and a standard 
deviation of 15 MPa.  The supervisor can therefore determine precisely the dimensions of 
the pressure vessel that result in the maximum expected utility.  This optimal design 
under the precise information is the benchmark for comparison of the other design 
approaches. 
The general layout of the experiment is shown in Figure 5.2.  The experiment 
consists of two DMs who are identical except in their method for modeling uncertainty: 
one uses approach A to model uncertainty about the yield strength (in this example a 
single best-fit normal distribution) and the other uses approach B to model uncertainty 
about the yield strength (in this example a p-box).  The general experimental method is 
explained before including the details of specific experiment (shown in Figure 5.3) 




Both approaches start with the same information about the uncertain quantity (in 
this example the yield strength of the material).  This information is a set Σ of n random 
samples (torsion test results) from the true distribution: 
 1{ }i
n
y iσ =Σ =  (5.3) 
Model
Uncertainty
Σ = { set of n data samples }
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Figure 5.2. General experiment for 
comparing uncertainty models in 
engineering design decisions 
(shaded actions are performed by a 
supervisor) 
Figure 5.3. A computational experiment 
for determining the value of using 
imprecise probabilities  






Each DM models the uncertainty in these samples according to his or her own 
uncertainty model.  They each then apply a decision policy that is appropriate for the 
assigned uncertainty model in order to select an optimal design, denoted as *aΣ  for 
approach A and as *bΣ  for approach B.  The decision policies cannot be identical because 
the underlying models of the problem are different for each DM.  For example, when 
imprecise probabilities are used, the expected utility of an alternative becomes an interval 
(see Section 4.6.1), so interval-based decision policies must be used.  With the traditional 
best-fit approach, standard expected utility maximization can be used.  Since the decision 
policies and the uncertainty models vary, one could think of the experiment as comparing 
design approaches rather than uncertainty models.  The experiment is general in that it 
could even be repeated with both DMs using the same uncertainty model but different 
decision policies.  
After the DMs have chosen their optimal designs, the supervisor compares each 
of the design solutions to determine the expected utility evaluated under precise 
information for each solution.   
For approach A this is written as 
 *|E [ ( , )]y yU aσ σΣ Σ  (5.4) 
and for approach B as 
 *|E [ ( , )]y yU bσ σΣ Σ  (5.5) 
In order to compare the value of the two approaches, the supervisor, who has 
access to precise information, computes the difference in expected utility.  Using the fact 
that the two approaches start with the same information (sample set Σ ), the value of 
approach B over approach A can then be expressed as 




It is necessary to note that this value was for only one particular Σ—the set of 
yield strength measurements with which both designers start.  Due to the randomness in 
Σ , one trial is not sufficient to judge the relative value of each uncertainty model; the 
supervisor needs to repeat the above experiment many times in order to determine which 
design approach performs best on average, over m  different sample sets Σ .  
Mathematically, the expectation must be taken with respect to Σ  in order to calculate the 
average expected value of approach B over A, written  
 * *|E [V(B)] E [E [ ( , ) ( , )]]y y yU b U aσ σ σΣ Σ Σ Σ Σ= − . (5.7) 
The addition of the word average emphasizes that this quantity is the expectation 
over the samples of the expected utility of particular design solutions.   
In this section, a method for comparing design approaches was presented.  A final 
caveat on the method is that it can only compare uncertainty models that accept the same 
type of input data (specifically, observed statistical data).  For example, it could not be 
used to compare a method that requires pure expert opinion with one that requires 
statistical data samples.  The remained of this section presented the customized 
experiment that compares a best-fit precise probability approach (approach A) with a p-
box based approach (approach B).  
5.3.1 Design using approach A: precise normal fit 
Designer A does not have access to precise information, but instead only has 
access to the set Σ of n data samples.  Because the designer does not know the true 
distribution of yσ , he or she must make an approximation, denoted ( , )y Aσ Σ .  In this 
approximation, the representation of yσ  depends on both the approach, in this case A, 
and the observed random sample Σ.  Designer A represents the uncertainty as a normal 
distribution, using the sample mean and sample variance as unbiased estimates of the true 
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Designer A therefore chooses design variables { , , }A A Aa R t LΣ =  that maximize the 
estimated expected utility given his or her information about the randomness.  The 
expected utility is only estimated because designer A does not have access to a precise 
characterization of the random variable yσ .  The expected utility maximization results in 
the optimal design using approach A given samples Σ, denoted:  
 * |(E [ ( ( , ), )])arg max y yaa U A aσ σΣ Σ ΣΣ
= Σ  (5.9) 
5.3.2 Design using approach B: imprecise probabilities 
Designer B takes a different approach for capturing the uncertainty in the yield 
strength.  Specifically, designer B represents the uncertainty in yσ  by ( , )y Bσ Σ , where 
the uncertainty in ( , )y Bσ Σ  is modeled using a parameterized p-box rather than a precise 
normal distribution, such that ( , )
p
y yBσ σΣ = .  The p-box is constructed using 95% 
confidence intervals on the mean and variance of the yield strength (see Section 4.3), 
such that with  0.05α = : 
 / 2, 1 / 2, 1ˆ ˆ[ , ] [ ,  ]n n
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n nα α
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The estimated expected utility under design approach B is defined as 
 |E [ ( ( , ), )]y yU B bσ σΣ ΣΣ  (5.12) 
where { , , }B B Bb R t LΣ =  is the designer’s chosen design action given sample set Σ.  




longer a crisp number but rather an interval defined by lower-bound E  and upper-bound 
E  (as described in Section 4.6.1), such that 
 |E [ ( ( , ), )] [ , ]y yU B b E Eσ σΣ ΣΣ = . (5.13) 
Because the expected utility is now an interval, the designer cannot choose design 
variables bΣ  that maximize the expected utility in the traditional sense, as mentioned in 
Section 4.6 and discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.  In this experiment, a conservative 
best worst-case, or Γ-maximin policy (Berger 1985) is used.  Designer B therefore 
chooses the design action bΣ  that has the highest lower bound E  on the expected utility.  
This results in an optimal design decision using approach B given the observed samples 
Σ, denoted: 
 * |( ) ( ])E [ ( ( , ), )arg argmax max y yb b
b E U B bσ σΣ Σ Σ
Σ Σ
= = Σ . (5.14) 
5.3.3 Supervisor’s design under precise information 
In addition to approach A and approach B, the experiment’s supervisor can create 
a design using the true distribution, since he or she is in a state of precise information.  
The supervisor therefore knows precisely that 2~ (180 , (15 ) )y N MPa MPaσ .  If approach 
is defined as approach K (not shown in Figure 5.3), the supervisor then chooses the 
design variables  { , , }K K KDV k R t L= =  such that the expected utility E [ ( , )]y yU kσ σ  
is maximized.  This leads to the optimal design under precise information: 
 *
k
(E [ ( , )])argmax
y y
k U kσ σ= . (5.15) 
This optimal design, with expected utility denoted *E[ ( )]U k  for brevity, serves as 
the baseline for comparison because no other approach can yield an average higher 




5.4 Experimental results 
The computational experiment was repeated for many different initial sample set 
sizes, that is many different n .  For each level of n , the design process was repeated for 
100,000m =  different initial sample sets Σ in order to determine the average performance 
of the two methods.  The results for the particular sample size 25n =  are presented first, 
and then the results over varying values of n , which represent different levels of 
imprecision, are discussed. 
5.4.1 Value of using imprecise probabilities for 25 samples of 
the true yield strength 
The experiment is first conducted with a sample set Σ of size 25n = , meaning the 
designers are given the results of 25 independent yield stress tests.  As measured by the 
supervisor using precise information and averaged over 100,000m =  initial sets, 
approach B on average yields designs with greater expected utility than approach A. 
Specifically, using standard statistical analysis, the 95% confidence interval (CI) on the 
value of approach B over approach A shown in Equation (5.16) is found. 
 95% CI on ( ) is [$22, $26]V B  (5.16) 
To put this result in perspective, the expected utility of the supervisor’s design, 
which is the best possible because it is designed under a state of precise information, is 
*E[ ( )] $104U k = .  Thus the CI on the expected value of approach B over A can also be 
expressed as [21%, 25%] of the optimal utility *E[ ( )]U k .  This is a substantial deviation 
that suggests that there is value in using the p-box approach for this design problem.  The 
average expected utilities realized under approach A and B are given in Equations (5.17) 
and (5.18) . 
 *|Approach A: E [E [ ( , )]] $34y yU aσ σΣ Σ Σ =  (5.17) 




The total deviations from optimal ($70 for approach A and $46 for approach B), 
coupled with the relative value of approach B over A, indicate that B is a better approach 
at this level of imprecision.  In the next section, the variation of these results at different 
levels of imprecision is examined 
5.4.2 Variation of value with level of imprecision 
The previous discussion dealt with a fixed sample set size of 25n =  material 
strength tests.  While those results demonstrated that it was valuable to use the p-box 
approach in that case, a more general result is desirable.  By varying the number of 
material strength tests n , one can vary the imprecision of the characterization.  The 
supervisor’s design yields the best possible expected utility *E[ ( )]U k , and hence the 
designs of designers A and B can at best equal it.  In Figure 5.4, the percent deviation 
from this best-possible expected utility for approach A and approach B for different 
values of n  are shown in log-log scale.  Because this is a deviation from best-possible, 
the smallest absolute value is desirable.  Hence, examining Figure 5.4, smaller is better.   
When the imprecision is large, approach B performs significantly better than 
approach A.  For example, at a sample size of 10, a 95% CI on the value of approach B 
over A is [520%, 570%] of *E[ ( )]U k .  There is no doubt that this value is significant.  



























Around sample size 40, the two approaches yield similar results.  Past this point, 
approach A performs better, but not by much.  For example, for a sample size of 100, the 
95% CI on the value of approach B is [-5.5%,  
-5.3%] of *E[ ( )]U k .   
In summary, as the imprecision increases, the value of approach B over approach 
A increases significantly. As the imprecision approaches zero, approach A becomes only 
slightly better than B.  For different design problems, the designer will not necessarily 
know where the two curves cross.  Thus, unless the designer is sure a priori that the 
consequences of the imprecision are insignificant, the results of this computational 
experiment suggest that it is valuable to explicitly represent the imprecision in the 
available characterization of uncertainties by using imprecise probabilities.   
5.4.3 Explanation of results 
In this section, additional insight into the results of the previous two sections is 
presented.  The results for 100,000 different sample sets Σ of sizes  n =10, 25, and 100 
are shown in histograms in Figure 5.5.  The x-axis of the histogram in Figure 5.5 is the 




In many cases, approach B yields a design with a lower utility than approach A 
due to the extra material costs of the more conservative design.  However, in some cases, 
approach B yields a design with a much higher expected utility.  The tails of the 
distribution for 10n =  and 25n =  extend much farther to the right than shown in the 
figure.  For example, the maximum expected value of approach B over A seen in any trial 
of 10n =  was $220,000.  Results such as these skew the overall distribution such that on 
average, approach B yields a design with a higher expected utility than approach A 
yields.  As the imprecision decreases, both the skewness of the distribution and the value 
of approach B over A decrease.  
The results can also be understood in terms of the expected utility curves used in 
the experiment.  In Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7, the expected utility is illustrated as a 
function of wall thickness t for two different samples, Σ1 and Σ2 respectively, both of size 
25n = .  The four curves shown in each figure are: 
1. Estimated expected utility under approach A: |E [ ( ( , ), )]y yU A tσ σΣ Σ  











































2. Estimated lower bound on expected utility under approach B: 
|E [ ( ( , ), )]y yU B tσ σΣ Σ  
3. Estimated upper bound on expected utility under approach B: 
|E [ ( ( , ), )]y yU B tσ σΣ Σ  
4. The true expected utility in a state of precise information: E [ ( , )]
y y
U tσ σ  
Designers A and B choose a thickness ( *At  and 
*
Bt  respectively) that is optimal 
according to their estimated expected utilities.  Their estimates are in general not 
equivalent to the true expected utilities.  Therefore, the expected utility actually realized 
by a particular design is not reflected in their estimates, but rather in the true curve 
E [ ( , )]
y y
U tσ σ , which is known only to the supervisor. 
In Figure 5.6 (based on sample set Σ1), the true curve is between the curve from 
approach A and the upper bound from approach B.  By noting *At  and 
*
Bt , one can read off 
the true expected utility evaluated under precise information for each approach from the 
truth, E [ ( , )]
y y
U tσ σ .  For this particular sample set Σ1, the expected utility realized from 
approach A is about $20 higher than the expected utility realized from approach B.  This 
means for sample Σ1 the relative value of approach B is negative: V(B) = -$20, indicating 
approach A performs better.   
In Figure 5.7 (based on sample set Σ2), the true curve is near the lower bound of 
approach B.  For this particular sample set Σ2, the expected utility from approach B is 
about $70 more than that from approach A, so the relative value of approach B for 
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Figure 5.7. Example expected utility functions, V(B)>0 
The preceding results are for two representative cases.  The overall results of the 
experiment, discussed previously, indicate that, on average, the latter case dominates.  
Approach A is more likely to overestimate the true material strength, and when it does, 
the consequences are disastrous — a high probability of failure.  Approach B is more 
conservative, resulting in higher material costs, but, on average, these material costs are 
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distribution of approach A becomes, on average, closer to the true distribution, such as 
the example sample 3Σ  shown in Figure 5.8.  For this sample, the optimal designs of the 
three approaches converge, and therefore yield similar utilities.  Thus one can see that 
when the imprecision is small, the value of approach B over A is near zero. 
5.4.4 Summary of results 
For this design problem, the experimental results indicate that when the 
imprecision is large, approach B (using imprecise probabilities) performs significantly 
better than approach A (using precise probabilities).  When the imprecision is small, the 
difference between the two approaches is insignificant.  This computational experiment 
has therefore demonstrated that there are scenarios in which it is valuable to explicitly 
represent the imprecision in the available characterization of uncertainties by using 
imprecise probabilities. 
5.5 Discussion of experimental results 
So far in this chapter, a specific and simplified design problem and computational 





















|E [ ( , )]y yU aσ σΣ Σ ≈
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design has been presented.  There are other issues to consider, such as computation cost 
and decision policies.  Additionally, it is always useful to explore the results in more 
general problems.   
5.5.1 Computational costs 
In this paper, the potential value of a design method that uses imprecise 
probabilities has been demonstrated.  What has heretofore been referred to as value is 
really the gross value or benefit.  According to the principles of information economics 
(Aughenbaugh, et al. 2005), designers should really care about the gain, or net value, 
which is defined as the difference between gross value (benefit) and cost, including 
computational cost.    
In this example, the computational costs for both approaches were small due to 
the structure of the problem.  In reality, even the best-fit probabilistic approach often will 
require Monte Carlo analysis or related methods in order to calculate expected values 
(Robert and Casella 1999).  These methods have an inherently high computational cost, 
even when used in combination with surrogate modeling (Myers and Montgomery 1995, 
Simpson, et al. 2001) to reduce the computational burden.  An obvious way to compute 
with p-boxes is to perform a second-order Monte Carlo simulation, in which an outer 
loop is added around the traditional loop (Vose 2000).  Such methods can be extremely 
expensive in terms of computations.   
However, the DBC method discussed in Section 4.5.1 can be used instead.  
Ferson and Ginzburg (Ferson and Ginzburg 1996) show that these methods are on 
average much less computationally expensive than second order Monte Carlo methods.  
However, additional work is needed to compare the actual additional computational 
burden of PBA with the additional benefits from using PBA in complex problems.  





An added benefit of PBA is the flexibility of the DBC algorithm.  In Monte Carlo 
analysis, engineers often assume specific dependencies between variables as a matter of 
convenience that enables the use of standard statistics.  This may understate the true 
imprecision in the available characterizations of uncertainty and may have serious 
consequences.  PBA provides methods (Ferson, et al. 2002b) that can propagate 
uncertainty under various conditions of dependence and correlation, including the 
extremes of fully known and completely unknown dependencies.   
Despite this promise, the application of these techniques has yet to be explored in 
complex engineering design problems.  It is therefore unclear how well PBA can 
propagate uncertainty from many sources, or how well PBA can be integrated with more 
complex design tools and models, such as discrete-event simulations and optimization 
methods.  These issues need to be addressed before PBA can be put to use in general 
engineering design problems. 
5.5.2 Decision policies and preferences 
In this experiment, the relatively high consequences of vessel failure, in 
comparison to material costs, makes failure avoidance a key driver in the design.  The Γ-
maximin decision policy used in this experiment is conservative compared to a normal fit 
approach.  Because it uses the lower bound on the expected utility, it is actually the most 
conservative policy that is consistent with the available evidence.   
Other decision policies (such those that account for shared uncertainty such as 
maximality (Walley 1991) and E-admissibility (Levi 1974), discussed in Chapter 8, or the 
arbitrary choice policy of the Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 1972)) are possible 
and may perform better in different circumstances.  For example, if instead of the lower 
bound on expected utility one uses the midpoint between the upper and lower bounds (a 




Figure 5.9 cross at 45 samples using the Hurwicz policy, as compared to 40 in Figure 5.4 
with the Γ-maximin policy.   
Part of the motivation of using a policy such as the Hurwicz criterion is that it 
allows the designer’s preferences (in the form of the utility function) to influence the 
resolution of imprecision.  A best-fit approach ignores the nature of the DM’s 
preferences.  The distinction between the two approaches is illustrated with the following 
example, as shown in Figure 5.10.  When the utility function is skewed due to a high cost 
of consequences in the risk term, such as in this example, the maximum of the midpoint 
of the expected utility bounds is much closer to the maximum of the lower bound than to 
the maximum of the best-fit solution, as shown in.  By explicitly accounting for 
imprecision, a more appropriate and quantitative performance/risk tradeoff can be 
performed.  
An obvious question is: why is the midpoint solution not similar to the best-fit 
solution?  The answer highlights an important advantage of a p-box approach over a best-
fit approach.  The midpoint is applied to the expected utility distributions, whereas the 
best-fit is done on the parameters of the uncertainty model.  In general, the best-fit 
approach leaves the decision-maker to deal with imprecision qualitatively and outside the 




























uncertainty formalism, while the p-box approach quantifies the imprecision explicitly in 
utility curves.  In a scenario in which only one decision is to be made regarding a 
particular uncertain quantity and imprecision is high, it is clearly useful to model 
uncertainty using p-boxes.  However, identifying this situation is more complicated. 
 
Arbitrary policies are limited in their applicability in engineering design because 
it is difficult to apply them (other than Γ-maximin) in a way that is rationally consistent 
across multiple decisions that involve the same uncertain quantities.  This is not 
necessarily surprising since the Hurwicz policy essentially breaks a tie between two 
alternatives arbitrarily.  However, it does suggest a need for future work in decision 
making under uncertainty.  Fortunately, other policies are available for rationally and 
consistently reducing the set of alternatives even when the alternatives are imprecisely 
characterized.  These policies are the subject of Chapter 8.  The question remains as to 
how to make a final decision when the intervals of alternatives overlap and there is no 
economic way to further reduce the imprecision. 
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In this chapter, an experiment was developed that allows for two uncertainty 
models to be compared in terms of the quality of the final product that results from the 
design process.  This method is part of the answer to motivating question 3 of the 
dissertation, which asks how should engineers compare alternative models of 
uncertainty?  This method is then used to help validate the answers advanced in response 
to motivation questions 1 and 2.  
Specifically, the pressure vessel design example and experiment in this chapter 
demonstrates that when the designers only have access to a small set of sample data, a 
design approach that uses imprecise probabilities to model uncertainty in design 
decisions leads on average to better designs than a purely probabilistic approach that 
requires precise probabilities.   
It can then be concluded that in some design problems, it is valuable to represent 
the imprecision in the available characterization of uncertainties explicitly by using 
imprecise probabilities.  In the next chapter, properties of PBA that are more general in 
their applicability and value are described, thus moving past the context of a specific, 









PBA AS A GENERAL APPROACH  TO SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  
 
In the previous chapters, several discussions and results regarding imprecision in 
engineering design have been presented.  In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the general 
motivation for considering imprecision explicitly was developed.  In Chapter 4, the 
probability bounds analysis (PBA) approach was introduced.  The potential value of 
using PBA was demonstrated in Chapter 5 in the context of a high-risk, compromise 
decision.   
In this chapter, acceptance of the existence of imprecision is assumed.  People 
often recognize their lack of knowledge implicitly, even when they use formalisms such 
as precise probabilities that do not recognize this imprecision.  They often perform 
“what-if” analyses that compare the assumed scenario to different, but often closely 
related scenarios.  For example, it is common in decision analysis to perform a sensitivity 
analysis as part of the decision process (Clemen 1996).  One purpose of a sensitivity 
analysis is to examine whether the decision is sensitive to lack of knowledge.  This is 
achieved by exploring whether the optimal decision action changes as the uncertain 
parameters are varied across some neighborhood of the decision-maker’s best-guess, or 
base values.  Bayesian decision theorists often perform Bayesian sensitivity analysis in 
which various prior distributions are examined (Berger 1985).  By performing a 
sensitivity analysis, the decision-maker is in essence checking whether his or her lack of 
knowledge affects what he or she decides.   
Due to computational costs and other factors, decision-makers are normally 




way analysis, each uncertain parameter is varied over a range with the others fixed at 
their base values (Clemen 1996).  This analysis neglects interactions between the 
uncertain parameters.  In order to be absolutely sure that a decision is not sensitive to 
imprecision, a decision-maker would need to perform an all-way analysis, which means 
comparing all combinations of reasonable values across all uncertain parameters.  In this 
chapter, it is shown that an uncertainty analysis using PBA generalizes the process of an 
all-way effects analysis for selection decisions in a computationally efficient manner. 
In Sections 6.1 and 6.2, existing sensitivity analysis approaches are discussed.  In 
Section 6.3, it is explained how PBA generalizes sensitivity analysis; it provides 
measures of the sensitivity of a decision to imprecision, measures that are more 
conservative and more rigorous than those provided by traditional methods.  In Section 
6.4, some limitations of PBA-based sensitivity are presented, and an extension of PBA-
based sensitivity analysis is proposed in Section 6.4.3.  Finally, the use of PBA as a 
sensitivity analysis method is demonstrated and discussed using the example of the 
design of an environmentally benign oil filter in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Traditional sensitivity analysis approaches 
The notion of “sensitivity analysis has been used to describe various procedures 
and specific goals in engineering design.  As such, there is no universal definition of what 
a sensitivity analysis is or should be.  At the highest level of abstraction, a sensitivity 
analysis is the study of how certain things influence other things.  More specific to the 
context of engineering design, a sensitivity analysis is the quantitative study of how the 
inputs to a model affect the outputs (Ferson, et al. 2004a), where a model is defined 
broadly and includes all functions, calculations, and simulations.  Ferson and coauthors 
(Ferson, et al. 2004a) also note that there are fundamentally two reasons for conducting a 
sensitivity analysis: to understand the reliability of conclusions and inferences drawn 




dissertation) and to focus future information collection efficiently on those aspects to 
which the problem is most sensitive (which will be called sensitivity analysis for 
information prioritization in this dissertation). 
A lot of research in engineering design has focused on probabilistic sensitivity 
analysis (Homma and Saltelli 1996, Sobol 2001, Chen, et al. 2004, Felli and Hazen 2004, 
Liu and Chen 2006).  These methods focus on identifying the largest contributors to 
probabilistic effects in the output.  For example, one type of approach attempts to 
determine how much each input contributes to the statistical variance of the output.  
These methods are not exploring sensitivity to a lack of information, but rather sensitivity 
to a physical reality of the problem or process being modeling.  This analysis can provide 
important insight during the design process, such as indicating that a manufacturing 
process needs to be improved so that the variance of the thickness of parts is reduced to 
an acceptable level.  However, such analyses do not help a DM explore the robustness of 
his or her decisions to the available information, which is the focus of this dissertation.   
Another form of sensitivity analysis looks at the partial derivatives of a function 
(Ferson and Tucker 2006 (in preparation)).  For example, if a model is represented by 
Equation (6.1), it is possible to express the sensitivity of the result to each input 
parameter in terms of partial derivatives, as shown in Equations (6.2)-(6.4): 
 2( , , )f a b c ab a c= +  (6.1) 





















The partial derivatives represent the local sensitivity of the function to the three 
independent variables.  The sensitivity analysis is local in that it must be evaluated at 
some point { , , }a b c , and the sensitivities, like all partial derivatives, are only locally valid 
approximations.  The comparison of the partial derivatives is complicated because the 
units are not consistent, since in general a , b , and c  have different units.  Nevertheless, 
the partial derivatives do give some insight into the impact that different input parameters 
have on the output.   
Sensitivity measures made using partial derivatives capture an inherent quality of 
the problem, but they do not take into account the available information.  For example, if 
the DM knows a , b , and c  perfectly, then these derivatives are irrelevant to information 
management, because there would be no deviation from the perfectly known nominal 
values.  A more useful analysis would explore the effects of imprecision on the output.  
For example, if the available knowledge is only that [6,17]a = , 2b = , and [1,2]c = , then 
it is pretty clear from Equation (6.1) that the output is very sensitive to the imprecision in 
a , but the partial derivatives make it appear as if the greatest sensitivity is to c .  It 
appears that a more complete approach is needed. 
Leamer (1990) has defined a global sensitivity analysis as a systematic study in 
which “a neighborhood of alternative assumptions is selected and the corresponding 
interval of inferences is identified.”  As Ferson and Tucker note (2006 (in preparation)), 
such studies can be done in at least two obvious ways.  In the first approach, the 
neighborhoods of consideration are expressed as bounds, thereby forming intervals of 
imprecise parameters.  In the second, probabilities are assigned across the neighborhood, 
thus making the parameters probabilistic.   
As established in the preceding chapters, the perspective adopted in this 
dissertation is that imprecision is expressed well using intervals, and thus the first 
approach is taken in this chapter.  In fact, the use of probabilities to describe imprecision 




which is to identify the reliability of the inferences (or outputs) drawn from the assumed 
inputs.  Adding an additional assumption of information about probabilities over the 
imprecision adds information, rather than explores the sensitivity of the true lack of 
information.  The use of intervals is consistent with traditional decision analysis 
approaches to sensitivity analysis, as discussed in the following section. 
This section is closed with a brief disclaimer.  Since there is no universal 
agreement on what a sensitivity analysis is or how it should be performed, there is no 
universal standard for comparison.  In the following section, a specific type of sensitivity 
analysis is described.  The subsequent sections then discuss how the propagation and 
analysis of uncertainty using PBA generalizes this type of sensitivity analysis, providing 
information and rigor that is not available with the traditional approach. 
6.2 Sensitivity analysis in decision analysis 
Decision analysis is a discipline that studies procedures, tools, and frameworks 
for transforming problems that are difficult to understand, solve, or explain into problems 
that are more readily understood and solved (Howard 1988a, Clemen 1996).  To 
distinguish the approach discussed in this section from alternative approaches, it will be 
referred to as decision analysis with sensitivity analysis, abbreviated as DASA in the 
remainder of this dissertation. 
Clemen  (1996, page 6) describes the DASA process with the following steps: 
1. Identify the situation and understand objectives 
2. Identify alternatives 
3. Decompose and model the problem structure, uncertainties, and preferences 
4. Choose the best alternative 
5. Perform sensitivity analysis 




7. Implement the chosen alternative 
Steps 1-3 result in the specification of the decision model described in Section 
3.6.  Traditional decision analysis does not explicitly recognize imprecision when 
choosing the best alternative in Step 4, so the analysis is performed using best-guess, base 
values for all of the imprecise parameters.   
6.2.1 Choosing the best alternative 
Recall that the imprecise parameters are a subset of the uncertain parameters.  
Any probabilistic uncertainties are retained.  Returning to the example of Section 3.6, if 
2
2 1( , )x N x σ∼ , then 2 x  will still be treated probabilistically, but any imprecision in 1 x  
must be reduced to a base value, for example 1 x̂ .  More generally, the state vector 
1 1 2{ ,..., , ,..., }k ks x x x x+=  is replaced with 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ{ ,..., , ,..., }k k ns x x x x+= , such that 1 ˆ ˆ,..., kx x  
are all scalar values. 
With 1 ˆ ˆ,..., kx x  fixed to base values, an expected utility maximizing action 
*a  can 
be chosen using the precisely defined probabilities over the probabilistic parameters 
1 ,...,k nx x+ .  Step 5 then considers the sensitivity of the optimality of 
*a  to the actual 
imprecision in the available information. 
6.2.2 Performing a basic one-way sensitivity analysis 
 DASA assumes that the DM can specify a feasible range for the imprecise 
parameters, such as given by Equation (6.5). 
 [ , ] for i=1...ki i ix x x=  (6.5) 
The sensitivity analysis step of the decision process explores how moving the 
values of the i x ’s across their ranges affects the optimal decision.  One convenient way of 
performing a sensitivity analysis for a selection decision is to evaluate the sensitivity of 




1992, Clemen 1996).  A tornado diagram allows a decision maker to perform a one-way 
sensitivity analysis--that is, to explore the effects of uncertain parameters one at a time.   
A simple tornado diagram, such as shown in Figure 6.1, compares a single action 
(for example 1a ) to another action (for example 2a ), where it is assumed that action 2a  is 
entirely robust to the imprecision; that is, the expected utility of 2a  is completely 
independent of 1 ,..., kx x .  The perfectly known expected utility of action 2a  is 
represented by the large vertical, dotted line on the tornado plot.  Also displayed on the 
tornado diagram is a bar for each imprecise parameter, where each bar represents the 
range of the expected utility of action 1a  across the range of an imprecise parameter.  The 
bars are created by taking one imprecise parameter i x  and varying it from its lower limit 
i x  to its upper limit i x  with all other parameters held constant at their base values.  This 
is repeated for each parameter.  The bars are then reordered from largest (at the top) to 
smallest (at the bottom), thus creating the shape that gave rise to the name “tornado 
diagram." 
If any of the bars of the tornado plot intersect the dotted line corresponding to the 
expected utility of 2a , then the decision is sensitive to the imprecision.  Recall that each 
bar represents the range of expected utilities that can be realized for action 1a  depending 

















crosses the dotted line, it means that depending on where the true i x  lies, either 1a  or 2a  
can yield a higher expected utility. 
6.2.3 Performing a more advanced one-way sensitivity analysis 
Tornado diagrams can be generalized to situations with more than two alternative 
actions, including cases in which there are multiple alternatives whose expected utilities 
are functions of imprecise parameters, although this is not addressed explicitly in the 
existing literature.  Consider first the case in which there are two actions whose expected 
utilities depend on imprecise parameters.  There are two ways to consider this problem.  
The first is to draw bars on a tornado plot for each alternative and each imprecise 
parameter.  If the bars for the two alternatives overlap for the same parameter, then the 
decision is one-way sensitive to that imprecise parameter; overlapping intervals imply 
that the decision depends on the resolution of the imprecision, as discussed in Section 
4.6.3.   
There are two limitations to this straightforward method.  First, such comparisons 
become graphically confusing for more than two alternatives.  Second, this method does 
not account for shared uncertainty.     
Consider the imprecise parameter [ , ]i i ix x x= , and assume that i x  represents the 
ambient temperature in which a system will operate.  Obviously as i x  is varied within its 
range, the expected utility of each action ( 1a  and 2a ) varies.  However, the movement of 
the expected utilities is in a sense coordinated.  Assuming that the action chosen has no 
effect on the resolution of the imprecision in i x , then both actions would face the same 
true value of i x —i.e., the same ambient temperature.  This is a generalization of act-state 
independence, a probabilistic concept that states that ( | ) ( )i i iP x a P x= , meaning the 
probability of future states of the world are independent of the DM’s actions.  The 
expected utilities of two actions should therefore be compared using the same values for 




For example, the expected utility for 1a  assuming i ix x=  should be compared to 
the expected utility of 2a  also assuming i ix x= .  A comparison of 1a  assuming i ix x=  
to 2a  also assuming i ix x=  provides no information, because in general i ix x=  and 
i ix x=  are contradictory.  It thus only makes sense to construct a tornado plot of the 
differences of expected utility ( 1 2[ ( ) ( ) | ]iE u a u a x− ) while considering this shared 
imprecision, as shown in Figure 6.2.  In this approach and as portrayed in the figure, the 
comparison is made to a zero difference in expected utility.  If a bar of the diagram 
crosses zero, it means that with the given imprecision, it is not clear whether alternative 
1a  or 2a  yields the higher expected utility, and hence the decision is one-way sensitive to 
the parameters for which the bars cross zero.  The distinction “one-way sensitive” is 
made to emphasize that the sensitivity was identified using a one-way, or one-factor-at-a-
time analysis. 
If a decision is found to be sensitive to imprecision, the DM has a few choices.  
One of these is to continue collecting information to reduce the imprecision, a topic 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 8.  The DM can also conclude that the sensitivity is 
small enough that he or she does not care enough to spend resources to further reduce the 


















6.2.4 Beyond one-way sensitivity analysis 
A one-way sensitivity analysis can be generalized to a 2-way, 3-way, and so on up 
to an k-way (or all-way) analysis, although graphical representations become prohibitive.  
A k-way analysis considers all k  imprecise quantities at the same time, effectively 
consider all possible combinations of resolutions of the imprecision.  This is important 
because a one-way analysis ignores interactions between parameters as well as the 
additive effects.  For example, the tornado plot considered only one parameter at its 
extremes at once.  What if actually two of the parameters are at their maxima?  This 
could lead to a combined effect that makes the decision sensitive to the imprecision, a 
sensitivity that is missed with one-way analysis.  In this next section, it is shown that 
PBA is a generalized and complete all- k-way sensitivity analysis. 
6.3 PBA as a generalized sensitivity analysis for 
decision robustness  
By modeling and propagating uncertainty using p-boxes and PBA, a DM can 
achieve an all-way sensitivity analysis for decision robustness (identifying whether the 
decision is sensitive to the existing imprecision).  It is in this area that PBA is most 
promising as a sensitivity analysis tool.  A discussion of sensitivity analysis for 
information prioritization (identifying which imprecision is most important to reduce), an 
area in which the value of PBA is more difficult to assess, is deferred until  Section 6.4.3.   
It is important to note that there are many ways to compute with p-boxes, just as 
there are many algorithms for performing an optimization.  Therefore, when discussing 
properties of PBA, it is necessary to specify the algorithms being used.  In this section, 
the set of methods called dependency bounds convolutions (Williamson and Downs 
1990, Berleant 1993, Ferson and Donald 1998) (discussed in Section 4.5.1) is considered, 





The use of PBA as a sensitivity analysis method is not an entirely novel idea.  
Ferson and co-authors (Ferson, et al. 2004a) explored this question at a high level but 
without concrete arguments in terms of analysis for decision making and without 
reference to decision analysis.  In this chapter, an argument for PBA as a general 
sensitivity analysis method is constructed from the bottom up, starting with a simple case.  
The idea is to show, via a loose type of induction—or more descriptively by informed 
extrapolation—that the ideas that are easily demonstrable for very simple scenarios 
extend to more complex scenarios. 
For illustrative purposes, the discussion is built up by successively moving to 
more complicated scenarios.  The problem is first limited to two imprecise parameters, 
1 2{ , }x x , so that it can be represented graphically in two dimensions.   It is also 
initially assumed that there are no probabilistic parameters (and hence 2k n= =  in the 
generalized model of Section 3.6).  These assumptions will be lifted later in the chapter.  
As described in Section 6.2.2, a basic sensitivity analysis consists of comparing the range 
of expected utilities for one alternative with a precisely known expected utility for 
another alternative.  This section will focus on the calculation of this range of 
performance for one alternative.  It is a trivial step to recast the problem for comparisons 
of alternatives with shared uncertainty discussed in Section 6.2.3  
Each imprecise parameter i x  is represented as an interval [ , ]i i ix x x= .  
Expressed graphically as in Figure 6.3, these ranges correspond to a rectangle (the shaded 
region), which will be called the consistent region, as it is the region that is consistent 
with the available information.  Also shown are the base values 1 x̂  and 2 x̂  that the DM 




If a one-way DASA (as described in Section 6.2) were performed, the dark lines 
would be explored, probably using some sampling method across this infinite set of 
points.  Notice that these lines represent only a small, and generally non-representative 
region of the consistent region; considering the entire range of the parameters one at a 
time (the solid lines) does not yield rigorous or complete analysis of decision robustness.   
In order to fully assess the sensitivity of a decision to imprecision, it is necessary 
to explore the expected utilities of the various alternative actions over the entire 
consistent region.  In general, this would require an all-way sensitivity analysis, which in 
this simple example is just a two-way analysis.   
The goal of sensitivity analysis is to find the interval of expected utility that is 
consistent with available information.  This is equivalent to finding the minimum and 
maximum of the expected utility in the consistent region—an optimization-like problem.  
One-way DASA only considers points on the lines, so if the min and max are not on the 
line, it will not find the true extreme. 
The need to explore the entire region raises the question as to how best discretize 
or sample this region, a question that will become more and more complicated as the 



















6.3.1 Interval arithmetic as a sensitivity analysis in two 
dimensions 
Since both 1 x  and 2 x  are expressed as intervals, it seems logical to deal with 
them in their native format and to use interval arithmetic (see for example (Moore 1966, 
1979, Kearfott and Kreinovich 1996, Muhanna and Mullen 2004)).  Algorithms for 
interval arithmetic are available that provide rigorous bounds on the output of a 
calculation.  For example, if the true 1 x  is in the interval 1 1[ , ]x x  and the true 2 x  is in the 
interval 2 2[ , ]x x , then interval arithmetic methods ensure than for the true result for a 
function 1 2( , )f x x  is contained in the interval that results from the calculation.  For 
example, if 1 [2,5]x = , 2 [1,7]x = , 1 ˆ 3x = , 2 ˆ 5x = , and 1 2 1 2( , ) 2 ( ) 3 ( )f x x x x= ⋅ + ⋅ , then 
1 2( , ) [7,31]f x x = .   
This example is shown graphically in Figure 6.4 in a format similar to that shown 
in Figure 6.3.  The points in the 1 2{ , }x x  space that correspond to the minimum and 
maximum of 1 2( , )f x x  are marked with a solid four ( ) and solid five point star ( ), 
respectively.  Notice that these points are missed by the one-way analysis in DASA, 
which finds the interval to be 1 2( , ) [9, 27]f x x = , with the extrema corresponding to the 
hollow four and five point stars in Figure 6.4.  Notice that this interval underestimates the 




The extrema of the output will not always correspond to the corners shown in 
Figure 6.4.  For example, if the function were instead 1 2 1 2( , ) 2 ( ) 3 ( )g x x x x= ⋅ − ⋅ , the 
maximum of 1 2( , )g x x  occurs at (5,1) and the minimum of 1 2( , )g x x  at (2,7).  In general, 
the extrema do not have to be the corners at all, so it is actually necessary to search the 
entire consistent region.  Any discretization of this space could miss the true extrema.  
This was one of the original motivations for developing interval arithmetic: to deliver 
rigorous results in comparable (or less) computing time than purely numerical methods.  
Modern methods, such as those summarized in (Muhanna and Mullen 2004), achieve 
these goals. 
6.3.2 Interval arithmetic as a sensitivity analysis higher 
dimensions 
In the preceding section, an example was used to demonstrate how interval 
arithmetic can serve as a sensitivity analysis.  In some ways, this example was too simple 
to display the real advantage of interval arithmetic as a sensitivity analysis.  In this 
section, the example is expanded into three dimensions, or more specifically, to three 




















parameters (and hence 3k n= =  in the generalized model).  Each imprecise parameter i x  
is again represented as an interval [ , ]i i ix x x= .   
6.3.2.1 One-way analysis in three dimensions 
The consistent region is now a rectangular prism, such as shown in Figure 6.5.  
Just as in 2-dimensions, the path of points considered in a one-way analysis for one of the 
imprecise parameters traces out a line.  To clarify the figure, the endpoints of these lines 
are distinguished based on whether they are on the visible faces (solid black circles) of 
the rectangular prism or on the hidden faces (hollow circles), which also correspond  
respectively to the upper ( i x )and lower ( i x ) bounds of the imprecise parameters.  
 In three dimensional space, it is even clearer that the one-way analysis paths do 
not adequately cover the consistent region, and again the endpoints are even worse.  The 
global minimum and maximum will almost never fall exactly on these lines, and there is 
no guarantee that the extreme will even be anywhere near these lines.  It is necessary to 
















6.3.2.2 Two-way analysis in three dimensions 
Whereas in the two dimensional case a two-way analysis covered the entire 
consistent region, in three dimensions a two-way analysis only covers part of the 
consistent space.  Since there are three imprecise parameters, there are three possible 
pairs for a two-way analysis: 1 x  and 2 x , 1 x  and 3 x , and 2 x  and 3 x .  The regions that 
these span are shown in Figure 6.6(a) through Figure 6.6(c) respectively, and then all 
together in Figure 6.7.  These three planes do not cover large regions of the consistent 
space.  This problem will continue in higher dimensions; for a k-dimensional problem, 
only a k-way sensitivity analysis will cover the entire consistent region, and even then a 
way must be found to exhaustively search the region.  Attention is again turned to the 
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Figure 6.7. Total consistent region searched using two-way sensitivity analysis in three 
dimensions 
6.3.2.3 Interval arithmetic in three dimensions 
Interval arithmetic becomes more and more useful as the number of imprecise 
parameters increases, both because it is difficult to visualize more than three dimensions 
and because thoroughly sampling a multidimensional space is challenging, although 
methods for searching large combinatorial spaces are available in the design of 
experiments literature (Neter, et al. 1996, Frey, et al. 2005, Li and Frey 2005) and may be 
adaptable to this problem.  However, interval arithmetic is specifically developed to 
handle these types of operations.   
Interval methods readily extend from two dimensions to three dimensions.  This is 
a trivial result if one accepts binary operations with intervals.  For example, even if the 
function of interest is as complicated as shown in Equation (6.6), it can be decomposed 
into a sequence of binary operations for which all of the operands are intervals, such as 
shown in Equation (6.7). 
 2 21 2 3 1 2 3 1 2( , , ) 2 ( ) ( ) 7 ( ) ( ) 5 ( )f x x x x x x x x= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅  (6.6) 




Performing interval calculations such as in Equation (6.7) is equivalent to 
exhaustively searching the entire consistent prism shown in Figure 6.5.  It should be 
noted that it is generally a bad idea to decompose the equation in this way.  By separating 
the quantities as in Equation (6.7), several quantities appear multiple times, thus 
exacerbating the repeated variable problem discussed in Section 6.4.1.   
6.3.2.4 Interval arithmetic in higher dimensions 
Based on the results shown in Equations (6.6) and (6.7), the implementation of 
interval methods in higher dimensions is trivial.  Interval methods are specifically 
designed to be rigorous in all dimensions, meaning that as long as the true values of the 
imprecise parameters fall in the hyperspace that describes the consistent input parameters, 
the true value will fall in the output interval.  Because interval arithmetic is equivalent to 
searching the entire hyperspace of the consistent imprecise parameter values, it is also 
equivalent to an all-way sensitivity analysis.    
6.3.3 Sensitivity analysis with imprecise and probabilistic 
parameters 
In the previous sections, it was assumed that there were no probabilistic 
parameters.  In this section, that assumption is lifted.  This scenario is first presented in 
terms of the traditional DASA approach, and then it is shown how PBA generalizes this 
approach. 
6.3.3.1 Traditional DASA with probabilistic parameters 
From one perspective, sensitivity analysis for decision robustness with 
probabilistic quantities is fundamentally equivalent to sensitivity analysis without 
probabilistic quantities.  Note that the analysis intended in this section is different from 
probabilistic sensitivity analysis (Homma and Saltelli 1996, Sobol 2001, Chen, et al. 




identify the  largest contributors to probabilistic effects in the output.  Here the emphasis 
is on the sensitivity to lack of knowledge (imprecision) about the probabilistic 
components.  However, the presence of a probabilistic quantities does not change the 
basic process; it only changes the function that needs to be evaluated in the decision 
problem, since now mathematical expectations need to be calculated over the probability 
distributions. 
In order to handle imprecision about probabilistic parameters in DASA, it is 
necessary to assume that the type (normal, Weibull, gamma, etc.) of the probability 
distributions is known.  PBA can actually handle the more general case of unknown 
distributions, as discussed in Section 6.5.1.  While DASA assumes that the type of the 
distribution is known, the parameters of the distributions do not need to be known.  For 
example, consider 9 1 2( , )x N x x∼ .  This means that 9 x  is a probabilistic quantity that is 
normally distributed with imprecise parameter 1 x  as the mean and imprecise parameter 
2 x  as the standard deviation. 
When a DASA sensitivity analysis is performed, the imprecise parameters are 
considered using a single value from their consistent regions at a time.  Consequently, for 
each combination of imprecise parameters (whether one-way, two-way, or more 
analysis), a particular precise distribution is specified and the expected value can be 
calculated.  This process is then repeated for multiple (discretized) values in the analysis, 
and the results of these calculations are aggregated into an interval of expected utility. 
6.3.3.2 PBA as a sensitivity analysis 
In the previous section, the case of an imprecisely characterized probabilistic 
parameter was considered.  The model 9 1 2( , )x N x x∼  presented is actually a p-box.  
Specifically, it is a parameterized p-box.  A parameterized p-box is different from a 
general p-box in that the parameterized p-box consists of a parameterized family of 




mean 1 x  and standard deviation 2 x .  For example, if 1 [50,60]x =  and 2 [3,5]x = , then 
9 x  can be expressed with the p-box shown in Figure 6.8. 
As described in Chapter 4, a p-box is a generalization of both intervals and 
probabilities.  Consequently, it is not necessary to distinguish imprecise and probabilistic 
variables as separate entity types in PBA as it was in DASA.  Some variables, which 
were previously used only as parameters in probability distributions, can even be 
eliminated.  For example in the above relationship ( 9 1 2( , )x N x x∼ , 1 [50,60]x =  and 
2 [3,5]x = ), 1 x  and 2 x  can be eliminated, and the total uncertainty in 9 x  can be written 
directly as the parameterized p-box  9 ([50,60],[3,5])x N∼ .   
Calculations based on PBA preserve both the intervals (imprecision) and 
probability information.  In general, calculations with p-box inputs result in p-box 
outputs.  Specific algorithms for computing with p-boxes are discussed in Chapter 4.  
Attention here is limited to a set of algorithms based on dependency bounds convolutions 
(Williamson and Downs 1990, Berleant 1993, Ferson and Donald 1998).  These methods 
allow for rigorous calculations with p-boxes for the principle binary operators of 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division (as long as zero is not a consistent 
value).  Similar to rigorous interval calculations, a p-box calculations is rigorous if it is 
true that if the true distributions are contained in the input p-boxes, then the true output 












distribution is included in the output p-box. 
Returning to the general mathematical model defined in Section 3.6, the goal of 
the p-box calculations is to determine the expected utility of particular action.  The final 
output p-box is a set of distributions for the utility of a particular action.  Each of these 
distributions has a particular expected value associated with it, and the entire set in the p-
box corresponds to an interval of expected values (see Section 4.6.1).  This interval 
contains all of the expected values that are consistent with the available information, 
considering all possible interactions and all-way sensitivities.   
It is in this way that an uncertainty analysis generalizes sensitivity analysis for 
decision robustness; the output interval of expected utility is guaranteed to include the 
true interval, which means that if the true interval crosses the critical value13, the output 
interval will, too.  Thus, any sensitivity of the optimal action to the imprecision will be 
detected.  If the chosen action’s output expected utility interval does not cross the critical 
value and all inputs were rigorously determined, then the optimality of the chosen action 
is robust to imprecision. 
6.4 Limitations and extensions of PBA-based 
sensitivity analysis 
In Section 6.3, the emphasis was on the advantages of PBA as a sensitivity 
analysis procedure.  Like all methods, the use of PBA is limited to certain scenarios and 
requires certain assumptions to be made.  The overall message of this chapter is twofold: 
(1) the requirements of PBA are in many ways less strict than the requirements of other 




13  It is important to note that the critical value is known.  For comparison between 
alternatives it is zero.  Originally in the literature, an uncertain investment was 
compared to an investment with a deterministic return, so alternatively the critical 




methods; (2) PBA can provide information that is not available with other methods.  
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the limitations of PBA as a sensitivity analysis 
procedure. 
6.4.1 Bounds are rigorous but not necessarily best possible 
In the previous sections, it was emphasized that the results of PBA computations 
using dependency bounds convolutions (DBC) (Williamson and Downs 1990, Berleant 
1993, Ferson and Donald 1998) are rigorous, meaning that the true interval is contained 
in the output interval assuming the inputs are correctly defined.  Note that it was not said 
that the output intervals are the true intervals.  This is because the output intervals 
actually can be larger than the true distributions as a consequence of the repeated variable 
limitation of interval arithmetic (as explained in Section 4.5.2).   
Since the bounds are rigorous, an alternative will never appear to be the most 
preferred when in fact it is not the most preferred.  However, if the bounds are much 
larger than the best possible bounds (a situation referred to as overly conservative), then 
there may appear to be significant indeterminacy when in fact the real problem may 
involve none.  This could lead to the conclusion that the decision in not robust when in 
fact it is robust.  This is the opposite of the problem faced by less than all-way sensitivity 
analysis, which ignores dependencies and higher order interactions and can lead to results 
that are non-rigorous, i.e., that are inconsistent with the truth.   
If a selection decision problem is recast as an exercise in hypothesis testing, the 




statistical terms of Type I and Type II errors (Devore 1995) via an analogy14.  Returning 
to the decision model, 1{ ,..., }mA a a=  is the set of all possible actions.    The null 
hypothesis is that any one of the 2{ ,..., }i ma a a∈  is the optimal action.  The alternative 
hypothesis is that 1a  is the optimal action.  Formulated this way, the burden of proof is on 
showing that 1a  is optimal.   
A less than full-way DASA sensitivity analysis may underestimate the true 
imprecision and indicate that there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis in 
favor of the alternative when there really is not sufficient evidence to do so.  In this 
situation, the null hypothesis would be rejected when it is actually true, a Type I error.   
Conversely, PBA may overestimate the uncertainty and lead to the failure to 
reject the null hypothesis when it is actually false, a Type II error.  A Type II error is an 
error in the sense that an opportunity to make a decision is lost; the null hypothesis could 
have been rejected, but was not.  Consequently, a decision maker may waste resources or 
make an arbitrary decision trying to reduce indeterminacy that does not exist in the actual 
problem.  PBA will not lead to a Type I error assuming the imprecision in the inputs is 
sufficiently characterized.   
Which is preferable, a Type I or Type II error?  A Type II error may be preferable 
in high-risk applications; when the cost of failure is high, one is often more willing to be 
conservative and spend additional resources to reduce uncertainty further.  In other 
applications, the cost of delaying a decision or collecting more information may exceed 
any potential benefit from waiting.  There is no general answer; the analyst must assess 




14 The alignment is not exact, but is illustrative.  As such, this hypothesis testing 
procedure is meant for discussion only; it is not proposed or recommended as an actual 





the situation and make his or her own choice.  However, one can conclude that PBA leads 
to a more rigorous sensitivity analysis for robustness in that it avoids a Type I error; it 
will always detect a lack of robustness. 
This result can be seen by considering Figure 6.9 and Table 6.1.  In Figure 6.9, 
the possible resultant intervals from DASA and PBA (using DBC) are compared for (and 
against) a given truth.  These intervals are compared to a set of possible scenarios for the 
critical value that indicated sensitivity.  As shown in Table 6.1, scenarios 1c , 
,
1c , 2c , and  
,
2c  represent cases in which the decision is not sensitive.  Scenarios 3c , 
,
3c , 4c , and  
,
4c  
represent cases in which the decision is sensitive.  For example, in a scenario in which 1c  
represents the critical line, the decision is insensitive to the imprecision (as revealed by 
the true interval).  In this scenario, both DASA and PBA (with DBC) conclude correctly 
that there is no sensitivity.   
These comparisons are summarized in Table 6.1.  Clearly whenever the decision 
is truly sensitive, PBA (with DBC) recognizes this sensitivity (no Type I error) when the 
inputs are defined correctly.  Similarly, whenever the decision is truly insensitive, the 
DASA approach concludes correctly that it is insensitive (no Type II error).  It is also 
worthwhile noting that since the DASA intervals are always no bigger than the PBA 
(with DBC) intervals, PBA will conclude that there is sensitivity whenever DASA 










1c 2c 3c 4c 1'c2'c3'c4'c  
Figure 6.9.  Graphical scenarios of sensitivity analysis 
 
Table 6.1. Comparison of sensitivity analysis scenarios, assuming correct inputs 
Critical level Truth PBA conclusion DASA conclusion 
1c  or 
,
1c  Not sensitive Not sensitive Not sensitive 
2c  or 
,
2c  Not sensitive Sensitive Not sensitive 
3c  or 
,
3c  Sensitive Sensitive Not sensitive 
4c  or 
,
4c  Sensitive Sensitive Sensitive 
 
In the preceding discussion, it was noted several times that the rigor of the PBA 
method depends on the accuracy of the characterization of the inputs.  This is a somewhat 
obvious but crucial limitation.  For example, if a DM assumes that a quantity is known 
precisely when actually significant imprecision exists, then any subsequent analysis will 
underestimate sensitivity.  The characterization of inputs is not a perfect science, so 
underestimation can occur.  Consequently, the “guarantee” of rigor does not apply 
universally, but only when the inputs are correct.   
However, if the same assumptions are made for DASA and PBA, then PBA will 
conclude sensitivity in all cases that DASA does and possibly in more cases.  In other 




that underestimate the imprecision in the output, and thus may fail to identify sensitivity.  
However, there is no case in which DASA avoids a Type I error and PBA does not. 
6.4.2 Lack of rigorous black-box methods 
As described in Section 4.5.2, DBC methods for p-box computations require an 
open, operationally defined model (e.g. algebraic) of the problem.  Consequently, they 
cannot be used to analyze so-called black-box models such as differential equations, 
simulations, and finite element analysis in which the underlying equations cannot be 
expressed in the appropriate form.  The methods for black-box analysis discussed in 
(Bruns 2006, Bruns and Paredis 2006, Bruns, et al. 2006) generally sacrifice the 
guarantee of rigor in the calculations.  Optimization-based methods often lead to bounds 
that are close to being both rigorous and best possible, but no guarantee can be made with 
these heuristic or sampling based methods.  Consequently, the value of PBA for rigorous 
sensitivity analysis for robustness is limited to non-black box models for which DBC are 
applicable. 
6.4.3 Sensitivity analysis for information prioritization 
All of the discussion in Sections 6.2-6.3 focused on what was described as 
sensitivity analysis for decision robustness.  Another major use of sensitivity analysis is 
for identifying to which uncertainties the decision is most sensitive, assuming a decision 
is sensitive (lacks robustness) given the existing imprecision.    PBA does not provide a 
direct method for determining to which imprecise quantity the decision is most sensitive.  
Ferson and co-authors (Ferson, et al. 2004a) have proposed a meta-level sensitivity 
analysis for identifying where future empirical efforts (or information collection) would 
be most productive. 
The meta-level analysis is similar to an approach in probabilistic sensitivity 
analysis in which the variance of a parameter is reduced and the resulting reduction in the 




“pinching” means reducing the uncertainty.  A p-box can be pinched in two 
dimensions—reducing the imprecision or reducing the variance of the probabilistic 
component.  Naturally, one could also pinch both dimensions. 
Since the goal of a sensitivity analysis (as defined in this chapter) is to identify the 
sensitivity of the decision to the current imprecision (i.e. lack of available information), it 
is only reasonable to pinch the p-boxes with respect to the imprecision.  Any underlying 
and inherent probabilistic variability should clearly be preserved.  
This applies even when subjective probabilities are used.  A DM may want to 
explore the sensitivity of the decision to his beliefs, but if the DM is not sure about his or 
her subjective probability distributions, he or she should represent this incertitude using a 
p-box that would contain multiple distributions.  The sensitivity of the decision to the 
imprecision in the DM’s beliefs is captured in the p-box analysis. 
Regardless of whether the probabilistic information is subjective or objective in 
nature, a crucial question remains: to which distribution should the p-box be pinched?  
This question must be answered before the method can be used in practice.  There are 
many possibilities, as shown in Figure 6.10 for the p-box from Figure 6.8.  As Ferson and 
coauthors note, the current answer is pure conjecture (Ferson, et al. 2004a), so future 
work is necessary.   
The answer is not obvious because by its very nature, the p-box contains all of the 
distributions that are deemed consistent with the available information.  One option 
would be to pinch the p-box to some best-guess distribution (the lower left quadrant of 
Figure 6.10), such as what would be used in DASA.  The idea of this meta-level 
sensitivity analysis is to pinch a the p-box of a particular input quantity and to compare 
the resultant p-box using this pinched input to the p-box that results from the original 
input p-box.  The ideal goal would be to identify for which input quantity the pinching 
reduced the uncertainty in the output p-box the most.  This raises another question: how 




In probabilistic sensitivity analysis, the difference between two assumptions is 
measured in uncertainty reduction in terms of variance reduction.  Ideally, a meta-level 
sensitivity analysis also would compare the reduction in uncertainty by pinching a 
particular uncertain quantity, and then the quantity that yields the greatest reduction in 
uncertainty would be the priority for additional information collection.  Unfortunately, 
there is no way to fully capture all aspects of the uncertainty in a p-box with a single 
number, and different measures of uncertainty essentially allow different questions to be 
addressed (Ferson, et al. 2004a).  The validity and exact meaning of such measures of 
total uncertainty for p-boxes is an open research question. 
A DM could perform a qualitative analysis of uncertainty reduction using 
intuition about the “total uncertainty” in a p-box, but such intuitive methods are less than 




















































(original p-box shown in dotted line, pinched p-boxes shown in solid lines) 




ideal than formal quantitative methods.  However, given the double questions of to what 
to pinch a p-box and how to measure uncertainty of a p-box, it appears that such intuitive 
methods will be the best possible in the near future.  In that light, the ability of PBA to 
serve as a sensitivity analysis for information prioritization is currently limited.  
However, this does not diminish its ability to discern the presence of robustness. 
6.5 Additional advantages of PBA as a sensitivity 
analysis 
In addition to providing an all-way, rigorous sensitivity analysis for decision 
robustness, PBA is also much more flexible that traditional DASA methods.  
Specifically, PBA allows for unknown distribution types and various conditions of 
dependency between uncertain parameters. 
6.5.1 Unknown distribution types 
In Section 6.3, the flexibility of PBA with regard to imprecise distribution 
parameters was demonstrated, but PBA can also handle cases of unknown distribution 
type (Ferson and Hajagos 2004).  For example, a p-box can be constructed and 
propagated with only knowledge of the mean and variance; no assumption of distribution 
type (e.g. normal, lognormal, gamma, or Weibull) is necessary (Ferson 2002).  A p-box 
for a mean of 15 and variance of 20 is shown in Figure 6.11.  Such flexibility is useful 
when, for example, a DM has an estimate of the mean and variance of a probabilistic 
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Figure 6.11. Example p-box for mean and variance, no distribution knowledge 
6.5.2 Known or unknown dependencies 
In many statistical analyses, DMs assume independence between the uncertain 
quantities.  In some cases this is justifiable, but in many cases it is merely a short-cut 
taken to reduce the complexity of the problem.  The challenge is that traditional statistical 
methods require that the joint probability density functions between all uncertain 
quantities to be known precisely.  Since information regarding joint density functions is 
often scarce, it is convenient to assume independence, thus making the joint density 
functions simple functions of the marginal density functions.     
DBC methods can determine probability bounds in the case of unknown 
dependence between the inputs.  Essentially, a p-box can be computed that covers all 
possible dependency scenarios; this allows the DM to avoid making unwarranted 
assumptions about dependencies.  DASA sensitivity analysis, on the other hand, ignores 
dependencies and higher order interactions, and it requires a known distribution type.  
Consequently, the class of problems that can be accurately explored with PBA (using 




6.6 Summary: General usefulness of PBA 
In this chapter, it was shown that PBA generalizes a global (or all-way) sensitivity 
analysis, as defined in decision analysis.  When implemented using the DBC algorithm, 
PBA provides a means for performing a sensitivity analysis for robustness identification 
that avoids a Type I error; it will never lead to the conclusion that the decision is not 
sensitive to the existing lack of information when in fact the decision is sensitive, 
assuming the imprecision in the inputs are properly characterized.  In other words, it 
never leads to a false sense of security.  PBA can also handle a wider array of problems 
that a traditional sensitivity analysis because it can be used to propagate uncertainties 
without making any assumptions about the dependencies between uncertain quantities.   
However, PBA also has important limitations.  First, it provides no direct 
information for prioritizing information collection; it identifies the existence of 
sensitivity, but not the source.  Second, PBA is subject to a Type II error, which means 
concluding that the decision is sensitive to the existing lack of information when in fact it 
is not sensitive.  This could result in missed opportunities or unnecessary expenditures on 
information collection.  The exact tradeoffs between the two methods of sensitivity 
analysis are explored in more detail in the next chapter, which compares the two for the 







DEMONSTRATION OF PBA AND A COMPARISON TO ONE-WAY 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
ENVIRONMENTALLY BENIGN DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE 
 
This chapter, much of which was previously published in a conference paper 
(Aughenbaugh, et al. 2006), serves as a capstone to the core of the dissertation.  In 
Chapters 2 and 3, motivating questions 1 and 2 were explored and potential answers were 
advanced.  In Chapter 4, the details of a particular representation were presented.  
Chapter 5 contained a motivating example that demonstrated the potential value, in terms 
of the quality of the final design, of using imprecise probabilities.  In Chapter 6, it was 
shown how PBA presents a rigorous sensitivity analysis for robustness, as compared to 
decision analysis with sensitivity analysis (DASA).  In this chapter, aspects from each of 
these chapters are brought together and augmented in the context of the environmentally 
benign design of an oil filter.  The goals of the chapter are to: 
1. Explore an application in which the ability to represent imprecision is 
important and could have significant impact on society 
2. Demonstrate the process of performing a probability bounds analysis  
3. Compare PBA and decision analysis with one-way sensitivity analysis in a 
specific context 
The first section of this chapter is an introduction to the context of 
environmentally benign design and manufacture.  The example problem of oil filter 
selection is introduced in Section 7.2.  The process of applying PBA to the selection 




analysis approach to solving the same problem is presented in Section 1.4.  In Section 
1.5, the two methods are compared in the context of the oil filter example.   
7.1 Environmentally benign design and 
manufacture (EBDM) 
Consumers and legislators are beginning to recognize the cost to society that 
results from the environmental impact of products.  Consequently, companies are 
increasingly concerned with the environment.  Interest is therefore growing in 
environmentally benign design and manufacture (EBDM), a domain that examines the 
often competing goals of achieving economic growth and protecting the environment.   
The economic goals of product design are relatively clear and generally can be 
tracked using financial accounting.  Environmental goals are harder to quantify.  It is 
challenging to assess the environmental impact of a product because there are many 
people who can suffer from environmental impacts, and these people are often spread out 
geographically and temporally.  For example, in addition to manufacturing workers and 
customers who are in direct contact with the product, the residents in the areas where 
products are produced and disposed of can feel the effects of the products.  Residents in 
areas downstream and downwind from industrial sites can also suffer.   
These events can take place at many different locations in many different 
neighborhoods (and even countries) over the product’s entire (and often long) lifespan 
and even long into the future.  Consequently, an evaluation of all of the loads and impacts 
has traditionally been addressed with life cycle assessment (LCA) methods.  Researchers 
are starting to recognize that a key characteristic of LCA is that only very limited 
information and knowledge is available, resulting in large uncertainty, as summarized by 
Ross and coauthors (Ross, et al. 2002) and Björklund (2002).   
In general, multi-criteria evaluations that include environmental performance can 




(Hofstetter 1998, Lu and Gu 2003), though none are identical in form or scope to the 
structure presented here.  Components are grouped, as indicated by dashed-lines in the 
figure, using Hofstetter’s concept of “spheres” of knowledge and reasoning about 
environmental evaluation (1998). 
• Technosphere:  description of the product and its life cycle and an inventory of loads 
(e.g. emissions) 
• Ecosphere:  modeling of changes to the environment 
• Valuesphere:  modeling of the perceived seriousness or importance of changes to 
the environment 
Any of the components in Figure 7.1 can be a source of uncertainty.  Often some 
of these sources, such as form and inventory, are well characterized, while others, such as 
environmental damages, are much harder to characterize.   
EBDM is a multi-objective problem, pursuing the often competing goals of 
economic growth and environmental protection, while subjected to multiple sources of 
uncertainty.  This is a rich context in which to explore different methods of representing 
uncertainty and making engineering design decisions.  It also offers an opportunity to 
contribute to the EBDM and LCA communities by demonstrating practical approaches 




























7.2 EBDM Example: Selecting an appropriate oil 
filter design 
Around 250 million light duty oil filters are discarded (and not recycled) in the 
United States each year.  The environmental impact of these filters can be substantial, as 
disposable filters contain large amounts of steel, aluminum, or plastic, depending on the 
style of filter.     
In this example, it is assumed that an automobile manufacturer wants to reduce 
the environmental impact of oil filters from its cars by designing a more environmentally 
benign filter.  Naturally, the company simultaneously wants to turn a profit, making this 
an EBDM problem.  It is assumed that since high-price filters are less attractive to 
consumers than low-price filters (with all other things being equal), the manufacturer 
wants to minimize the total cost to the consumer of purchasing oil filters over the lifetime 
of the vehicle.   
In the following, the example problem is described in detail.  This extensive 
explanation will be useful in the subsequent sections, as a complete understanding of the 
example problems and assumptions is necessary to appreciate the advantages and 
limitations of the methods.  
Naturally, some simplifications and assumptions are introduced in the problem.  
For example, the exact dimensions and parameters for the problem are chosen to be 
realistic, but are not based on hard, real-world data.  Consequently, the emphasis is not on 
the actual decision outcome (i.e. the chosen filter), but rather on the decision and analysis 
process. 
7.2.1 Types of oil filters 
In this simplified model, shown in Figure 7.2, an oil filter is comprised of five 
components: housing, top cap, filter, inner support, and bottom cap. The housing, top cap, 
and bottom cap make up the casing, and the inner support and filter make up the 




For the steel easy change (SEC) filter, the structural components are made of 
steel.  The entire filter is designed to be replaced at once; it is simply unscrewed from the 
engine and then discarded or recycled.  The plastic easy change (PEC) filter is used 
exactly as the SEC filter, but its structural components are plastic rather than steel.  
Finally, the take-apart spin-on (TASO) filter has structural components made of 
aluminum and when the filter is replaced, only the cartridge is replaced; the casing is 
reused. 
7.2.2 The design problem 
The design problem used in this example is a selection between the SEC, PEC, 
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Figure 7.2.  Oil filter schematic diagram 
 
 
 Table 7.1.  Types of filters 
Filter Material Discarded parts 
SEC Steel Cartridge and Casing 
PEC Plastic Cartridge and Casing 




influence diagram in Figure 7.3 [see (Clemen 1996) for an introduction to the usage and 
(McGovern, et al. 1993) for an overview of the history of influence diagrams]. The 
influence diagram is constructed by first identifying the decision (i.e. filter type selection) 
the objective function; the purpose of the influence diagram is to map what influences 
this objective. 
7.2.3 Objective function 
It was noted earlier that the manufacturer has two primary goals: to minimize 
environmental impact, and to keep the cost to the user low.  This is shown in Figure 7.3 
by the arrows leading from “Total user cost” and “Total impact on environment” into the 
objective.  In this example, the objective will be expressed in terms of utility, using multi-
attribute utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1993, Scott 2004). 
Specifically, the total utility is given in Equation (7.1), and the individual utility 
functions are given by Equations (7.2) and (7.3). 
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 costU cost= −  (7.2) 
 impactU ecoscore= −  (7.3) 
The quantity ecoscore is explained in the next subsection.  As defined, all utilities 
will be negative, but they remain relevant for comparisons.  This simple utility function is 
chosen to highlight the influence of uncertainty representations on the decision process.  
The elicitation of exact multi-attribute utilities is challenging, so the weight parameter w  
is assumed to be imprecise, confined only to the interval [0.5,  2]w = , with the best guess 
at 1w = .  In practice, the functional form of the utility functions could also be uncertain, 
a scenario which is not addressed in this dissertation.   
7.2.4 Environmental impact calculation 
It is assumed that the primary environmental impact of an oil filter arises due to 
the construction, transportation, and disposal of the casing and cartridge.  These 
components are constructed of materials such as steel, aluminum, and plastics and are 
present in large quantities.  Other substances, such as the cellulose filter element and oil 
residue, are present in much smaller quantities and are generally equivalent in all three 
types of filters.  
The Eco-indicator 95 is an impact assessment method for life-cycle analysis in 
which particular scores (ecoscores), measured in eco-points, are assigned to specific 
materials and processes There is also an updated Eco-indicator 99 available (Goedkoop 
and Spriensma 2001), but for illustrative purposes the old database and methodology is 
sufficient.  Assuming that the impact of geometric forming processes is negligible 
compared to the impact of the mass of the material and its production (mining, 
processing, etc.), these scores can be given for specific materials as points per mass.  
They will be referred to as Eco-indicator rates, or simply ecorates in this dissertation.  




 m m m mimpact ecoscore mass ecorate= = ⋅  (7.4) 
For a particular material, the ecorate not only captures its environmental effects 
and damages, but also sets a value on these damages relative to other damages.  As such, 
it combines the ecosphere and Valuesphere components of Figure 7.1.  This allows for 
tradeoffs between different materials and processes with different inherent environmental 
impacts.  These value tradeoffs are fixed within the Eco-indicator model, but in practice, 
not every society or decision maker will agree with these tradeoffs.  Consequently, the 
Valuesphere is a source of uncertainty in environmental life-cycle assessment.  The 
effects and damages are uncertain due to the complexity and uncertainty of modeling 
ecosystems.   
In Figure 7.1 the ecosphere is independent of the Technosphere because the 
ecorates are independent of what effects are present; they are pre-tabulated for all 
materials.  In this problem, the Technosphere effects, or inventory, is given by the total 
mass of material used over a vehicle’s lifetime, and are thus incorporated into the 
problem in Equation (7.4). 
The total mass depends on the number of filters F  used, as shown in Table 7.2.  
This number varies because not every vehicle is in service for the same number of miles, 
and car owners change the filters with difference frequencies.  Both vehicle lifetime L  
and frequency of filter change f  of a vehicle are thus uncertain.  The number of filters 
used over a vehicle’s lifetime is given by Equation (7.5) as a function of these two 
uncertain quantities, which were also reflected in Figure 7.3.  




Table 7.2.  Total environmental impact and cost functions 
Filter Total mass of F  filters (kg) Total cost of F  filters 
SEC ( )casing catridgemass mass F+ ⋅  $5 F⋅  
TASO ( )casing catridgemass mass F+ ⋅  $15 $5 F+ ⋅  
PEC ( )casing catridgemass mass F+ ⋅  $8.5 F⋅  
7.2.5 Total user cost calculation 
The total cost is a function of the number of filters F  used over the vehicles 
lifetime and the price of filter parts.  This function depends on the type of filter, since 
different parts are used for different filter types.  The functions and prices are 
summarized in Table 7.2.  In general, filter price is uncertain due to unknown market 
fluctuations and inflation.  For simplicity in this example, the costs are assumed known 
and constant. 
7.2.6 Assumptions on available information 
The assumed uncertainties are summarized in Table 7.3.  The environmental 
impact per unit mass is known to be within a stated interval for each material.  Interval 
data is assumed because the uncertainty in the numbers is not probabilistic but rather 
arises from modeling errors and assumptions about the ecosphere and Valuesphere.  The 
stated intervals represent 50% to 200% of the nominal values calculated using the Eco-
indicator 95 analysis (6.2, 21.2, and 9.4 millipoints per kilogram for SEC, TASO, and 




Table 7.3.  Assumptions about uncertainty 
Uncertain parameter Assumption 
Vehicle lifetime L  
(miles) 
1( , 2)Gamma α   
1 [40000,60000]α =  
Filter change frequency f  
(miles/filter) 
23000 ( ,5)Weibull α+  
2 =[3000, 5000]α  
Steel [3.1, 12.4 ] 
Plastic [10.6, 42.4] Eco-impact rate (millipoints/kg) Aluminum [4.7, 18.8] 
Utility weighting w  [0.5, 2.0] 
Imprecise probabilities are used to represent the uncertainty in the vehicle lifetime 
and filter change frequencies.  Variability (a type of irreducible uncertainty) arises 
because the population of vehicle owners contains a variety of individuals, each of whom 
has his or her own behavior, but who collectively appear random.  For illustration, only 
one parameter of the distributions is assumed to be known imprecisely, but the methods 
immediately generalize to multiple uncertain quantities.   
It is assumed that L  and f  are both independent of all three eco-rates, and that 
the weighting w  in the utility function is independent of all other quantities.  However, 
the dependency between L  and f  is unknown, as are all dependencies between all 
ecorates.   
Why is independence not assumed?  L  and f  are both related to user behavior.  
It is conceivable that a user who intends to keep a car a long time will change the filter at 
a higher rate than someone who keeps a car a short time, since the long-time owner 
would have a greater interest in keeping the engine in good condition.  In such a scenario, 
L  and f  are correlated. However, this dependence is not known exactly and may not 
even exist at all, so it makes sense to assume an unknown dependency.  A similar 
argument can be made between the eco-rates; they could be independent since they relate 
to different material and potentially different environmental effects and damages.  





A traditional statistical approach would require perfect knowledge of all joint 
probabilities, information that is rarely known.  Consequently, independence between 
uncertain quantities is commonly assumed, an assumption that is often unjustifiable given 
available information.  The ability of PBA to handle unknown dependencies, and 
therefore compute the possible range of results with just the marginal distributions as 
inputs, is a major advantage over traditional methods. 
7.3 Oil filter selection using PBA 
The objective function in this example, Equation (7.1), has two components: cost 
and environmental impact.  Of the two, the cost calculation facilitates a clearer 
demonstration of the PBA process.  Consequently, the single objective of cost is 
considered separately from environmental impact in order to illustrate some properties of 
PBA.  Attention is subsequently returned to multi-attribute EBDM problem in Section 
7.3.6.  The commercially available Risk Calc (Ferson 2002) software is used for all 
calculations in this section.  Risk Calc implements PBA using the DBC algorithms 
discussed in Section 4.5.1. 
7.3.1 Total cost calculation 
According to Figure 7.3, total cost is a function of the number of filter changes 
F , which according to Equation (7.5) is strictly the quotient of L  divided by f .  This 
calculation is evaluated in Risk Calc by first defining the variables L  and f  according to 
Table 7.3, which results in the p-boxes shown in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5 respectively.  
The result of the quotient is then calculated directly using Equation (7.5).  This results in 
the p-box for the total number of filter changes F  shown in Figure 7.6.   
To calculate the total cost, the p-box is merely scaled and shifted according to the 
equations in Table 7.2.  The result for the SEC filter is shown in Figure 7.7.  The p-box in 




SEC filter that are consistent with the available data.  The procedure can be repeated for 
the TASO and PEC filters using the appropriate equations.  The next step is to compare 
the results for the three alternatives. 
7.3.2 Comparing p-boxes 
In traditional statistical decision theory, precise probability distributions are 
assumed, and a decision maker compares alternatives by taking mathematical expectation 
over the distributions and selects the alternative with the lowest expected cost.  For a p-
box, a similar calculation can be made, but since the p-box consists of multiple 
distributions, multiple expected costs result, which together form an interval of expected 
cost for each alternative (as discussed in Section 4.6.1). 
The intervals of expected cost can be calculated using the bounding distributions 

























Figure 7.4.  Probability box for vehicle 
life 
Figure 7.5.  Probability box for filter 
change frequency 






















Figure 7.6.  Probability box for total 
number of filter changes  
Figure 7.7.  Probability box for total cost 




of the p-box (see Section 4.6.2 ).  The resultant intervals of expected cost are shown in 
Figure 7.8.  When two intervals of expected cost overlap, as in Figure 7.8, the choice of 
the best alternative is indeterminate.  Depending on where in the two intervals the true 
values lie, either one could be the best choice, but the available information does not 
present a rational way to determine which really is.  In some cases, this indeterminacy 
can be resolved, as follows. 
7.3.3 Resolving indeterminacy 
When the basic analysis results in indeterminacy of choice, the decision maker 
has several options, including: 
 
1. Collect additional information  
2. Make an arbitrary, satisficing, or robust decision 
3. Base the decision on additional criteria 
4. Include information in the decision that is not captured in the intervals, such as shared 
uncertainty 
The first option is straightforward—collect information until the indeterminacy is 
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assume that the decision maker is convinced that an oil filter with a lifetime cost to the 
average user of greater than $130 is unacceptable.  In that case, any filter whose interval 
is above or includes this value is unacceptable.  In a satisficing approach, any alternative 
that meets this constraint is acceptable.  In this example, only the SEC filter meets this 
criterion with certainty, so it would be chosen.  According to the intervals in Figure 7.8, it 
is possible that the PEC and TASO filters perform better than the SEC filter, but the SEC 
filter is guaranteed to meet the minimum requirement, while the other are not.   
One possible arbitrary policy is to choose the alternative with the lowest lower 
bound (a so-called mini-min policy), which suggests risk-taking or optimistic behavior.  
An opposite policy is to choose the alternative with the lowest upper bound (a so-called 
mini-max policy15), which suggests risk-aversion or pessimism.  In this example, all three 
policies result in the same choice, but this will not always be the case. 
The third option is to include additional criteria into the decision.  In this example, 
the decision maker’s actual goal is to minimize both the cost and environmental impact of 
the filter, so the impact information could be included in the decision with the hope of 
resolving the indeterminacy.   
The fourth option for resolving indeterminacy is to include additional 
information.  This is possible because any mathematical representation of information is 
an abstraction; generally, some information is lost when it is forced into a particular 
formal representation.  It is not always economical to use the most expressive formalism, 
because the complexity of a formalism increases the computational and informational 




15  The “maxi-min” policy is referred to more  frequently in the literature, but the policies 
are essentially the same; maxi-min is used in maximization problems, and mini-max is 




costs.  In the filter example, one possibility source of additional information to include is 
shared uncertainty (Rekuc, et al. 2006).   
7.3.4 Considering shared uncertainty 
Accounting for shared uncertainty when handling imprecision is similar in goal to 
using joint probability distributions or correlations when handling precise probabilities; 
the goal is to explicitly recognize events that tend to occur together (or separately).  In 
this example, the number of filters F  used is assumed to be independent of the filter 
design; the choice of filter has no impact on the number of times it will be replaced.  
Consequently, the imprecision in F  is the same, or shared, for all three alternatives. 
In the preceding analysis, this commonality was not considered.  For example, the 
upper bounds on the intervals shown in Figure 7.8 actually all correspond to the 
distribution of F  with the largest mean value.  Consequently, it only makes sense to 
compare the upper bound of the SEC cost to the upper bounds for TASO and PEC rather 
than the entire intervals.  One way to account for such shared uncertainty is to compare 
the differences between the alternatives at every realization of F , a so-called maximality 
comparison (Walley 1991, Rekuc, et al. 2006) [see also Chapter 4] that has a similar 
motivation as does paired statistical testing (Devore 1995).  The need for considering 
these differences explicitly is further explained in the following section, but first the 
results are presented. 
The resulting cost difference intervals are shown in Figure 7.9.  In this figure, the 
intervals are not compared directly to each other, but rather each interval is compared to 
zero.  Starting at the left, the interval for the expected difference in cost between the SEC 
filter and the PEC filter ( SEC PECcost - cost ) lies entirely below zero, so (since the decision 
maker wants to minimize cost) the SEC filter is preferred to the PEC filter (based on 
expected cost alone).  Similarly, the interval for the difference between SEC and TASO is 




that SEC is the best alternative in terms of minimizing expected cost, a conclusion that 
could not be drawn from Figure 7.8 when shared uncertainty was ignored.  The issue of 
shared uncertainty is addressed in detail in Chapter 8.   
7.3.5 Interval arithmetic and repeated variables 
In the previous section, the importance of considering shared uncertainty when 
comparing alternatives was illustrated.  The explicit consideration of shared uncertainty 
in PBA is necessitated partly by a fundamental limitation of interval arithmetic.  As 
described in Section 4.5.1, interval arithmetic algorithms are in general rigorous but not 
best possible.   
Since the bounds are rigorous, an alternative will never appear to be the most 
preferred when in fact it is not the most preferred.  However, if the bounds are much 
larger than the best possible bounds (a situation referred to as overly conservative), then 
there may appear to be significant indeterminacy when in fact the real problem may 
involved none.   


















filters compared  
 





For example, the p-boxes for differences in utility (both considering and not 
considering the shared uncertainty) between the SEC filter and TASO filter are shown in 
Figure 7.10.  The true p-box (solid line) is actually much more restrictive than the one 
(dotted line) calculated ignoring the presence of repeated variables.  An overly 
conservative p-box will lead to intervals of expected utility that are larger than necessary, 
possibly causing unwarranted indeterminacy in the decision, as described in Section 
6.4.1.  The consequence of this for the oil filter example is discussed in Section 7.5.2. 
7.3.6 Multiple objective analysis and selection 
In the previous section, various properties of PBA were demonstrated and 
discussed in the context of cost minimization.  Attention is now returned to the actual 
multi-attribute example problem.  Using Risk Calc, all of the uncertainties shown in 
Table 7.3 can be propagated through the problem to evaluate overall utility.  The 
resulting intervals for the comparisons of design alternatives are shown in Figure 7.11.  
Based on these results, no decision can be made because all three intervals contain zero.  
Such indeterminacy can be expected if the uncertainty is large, because large uncertainty 
implies a lack of information for determining the best alternative.   

















The indeterminacy implies that more information or a different decision policy is 
needed, such as discussed in Section 7.3.3.  However, because the PBA calculations are 
not always best possible, the indeterminacy shown in Figure 7.11 may not actually exist.  
This point is revisited in the discussion Section 7.5.1.   
7.4 Oil filter selection with decision analysis and 
sensitivity analysis 
Decision analysis is a discipline that studies procedures, tools, and frameworks 
for transforming problems that are difficult to understand, solve, or explain into problems 
that are more readily understood and solved (Howard 1988a, Clemen 1996).  This section 
presents a basic decision analysis, including sensitivity analysis, approach to selecting an 
oil filter.   
7.4.1 Basic decision analysis 
Clemen (page 6) describes the decision-analysis process with the following steps: 
1. Identify the situation and understand objectives 
2. Identify alternatives 
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3. Decompose and model the problem structure, uncertainties, and preferences 
4. Choose the best alternative 
5. Perform sensitivity analysis 
6. Decide if further analysis is needed 
7. Implement the chosen alternative 
This process will be referred to as decision analysis with sensitivity analysis 
(DASA) in this chapter.  Steps 1-3 have been completed in Section 7.2.  The resulting 
data is the same as in Table 7.3, but the uncertainties will be treated differently.  
Traditional decision analysis does not explicitly recognize imprecision, so the analysis in 
step 4 is performed using best-guess, base values for all of the imprecise parameters, as 
shown in Table 7.4.  Notice that this data is consistent with the data in Table 7.3.  
The expected value of the objective function for each design alternative can be 
calculated using the relationships described earlier.  The results are shown in Table 7.5.  
Assuming the base values for all quantities, the TASO filter has the highest expected 
utility and is therefore the best alternative (recall that as the utility function was defined 
in Equations (7.1)-(7.3), all of the utilities were guaranteed to be negative, and now the 
TASO filter has the least negative expected utility and is therefore the best).  The next 
step in decision-analysis is to perform a sensitivity analysis on the selection of the TASO 
filter, as discussed in the next subsection. 
 
Table 7.4.  Base values for imprecise quantities 
Uncertain parameter Assumption 
Vehicle lifetime L  (miles) (50000,2)Gamma  
Filter change frequency f  (miles/filter) 3000 (4000,5)Weibull+  
Steel 6.2 
Aluminum 21.2 Eco-impact rate (millipoints per kg) 
Plastic 9.4 





Table 7.5.  Results with nominal values 





7.4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
The use of the base values in the previous analysis ignores the knowledge about 
the uncertainties that was described in Table 7.3.  In a sensitivity analysis, a decision 
maker asks, “How might this neglected uncertainty affect the decision?” 
As described in the opening of Chapter 6, the phrase sensitivity analysis has been 
used to refer to various procedures in engineering design.  One convenient way of 
performing a sensitivity analysis for a selection decision is to evaluate the sensitivity of 
the decision outcome graphically using tornado diagrams (Howard 1988a, Eschenbach 
1992, Clemen 1996), such as shown in Figure 7.12 for the SEC filter.  A tornado diagram 
allows a decision maker to perform a one-way sensitivity analysis—that is, to explore the 
effects of uncertain quantities one at a time.   
The first step in constructing a tornado diagram is to define upper and lower 
bounds for the uncertain parameters, such as those shown in Table 7.3.  The next step is 
to take one parameter and vary it from its lower limit to its upper limit with all other 
quantities held constant at their base values.  This results in an interval of values for the 
objective function.  Finally, this is repeated for each parameter.  The base values are 
marked with dashed lines.  Note that since the SEC file contains no plastic or aluminum, 




The tornado diagram is useful for determining which quantities have a large 
potential to affect the decision, given the stated uncertainty bounds.  This is often done by 
comparing the performance to a reference line that represents the performance of a 
precisely characterized alternative.  If a bar crosses this reference line, then the decision 
is (one-way) sensitive to the corresponding parameter.  This information can then guide 
information collection or modeling decisions. 
In the oil filter example, all three alternatives involve uncertainty, so there is no 
constant reference line for comparison.  Instead, the difference in performance between 
alternatives can be compared for each of the necessary pairings, such as shown in Figure 
7.13.  For pair-wise comparisons, the reference line becomes zero.  If a bar of the tornado 
plot crosses the zero reference line, it indicates the preferred alternative can switch 
depending on the outcome of the uncertainty.   
According to the results, the preference of TASO over SEC is one-way insensitive 
to the uncertainties.  The preference of TASO over PEC is also one-way insensitive to the 
uncertainties.  Based on a strict interpretation of the one-way sensitivity analysis, the 
choice of the TASO filter is robust to the uncertainty, a conclusion that contradicts the 
findings of the PBA analysis.  Further comparisons are addressed in Section 7.5.1. 
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7.5 Discussion of oil filter example 
In this section, PBA and decision analysis are directly compared and contrasted in 
four areas: veracity, acuity, complexity, and flexibility. 
7.5.1 Veracity of the analysis 
The example problem confirmed the assertion in Chapter 6 that a one-way 
sensitivity analysis can lead to the conclusion that the decision is insensitive to the 
uncertainty, while the PBA analysis of the same problem can indicate that the solution is 
very sensitive to the uncertainty.  An obvious question to ask is which one gives the right 
result?  Unfortunately, this question has no straightforward answer.   
Due to repeated variables in the interval calculations, PBA gives bounds that may 
be overly conservative (too broad).  On the other hand, one-way sensitivity analysis 
ignores dependencies and higher order interactions and can lead to results that are non-
rigorous, i.e., that are inconsistent with the truth.  In Section 6.4.1,  the selection problem 
was compared to hypothesis testing.  This comparison is now repeated for the specific 
example of the oil filter selection.   
Consider the null hypothesis that either the PEC or the SEC filter is the best 




























choice.  The alternative hypothesis is that the TASO filter is the best.  A sensitivity 
analysis may underestimate the true uncertainty and indicate that there is enough 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative when there really is not 
sufficient evidence to do so.  In this situation, the null hypothesis could be rejected when 
it is true, a Type I error.  Conversely, PBA may overestimate the uncertainty and lead to 
the failure to reject the null hypothesis when it is false, a Type II error.   
In Chapter 6, the question was posed: which is preferable, a Type I or Type II 
error?  The oil filter example provides a context in which to why there is no general 
answer; the analyst must assess the situation and make his or her own choice.  In this 
example, DASA concludes there is no sensitivity and PBA concludes there is sensitivity.  
Returning to Figure 6.9 and Table 6.1 on page 189, this scenario can correspond to either 
2c  or 3c .  If it is 2c , then PBA is making a Type II error.  If it is 3c , then DASA is 
making a Type I error. 
Considering scenario 2c , the result is that the DM concludes that no rigorous 
decision can be made; either more information must be collected or a policy of arbitrary 
choice must be adopted, even though in truth the decision is robust.  This is a potential 
waste of resources or an unnecessary resort to arbitrary choice.  Considering scenario 3c , 
the DM thinks the decision is robust but it in fact is not, possibly leading to a very bad 
decision.  The DM does not know the true scenario, so he or she is left deciding which 
type of error is more acceptable for this particular problem.  If it is inexpensive to collect 
additional information in comparison to the potential cost of a bad decision, then that is a 
reasonable route.  Such cost-benefit tradeoffs in information collection are the subject of 
Chapter 9. 
7.5.2 Acuity of analysis 
One goal of sensitivity analysis is often to determine what additional information 




into individual quantities in one-way sensitivity analysis is an advantage.  By considering 
each parameter independently, the decision maker gains insight into the sensitivity of the 
decision to each parameter.   
PBA considers all uncertainties simultaneously, accounting for all interactions 
and dependencies, but it does not identify the individually important sources of the 
sensitivity.  If the PBA analysis determines that the decision is not sensitive to the overall 
uncertainty, this is not a problem.  However, in a case like Figure 7.11 in which there is 
indeterminacy, a DM would benefit from guidance into resolution of the indeterminacy.  
DASA provides this type of insight. 
For example, based on the sensitivity analysis in Figure 7.13, there seems to be no 
need to increase knowledge about vehicle lifetime.  On the other hand, the difference 
between SEC and TASO filter is very sensitive to the ecorate of steel, though not enough 
(as a one-way effect) to change the decision.  The sensitivity analysis suggests that any 
additional information collection focus on characterizing the environmental effects.  The 
basic PBA analysis does not provide this insight. 
As discussed in Section 6.4.3, Ferson and coauthors (Ferson, et al. 2004a) have 
suggested using a meta-sensitivity analysis with PBA.  Traditional sensitivity starts with 
the base values and systematically varies one parameter at a time to its extremes.  Since 
PBA can capture all of the uncertainty at once, the opposite approach can be taken.  The 
“base” case becomes the results with all of the uncertainty considered, and then each 
uncertain quantity is “pinched” down to a zero-variance interval, a precise probability, or 
even a point value and the reduction of uncertainty in the result is observed.  However, it 
is not clear how to best pinch a p-box or how to measure and interpret the resultant 
decrease in uncertainty in the outputs.  Consequently, the ability of PBA to provide 




7.5.3 Complexity of analysis 
A one-way sensitivity analysis is computationally inexpensive.  In addition to the 
solution with the base values, each uncertain quantity requires just two calculations—one 
for the upper bound and one for the lower bound.  Each of these calculations may involve 
one Monte Carlo loop to calculate expected values, although in many cases this is 
unnecessary.  Either way, the computational complexity is generally less than with PBA.  
The advantage moves to PBA as higher order (two-way, three-way, etc.) 
sensitivity analyses are performed, especially when nested Monte Carlo loops are used.  
PBA computations using dependency bounds convolutions (Williamson and Downs 
1990) are generally much faster than traditional sensitivity analysis (Helton and Davis 
2000, Ferson, et al. 2004a).  However, as noted in Section 4.5.2, the method of 
dependency bounds convolutions is not applicable to black-box analysis models.  
Consequently, they cannot be used to analyze models such a differential equations, 
simulations, and finite element analysis.  Current research establishes methods for 
propagating p-boxes through "black box" models, or models with unknown or 
complicated structure (Bruns, et al. 2006), and a comparison of these methods of PBA 
with DASA is an area of future work. 
7.5.4 Flexibility of the analysis 
Another advantage of PBA is its inherent flexibility.  PBA’s flexibility in terms of 
assumptions of independence or unknown dependence has already been discussed within 
the context of the EBDM example.  Recent algorithms also handle the pairwise 
dependencies of maximal or minimal correlation, correlation, linear relationship and 
correlation within a specified interval, and signed (positive or negative) correlation 
(Ferson, et al. 2004a). 
In this chapter, the flexibility with regard to imprecisely known distribution 




type  [see Section 6.5.1 or (Ferson and Hajagos 2004)].  This would be useful in the filter 
selection if, for example, the decision maker had an estimate of the mean and variance of 
filter change frequencies, but no theoretical or empirical evidence about the distribution 
family. 
DASA ignores dependencies and higher order interactions, and it requires a 
known distribution type.  Consequently, the types of problems that can be accurately 
explored with sensitivity analysis are more limited than PBA. 
7.6 Conclusions and summary 
The example decision of oil filter selection in this chapter has multiple objectives 
and multiple sources of different types of uncertainty.  The selection problem is 
approached with two methods: probability bounds analysis (PBA) and traditional 
decision analysis with sensitivity analysis (DASA).  The applicability of PBA to the 
example problem is illustrated and discussed in detail.  This detail allows this chapter to 
serve as a demonstration of the process of applying PBA to a problem, as well as serving 
as a demonstration of the value of PBA. 
Sensitivity analysis can identify important sources of uncertainty, but it can also 
lead to an incorrect selection because it neglects dependencies and interactions.  PBA can 
compute with unknown distributions types, unknown dependencies, and uncertain 
parameters.  It also provides a rigorous and global sensitivity analysis.  However, PBA 
may yield overly conservative results (bounds that are bigger than necessary), and it is 
computationally more complex than simple one-way sensitivity analysis.  PBA also 
provides little insight into information prioritization when using current methods of meta-
analysis. 
In short, both PBA and DASA are useful in engineering.  Importantly, this 
conclusion identifies PBA as a useful option in engineering problems, an option that 




traditional decision analysis.  As such, these results support the conclusion that 
imprecision is an important characteristic of uncertainty in engineering design and that 
there is value in using probabilities that are most generally subjective and imprecise.  In 
the following two chapters, attention is turned to the secondary questions of decision-










DECISION MAKING IN THE PRESENCE OF IMPRECISION 
 
According to the paradigm of decision-based design, decisions play a large role in 
the success of the design process.  Any uncertainty model used in engineering design 
must therefore support decision making 
  When precise probabilities are used, utility theory provides a clear, normative 
theory for decision making.  A decision-maker (DM) should choose the alternative with 
the highest expected value.  However, when imprecise probabilities are used, expected 
utilities become intervals, as described in Section 4.6.1.  Overlapping intervals can lead 
to indeterminacy, hence the importance of motivating question 4 addressed in this 
chapter:  
How should a designer make a decision in the case of 
seemingly indeterminate information? 
When there is indeterminacy, one cannot determine which decision alternative is 
most preferred using traditional utility theory arguments and must move to more 
advanced policies or resort to arbitrary choice.  In this chapter, three approaches are 
discussed.  The first involves using more of the available information to guide a choice, 
such as the relationship between the uncertainties of different alternatives.  The second 
approach involves acquiring information until indeterminacy is eliminated.  The final 
approach is to apply policies of arbitrary choice.  The bulk of this chapter focuses on the 
first procedure: making the most of available information.   
When dealing with imprecise characterizations of design alternatives, it can be 




emphasis is usually placed on selecting the most preferred alternative.  In a set-based 
approach, the emphasis moves to eliminating the least preferred alternatives.  In Section 
8.1, the set-based view of design is introduced.  The existence of indeterminacy is 
revisited in Section 8.2. Policies for eliminating decision alternatives are presented in 
Section 8.3.  The resolution of remaining imprecision is discussed in Section 8.4.  The 
example design of a gearbox is described in Section 8.5.  The various elimination policies 
are demonstrated using the example in Section 8.6.  The process of sequentially reducing 
the design space is summarized in Section 8.7.  The policies are discussed and future 
work presented in Sections 8.8 and 8.9.  Most of this chapter was previously included in a 
conference paper (Rekuc, et al. 2006). 
8.1 A set-based view of design 
Design is a process of converting information about customer interests and 
requirements into a specification of a product.  This process is complex because it 
involves searching through a very large, unstructured space of solutions (Tong and 
Sriram 1992) based on vague and uncertain knowledge about possible solution 
alternatives (Gupta and Xu 2002), their physical behavior (Aughenbaugh and Paredis 
2004), their cost (Garvey 1999), and the decision-maker’s preferences (Kirkwood and 
Sarin 1985, Otto and Antonsson 1992, Carnahan, et al. 1994, Seidenfeld, et al. 1995).  
The complexity of the design problem, including the presence of uncertainty, makes it 
impossible to arrive at a final design in one step, as described in Section 1.1.2. 
Researchers have recognized the limitations of sequential design processes and 
have proposed modifications in which the uncertainty about future design decisions is 
considered.  For instance, Chen, Allen, and coauthors (1996) have introduced an 
approach based on robust design that seeks decision alternatives that are robust to future 
decisions.  The idea is that since DMs lack knowledge about the outcomes of future 




solution (Simon 1982)—a solution that is in some sense good enough regardless of future 
design decisions. 
Robust design methods trade off optimal performance for consistent performance.  
This is a reasonable approach if the price one pays for robustness is relatively small—that 
is, if little performance is sacrificed for robustness.  Unfortunately, robust design methods 
currently do not explore how large that price is.  In this chapter, an approach is 
demonstrated that helps the DM move toward the most preferred solution by actively 
managing the design space, rather than compromising high performance for robustness.  
This approach is inspired by set-based concurrent engineering.  
The perspective taken in this chapter is that ideally the goal of the design process 
is to systematically eliminate inferior design alternatives from the set under consideration 
until only the most preferred alternative (or set of equally preferred alternatives) remains.  
This approach is derived from the paradigm of Set-Based Concurrent Engineering 
(SBCE) (Sobek, et al. 1999),  a management approach used at Toyota.  The guiding 
principle of SBCE is to begin the design process by selecting a broad set of solutions and 
gradually narrowing the set by eliminating weaker solutions as more information 
becomes available until converging on a final solution.   
In traditional design practice, the emphasis is on selecting a single good design; 
engineers quickly converge on a single design and then iteratively modify that solution 
until it meets the design requirements.  In SBCE, Toyota encourages its engineers to 
pursue multiple feasible design alternatives simultaneously.  The consideration of 
multiple designs incurs more costs early in the design process than selecting a single 
robust design.  However, these increased costs can be offset by two factors.  First, the 
resulting design in SBCE is often much closer to optimal (has a much better 
performance) than the final designs in traditional methods.  Second, SBCE avoids costly 




effects have enabled Toyota to use SBCE quite successfully (Parunak, et al. 1997, Sobek 
2004).   
As implemented at Toyota, SBCE places a large responsibility on chief engineers 
to guide the process effectively, relying heavily on their implicit knowledge and 
expertise.  Sobek, Ward, and Liker (1999) provide three broad principles for managing 
SBCE.  One of these principles involves narrowing sets gradually while increasing detail, 
and a formal method has been introduced that uses predicate logic to eliminate infeasible 
designs (Finch 1997).  However, little attention has been given to methods that guide 
elimination based on preferences—that is, methods that eliminate less-desirable, yet 
feasible, designs from the set under consideration.  If the benefits seen at Toyota are to be 
generalized to other applications, a formal method of set-based design must be 
developed. 
For a set-based approach to be efficient, the DM must be efficient at eliminating 
inferior solutions from the set under consideration; a DM should eliminate a solution as 
soon as he or she is confident that it cannot be the most preferred.  If the DM does not 
eliminate such solutions, then he or she will continue to develop them in more detail, 
thereby incurring unnecessary costs.  Since these elimination decisions must be made 
without complete knowledge about the solutions, traditional comparisons are 
inappropriate; different methods are needed.  The remainder of this chapter discusses 
elimination decision policies and demonstrates an elimination-oriented, set-based design 
approach using the design of a gearbox as an example. 
8.2 Indeterminacy in Decision Making 
In this section, the scenario of overlapping intervals of expected utility, mentioned 
throughout the dissertation, is revisited.  In general, there are three possible scenarios of 
preference between alternatives A and B.  Either A is preferred to B, B is preferred to A, 




these relationships can be determined by the inequality or equality of the expected 
utilities (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).  However, when imprecision exists, the 
expected utilities become intervals (since the probabilities are not uniquely determined, 
neither is the mathematical expectation), and such comparisons become more 
complicated. 
For example, consider the intervals of expected utility for two alternatives ( A  and 
B ) shown in Figure 8.1(a), which is a repeat of Figure 4.8(a).  In this example, the 
intervals overlap and the relationship between the alternatives cannot be stated in terms 
of standard mathematical comparisons such as A B> , A B< , or A B= .  Since the true 
expected utility of B  can lie anywhere in the given interval, the point labeled 1b  is 
possible.  Similarly, both 1a  and 2a  are possible true values for the expected utility of A .  
Notice that 1a  is greater than 1b , but 2a  is less than 1b .  Consequently, the available 
evidence is indeterminate; the DM cannot determine which alternative is the most 
preferred, nor can the DM determine that he or she is definitely indifferent.  In order to 


































8.3 Elimination decisions with imprecise 
information 
As demonstrated at the close of the previous section, standard numerical 
comparisons are insufficient for elimination under imprecision.  Instead, a DM must turn 
to interval methods such as interval dominance, maximality, or E-admissibility.  
8.3.1 Interval dominance 
An example of overlapping intervals was shown in Figure 4.8(a).  Obviously, two 
intervals will not always overlap.  In this case, shown in Figure 4.8(b), it does not matter 
where in the given interval the true expected utility of A falls—it will always be greater 
than any value in the interval for expected utility of B.  This illustrates a situation referred 
to as interval dominance [for a brief synopsis, see (Zaffalon, et al. 2003)]. Interval 
dominance can be defined as follows.  Consider two intervals [ , ]A A A=  and [ , ]B B B= .  
Interval A  dominates interval B  if and only if A B≥ , that is, if the lower bound on A  is 
at least as high as the upper bound on B .  By extension, this condition means that there is 
no point in interval A  that is lower than any point in interval B . 
Interval dominance is obvious when there are only two alternatives, but it is more 
subtle when there are more alternatives, such as shown in Figure 8.2.  At first glance, it 
may appear that no elimination is possible because there is significant overlap between 
intervals.  However, by comparing all pairs of alternatives, one discovers that alternative 
D is dominated by alternative A, and hence can be eliminated.  By using as a reference 




to the upper-bounds of all other alternatives16, the complexity of the calculation is 
reduced from 2( )O n  to ( )O n  for a problem with n  alternatives.  The result of applying 
this criterion is a set of alternatives whose intervals of expected utility all share some 
region of overlap.  
Elimination using interval dominance s is relatively easy to compute, but it may 
result in a large set of design alternatives.  Although this is to be expected, especially 
during the early phases of design, it is important for the success of this approach that as 
many designs as justified by the available knowledge and information are eliminated; 




16 Essentially, the problem is reduced to two loops over all the alternatives, avoiding 
combinatorial evaluation.  A simple pseudo-code example illustrates the method: 
 Define maxmin = some large negative number 
 For each alternative i 
  If maxmin < minimum value in interval of expected utility for alternative i 
(minEUi), 
  Then set maxmin = minEUi. 
 End for 
 For each alternative i 
  If maxmin > maximum value in interval of expected utility for alternative i 
(maxEUi), 
  Then eliminate alternative i from consideration. 


















inefficiencies should be avoided.  In the next section, two approaches that account for 
uncertainty shared across alternatives, the criteria of maximality (Walley 1991) and E-
Admissibility (Levi 1974), are considered. 
8.3.2 Accounting for shared uncertainty 
In design, there are often uncertain quantities that influence the performance of all 
decision alternatives in a similar fashion.  Such quantities are defined as shared 
uncertainties.  For an uncertain quantity to be considered shared between two design 
alternatives, two conditions must hold: 
1. The realization of that uncertain quantity must be independent of the 
action chosen by the DM (i.e. act-state independence must hold) 
2. The consequences of both alternative actions must be a function of the 
uncertain quantity 
For example, ambient temperature is independent of the alternative chosen—all 
potential final designs will have to operate over the same, but unknown, range of 
temperatures.  Hence, the uncertainty is said to be shared.  As an example of uncertainty 
that is not shared, consider the sequential decisions of designing first the engine of a car 
and then the drive shaft.  When designing the engine, the exact design of the drive shaft is 
unknown.  However, this uncertainty is not shared by all engine alternatives, because the 
final design of the drive shaft will depend on the chosen engine design; for example, the 
drive shaft must meet difference performances requirements depending on the power of 
the engine. 
Since temperature is a shared uncertainty, the performance of alternatives should 
be compared assuming they are operating at the same temperature.  A similar argument 
favors paired statistical testing over pooled statistical testing to remove shared systematic 




Consider two cars A and B, whose performance each depends strongly on the 
uncertain ambient temperature T , such as shown in the top left of Figure 8.3.  Note that 
for all values of the uncertain parameter, the utility of A is greater than the utility of B.  
Clearly then A is the superior alternative.  However, if only the intervals of performance 
were compared without regard to shared uncertainty, such as shown in the top right of 
Figure 8.3, this superiority would not be detected. 
The concept of shared uncertainty is similar to common random numbers (CRNs) 
in discrete-event simulations (Law and Kelton 2000).  The goal of a simulation is usually 
to compare two scenarios or alternative designs by examining the difference in output for 
different combinations of control parameters.  If different random numbers are used in 
the simulations for the different alternatives, additional noise is introduced into the 
model.  CRNs are used to induce correlation between scenarios, thereby reducing the 




























































In engineering design, shared uncertainty is an inherent characteristic of the 
problem.  Therefore, a DM does not have to add the commonality; he or she merely needs 
to recognize it and to take advantage of that additional property when it exists.  One 
approach that considers shared uncertainty is the maximality criterion. 
8.3.2.1 Maximality criterion 
Since the intervals in the top right quadrant of Figure 8.3 overlap significantly, 
neither A nor B is eliminated according to interval dominance, even though it is clear 
from the curves in the top left quadrant that B should be eliminated.  If the difference in 
performance across the uncertain parameter is considered, the elimination can be made, 
as shown in the lower left quadrant of Figure 8.3.  Note that for any and all values of the 
shared uncertain variable, the difference between alternative A and alternative B is 
positive.  In other words, A is always better than B.  Consequently, B can be eliminated; 
it cannot be the best alternative because it is inferior to A at all temperatures. 
This type of comparison is formalized as the maximality (Walley 1991) criterion 
for elimination.  Maximality is defined as follows.  First, a set of decision alternatives 
that are available for consideration is defined and denoted D .  Next, shared uncertainties 
(denoted s sz Z∈ ) are distinguished from uncertainties that are specific to each alternative 
(denoted i iz Z∈  for alternative iA D∈ ).  Recalling that the DM seeks to maximize 
expected utility, the elimination rule of maximality is defined as follows: 
A decision alternative iA D∈  is dominated according to 
maximality, and hence the corresponding set of design 
alternatives can be eliminated, if for some iA D∈ , and i j≠ : 
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Maximality is a stricter criterion than interval dominance, meaning that in general 
it leads to the elimination of more alternatives.  Maximality eliminates alternatives that 
are dominated at all values of the uncertain parameter by any individual other alternative.  
In general, this requires the maximality condition to be checked for all pairs of decision 
alternatives.  For example, consider the five decision alternatives whose expected utility 
is expressed as a function of a single shared imprecise parameter sz  (for example, 
ambient air temperature, sz T= ) in Figure 8.4.  If one were to use only A as a reference 
design (meaning comparing the other designs only to A), then only B could be eliminated 
because curves C, D, and E are higher than A for some values of sz , but B is always 
lower.  However, if C is used as the reference design, then D is also eliminated.  Clearly 
to complete the elimination, both A and C must be used as reference designs in this case.  
In general, a DM must compare all combinations. 
The difference in expected utility is often monotonic with respect to the uncertain 
variables.  In this case, the maximum difference occurs at the boundary of the uncertainty 
region, making it easy to compute for a given pair of alternatives iA  and jA  .  If the 
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difference between the two alternatives is not monotonic then a complete optimization is 
necessary.  This obviously increases the cost of applying maximality beyond that of 
interval dominance.  The tradeoff is in the more complete elimination of truly dominated 
alternatives.   
8.3.2.2 E-admissibility criterion. 
A stricter criterion than maximality is E-admissibility (Levi 1974).  According to 
E-admissibility, a solution is eliminated if at every value of the uncertain parameter there 
is at least one alternative with a higher expected utility.  This is more easily understood 
by considering the converse—E-admissibility only accepts alternatives for which there is 
at least one value of the uncertain quantity at which no other alternative has a greater 
expected utility.  In other words, an alternative is accepted only if it is optimal at some 
value of the uncertain quantity.  Applying E-admissibility in general requires solving a 
mathematical programming problem, or at least proving that a feasible solution exists 
(Kyburg and Pittarelli 1996), making it at least as expensive as applying maximality. 
For an example of applying E-admissibility, consider the alternatives in Figure 
8.4 once again.  Alternatives eliminated using maximality are necessarily eliminated 
using E-admissibility since if at all temperatures there is a single alternative with higher 
expected utility, then there can be no value of the uncertain quantity for which there is no 
alternative with a higher expected utility.   Consequently, alternatives B and D are 
eliminated using E-admissibility.   
Notice that alternative A performs best in low temperatures, C performs best in 
high temperatures, while E performs consistently throughout the entire temperature 
range.  Alternative E can be considered a robust solution, where a robust solution is one 
that can be exposed to variations in the environment (and other factors) without suffering 
unacceptable performance degradation (Allen, et al. 2006).  Nevertheless, E will be 




{ ,  }A C , since either A or C (or both) is greater than E at every temperature; car A 
dominates E at low temperatures while C dominates E at high temperatures.  There is no 
value of the ambient temperature at which there is no alternative with a higher expected 
utility than that of E.  The potential implications of eliminating the robust solution E are 
described in the following section. 
8.4 Resolving remaining imprecision 
Although a DM can maintain a set of designs in the early stages of design, he or 
she must eventually select a particular alternative to finalize the design.  After applying 
elimination criteria, multiple alternatives usually will remain due to imprecision.  In order 
to make a final decision, a DM has two choices—the DM can collect additional 
information, thereby reducing imprecision until only one alternative remains in the non-
dominated set, or the DM can select one alternative arbitrarily.  Traditional design 
approaches would require arbitrary elimination of non-dominated alternatives, while a 
set-based design approach allows a DM to delay elimination of alternatives until 
additional information is available. 
When delaying decisions, the DM should carefully consider the tradeoff between 
the value of obtaining more information and the cost of doing so by applying information 
economics [see Chapter 9 and (Ling, et al. 2006)].  Although the cost of additional 
investigation is often worth the improved ability to make a more informed decision, the 
DM will reach a point at which the cost of gathering additional information outweighs the 
expected benefits.  At that point, the DM should resort to the other option: arbitrary 
choice. 
If a DM is unable to resolve the imprecision before needing to choose a single 
alternative from the set, he or she may need to make an arbitrary choice—a choice that is 
not uniquely determined by the DM’s preferences, beliefs, and values (Walley 1991).   




uniquely identify a most preferred alternative.  Consequently, any arbitrary choice from 
among indeterminate alternatives can be defended as rational in the context of a single 
decision. 
Arbitrary in this sense does not necessarily imply without guidance or random.  
Several policies are of arbitrary choice have been proposed, including Γ -maximin 
(Berger 1985) and the Hurwicz-criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 1972).  A Γ -maximin 
policy says that given indeterminacy in a maximization problem, a DM should select the 
alternative with the highest lower-bound.  This is a conservative policy in that it seeks to 
mitigate the worst-case.  Robust design strategies that choose solutions that are 
insensitive to imprecision are also applicable at this stage.  If the remaining uncertainty is 
extreme, it may be valuable to consider an alternative approach such as information gap 
theory (Ben-Haim 2001).   
Returning to the vehicle design example in Figure 8.4, assume that the DM is 
unable to resolve the imprecise ambient temperature, yet has to choose between the 
alternatives (A and C) that remain after applying the E-admissibility criterion.  The Γ -
maximin policy would choose alternative A, because it has the highest lower-bound over 
the range of the uncertain parameter.  However, notice that while A performs well in low 
temperatures, it performs quite badly at high temperatures.  Notice also that alternative E 
performs moderately well at all temperatures—that is, alternative E is robust to 
temperature.  However, using the E-admissibility criterion, this alternative was 
eliminated. 
The elimination of alternative E is not a problem if the DM is able to resolve the 
imprecision before needing to choose a final design.  Once the imprecision is eliminated 
in this example, the DM knows at which temperature the car is required to perform and 
can select the car that is most preferred at that temperature—which will always be either 
car A or C, the two alternatives that remain after applying the E-admissibility criterion.  




decision [an example of such imprecision is that from future decisions], then E-
admissibility is an appropriate criterion.   
However, information economic considerations will usually lead a DM to stop 
collecting information before removing all imprecision.  In other cases, such elimination 
of imprecision is impossible.  For example, there is in general no one temperature at 
which a care must operate, but rather a produced car could be subject to the entire range 
of temperatures during operation.  The practical unlikelihood of removing all imprecision 
leads us to recommend the maximality elimination criterion for most design applications. 
8.5 The design example 
In this section, gearbox design problem is used to demonstrate the different 
elimination criteria.  The gearbox is intended for use in the drivetrain of an SAE Mini-
Baja competition off-road vehicle.  The basic configuration of the gearbox is shown in 
Figure 8.5, and the objective of the design problem is to determine the geometries of the 
three gears such that the expected utility of the design is maximized.   
A summary of the problem formulation is presented in Figure 8.6 on page 239.  
Utility is formulated as the dollar earnings from constructing and using the gearbox in 
Georgia Tech’s Mini-Baja vehicle for a long-distance race.  There are five design 
variables and ten shared uncertain parameters, with uncertainty modeled as p-boxes, 









As noted in Chapter 4, probability bounds analysis (PBA) is a refinement of 
imprecise probabilities in which uncertain information is represented as a p-box.  While 
less expressive than imprecise probabilities, the p-box representation simplifies 
computation.  In particular, DBC allow for the computation of rigorous, “best-possible” 
bounds on functionally determined distributions (Williamson and Downs 1990, Berleant 
and Goodman-Strauss 1998).  Unfortunately, DBC is often inappropriate for realistic 
engineering problems because it cannot be applied directly towards a black box analysis 
model. 
An alternative to these methods is to use an entirely stochastic approach.  For 
precise probabilistic problems, Monte Carlo sampling can be used to approximate the 
uncertainty in the output.  For imprecise probabilistic problems, second-order (2D), also 
known as two-dimensional or double-loop, Monte Carlo sampling can be used to 
approximate the imprecise uncertainty in the output (Hoffman and Hammonds 1994).  
However, for the high dimensional problems typical in engineering design, computational 
expense could still be prohibitive. 
For the gearbox example problem, an alternative approach is used in which the 
outer loop of a 2D Monte Carlo simulation is replaced with an optimization algorithm 
[see Bruns and co-authors for more information (Bruns 2006, Bruns and Paredis 2006, 
Bruns, et al. 2006)].  The inner loop remains a Monte Carlo sampling from parameterized 
distributions, but instead of determining the parameters of these distributions by an outer 
loop of Monte Carlo sampling, optimization is used to find the set of distribution 
parameters that will give us the largest (and the smallest) expected values.  The results of 













⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
, with the relationship determined by fitting a 
sigmoid function to past race finish times t . 
• {complete}P  is the probability that the gearbox completes the race, i.e. the reliability 
• CU =the cost of constructing the gearbox 
 
Select 
   Gear Ratio [ ]0.5, 5gN =  (torque ratio) 
   Input Gear Diameter [ ]1.5, 15ind cm=  
   Idler Gear Diameter [ ]1.5, 15idd cm=  
   Gear Width [ ]1.00, 8.75w cm=  
   Gear Module [ ]1.27, 8.75 /M mm tooth=  
 
Where 
   Performance depends on 10 uncertain system parameters shared across all alternatives: 
   Total Mass (kg), ~ ([200,215],[18,20])M Normal  
   External Drag Coefficient (N/(m/s)2), , [0.27,0.28]D eC =  
   Internal Drag Coefficient (N/rpm), , [0.0,0.0075]D iC =   
   Course Roughness Coefficient, ~ (3,0.5)CK Normal   
   Bending Strength Factor, [0.38,0.4]J =  
   Gear Quality, ~ ([8.25,8.75],1)vQ Normal  
   Cost Error ($), [ 5,5]errCost = −  
   Uncorrected Bending Strength (N/m2),  
         'fbS ~ Normal([197,203]x106, [30,35]x106 ) 
   Uncorrected Contact Strength (N/m2), 
         'fcS  ~ Normal([197,203]x106,[30,35]x106) 
   Application Factor, aK  = [1.68,1.70] 




This approach, while computationally more efficient, assumes independence 
between uncertain variables.  While not ideal, this assumption is reasonable for large 
classes of engineering models.  Nevertheless, this assumption removes one of the 
advantages of p-boxes, that being the flexibility of one algorithm (DBC, see Section 
4.5.1) to compute with unknown dependencies.  Another limitation of this approach is the 
presence of local minima in typical engineering problems.  For the gearbox example 
problem, this difficulty was overcome by using several starting points for the 
optimization.  However, this approach would not be appropriate for more complicated 
problems.  The need to start the optimizer with several initial points and the inability of 
the optimized computational approach to consider cases of non-independent inputs 
indicate directions for future work.     
8.6 Demonstration of existing elimination criteria 
The first part of the example demonstrates the reduction of the design space for 
the first design variable—the gear ratio.  This design problem is slightly different from 
the simple examples mentioned earlier in the chapter because it deals with a continuous 
variable.  For a continuous design variable, it is ranges of values that are eliminated, 
rather than discrete alternatives.  The initial problem statement specifies the design space 
of gear ratios in the interval [0.5, 5.0].  In the first step of the sequential decision process, 
the DM seeks to reduce this interval as much as possible while retaining in the range the 
most preferred—though currently unidentifiable—solution.   
The application of interval dominance by the DM is considered first.  Figure 8.7 
contains a plot of expected utility versus gear ratio.  The two curves represent the upper 
and lower bounds on expected utility at a given gear ratio.  In the plot, the highest point 
on the lower-bound, or the Γ -maximin solution, occurs at a ratio of about 1.5.  The DM 
draws a horizontal line at the lower expected utility at this gear ratio.  By the condition of 




this line should be eliminated.  For example, two expected utility intervals are indicated 
in Figure 8.7.  The leftmost interval is located at the Γ -maximin solution.  The DM 
compares all other decision alternatives to this interval.  The Γ -maximin solution clearly 
dominates any of the expected utility intervals in the shaded regions.  Therefore, the DM 
can eliminate gear ratios in both shaded regions from the design space. 
By taking into account that the uncertain quantities described in Figure 8.6 are 
shared between different design possibilities, further eliminations in the design space can 
be made using the maximality criterion.  In theory, the DM would need to make pairwise 
comparisons between all alternatives to eliminate all that are dominated under 
maximality.  Of course, this is impossible for design problems with continuous design 
variables.  In practice, a DM must therefore perform comparisons between a well-chosen 
discrete set of design alternatives the effectively sample the entire design space.  
In this example, the DM computes the bounds on the expected difference in utility 
between each gear ratio and the Γ -maximin gear ratio of 1.5.  Recall that the maximality 































elimination criterion specifies that the DM should eliminate any alternative (in this case, 
gear ratio) with an upper bound on expected difference less than zero.  Figure 8.8 
contains a demonstration of maximality elimination over a continuous variable.  The two 
curves in the figure represent upper and lower expected differences in utility between the 
current alternative and the reference material, in this case defined to be a gear ratio of 1.5.  
The DM draws a horizontal line at an expected difference in utility of zero.  The shaded 
regions correspond to gear ratios that are always dominated by designs with the reference 
gear ratio of 1.5.  Therefore, the DM can eliminate all decision alternatives that fall in the 
shaded regions in Figure 8.8.   
The calculation of a difference in expected utility requires two alternatives—the 
one being tested, and a reference.  In order to increase the efficiency of elimination, we 
choose a detailed reference design (Rekuc 2005).  The idea is to develop one promising 
alternative to a greater level of detail than the others, thereby reducing the imprecision 
from future decisions for that alternative.  The narrower intervals of utility for this design 
will often enable 
more 







Maximality w/ Reference Design: Difference in 






























elimination.  In this paper, the Γ -maximin solution is used as the reference design.  
Specifically, comparisons are made to the reference design of 2.1gN = , 1.5ind cm= , 
1.5idd cm= , 1.25w cm= , and 6.35M mm= .  The mechanics of the resulting elimination 
decisions are the same as those described earlier in this paper. 
8.7 Sequential reduction of the design space 
The examination of the example problem is concluded by considering the 
sequential process of reducing the set of feasible designs, as sketched in Figure 8.9.  A 
single step in this process was described in the last section, in which the design interval 
for the gear ratio was reduced.  Next, the set of non-dominated design alternatives is 
reduced sequentially for each of the remaining four design variables.   
The advantage of sequential elimination is that with each reduction in the 
uncertainty associated with a single design variable, the uncertainty in expected utility is 
reduced.  Often, the reduction of uncertainty at one step allows for additional reduction of 
Initial Intervals for Design Variables:
Ng,i = [0.5,5], din,i = [1.5,15] cm, did,i = [1.5,15] cm, 
wi = [1,8.75] cm, Mi = [1.27,6.35] mm
Inputs to Maximality
Simulation: Reduced Design Space:
Step 1: din,i did,i wi Mi Ng,r = [1.05,2.55]
Step 2: Ng,r did, i wi Mi din,r = [1.5,7] cm
Step 3: Ng,r din,r wi Mi did,r = [1.5,12] cm
Step 4: Ng,r din,r did,r Mi wr = [1,8.75] cm
Step 5: Ng,r din,r did,r wr Mr = [1.27,5.67] mm
 




uncertainty to be made in the next step.   
In step 1, the DM reduces the interval for the gear ratio based upon the initial 
design uncertainty for the other four design variables.  In step 2, the DM reduces the 
uncertainty for input gear diameter based upon the reduced uncertainty for the gear ratio 
and the initial uncertainty for the other three design variables.  The DM repeats this 
process sequentially until the design spaces for all design variables have been reduced via 
elimination.  The process could then be repeated for further reductions.  The right side of 
Figure 8.9 contains the intervals representative of the reduced design space for one 
iteration.  Additional aspects of this process are addressed in the next section. 
8.8 Discussion of results and identification of future 
work 
This chapter contains a motivation for and a demonstration of a sequential, set-
based design approach in which the decision maker (DM) explicitly considers 
imprecision.  In this process, the DM incurs extra costs in the form of additional 
computation time and the expenditure of additional resources for developing and 
evaluating sets of design alternatives.  In exchange for these costs, the DM receives the 
benefit of converging on the most preferred design alternative and avoiding costly 
redesign.  Before adopting these methods, a DM should consider whether these benefits 
outweigh the costs.  This question requires further research, and the answer to the 
question will likely depend on the development of efficient means for managing and 
organizing the sequence of decisions in set-based design.   
Specifically, it would be valuable to develop a formal set-based design model that 
goes beyond the general management principles of SBCE (Sobek, et al. 1999), 
feasibility-based elimination (Finch 1997), and the elimination methods presented in this 
paper.  Such a model would define the partitioning of the design problem into sets, the 




example, the order in which the design variables are explored in Figure 8.9 may affect the 
results. 
It was noted earlier that one factor in choosing between the maximality and E-
admissibility criteria was whether or not imprecision can be eliminated before a final 
decision is made.  In practice, it costs resources to eliminate imprecision, and resources 
are always limited.  At some point, the cost of additional information collection will 
exceed the expected benefit in increased performance of the design solution.  A DM must 
choose when to stop expending resources to eliminate imprecision and to select a final 
design solution arbitrarily, taking guidance from information economics in engineering 
design (see Chapter 9).  However, the issue remains as to how to make this final arbitrary 
decision in a manner that works effectively in different classes of engineering problems, 
if such a method even exists.   
There is also substantial room for improvement in the computational method for 
propagating imprecise probabilities through the model.  The method used in this example 
models all uncertain variables as independent.  This may be sufficient for certain 
problems, but how would the computations change for dependent or correlated uncertain 
variables?  In addition, with the current method, it is not clear how close the computed 
upper and lower expected utilities are to the actual expected utilities or to the so-called 
rigorous, “best-possible” bounds for unknown dependence between the uncertain inputs.  
Finally, more efficient computational methods would be necessary for uncertainty 
propagation in complex, computationally expensive models.   
8.9 Summary 
In this chapter, the issue of decision making with imprecise information was 
addressed.  The value of adopting a set-based view of design was introduced, and several 
decision criteria were presented.  Specific new contributions are the identification of the 




recommendation of the maximality criterion for engineering design decisions.  The policy 
of maximality was recommended for use in engineering design.  As an example context, 
a gearbox design problem involving multiple design variables and sources of uncertainty 
was presented.  Using this example, the ability of interval methods to guide the 
elimination of alternatives in set-based design was demonstrated.  Finally, priorities for 










BOUNDING THE VALUE OF FUTURE INFORMATION 
COLLECTION 
 
As described in Section 1.1, engineering design is a sequential and iterative 
process, consisting of several phases: product planning and clarification of task, 
conceptual design, embodiment design, and detail design (Pahl and Beitz 1996).  
Decision-based design research recognizes a sequence of decisions in the design process 
and emphasizes the importance of these decisions to the success of the design (Thurston 
1990b, Hazelrigg 1996, Marston, et al. 2000).  Each decision has two phases—problem 
formulation and problem solution.  Problem formulation consists of identifying design 
alternatives, states of the world, probabilities of the states, payoffs for each alternative 
under every state, and criteria for evaluation (Kmietowicz and Pearman 1981).  Part of 
the process of identifying the probabilities of the states of the world is a sub-decision 
problem regarding how much information to collect—the subject of this chapter, which is 
based heavily on a published conference paper (Aughenbaugh, et al. 2005) and 
forthcoming journal paper (Ling, et al. 2006).  Much of this work was also included in 
(Ling 2006). 
9.1 Decision formulation and information collection 
Engineers support decision making throughout the design process by expending 
resources to create, collect, and analyze information.  Although this information may 
provide value to the designers by leading to a better final design, this benefit is uncertain 




chapter, the incorporation of the management of this cost-benefit tradeoff into the design 
decision model is addressed.   
In related research, Gupta and co-authors have demonstrated the importance of 
incorporating the cost (in terms of number of design alternatives considered) of decision 
making into the overall design decision model (Gupta and Xu 2002), but they do not 
provide an approach for estimating the value of information in actual design problems.  
Radhakrishnan and McAdams consider the cost-benefit trade-offs in selecting models of 
various levels of abstraction in engineering design (Radhakrishnan and McAdams 2005).  
They present a framework in which a designer can reason about model uncertainty, but 
they admit that the designer is left with little guidance in estimating the actual value of 
information from different models.  Along similar lines, Bradley and Agogino develop a 
decision-analytic approach to assist designers in cost-benefit analysis of resource 
expenditures using precisely characterized probability distributions to guide and prioritize 
information collection (Bradley and Agogino 1994), but they do not explain how to 
estimate these distributions.   
In the simulation literature, statistical output analysis is commonly performed to 
assess whether a sufficient number of simulation replicates have been performed to 
obtain statistically significant conclusions (Law and Kelton 2000).  Standard practice in 
simulation output analysis is to specify a requirement on accuracy of predictions a priori.  
Then some initial number of simulations are run in order to get rough estimates of the 
standard deviation of the output quantities.  This estimate of the standard deviation is 
used to estimate how many more simulation runs are required in order for the estimates 
of the means of the output quantities to converge to the required accuracy. 
Because this analysis uses a predetermined measure of accuracy, several 
important aspects are lost.  First, the desired accuracy is determined before the problem is 
explored, meaning that it set without the guidance of the analysis.  For some problems a 




creating and running additional or more complex simulations is not considered as part of 
the problem.  Even if there is benefit in creating and performing more simulations, this 
benefit may not exceed the costs. 
As in any kind of cost-benefit analysis (Layard and Glaister 1994), a common unit 
of measure is needed.  This need can be met by using the economic value of information 
(Lawrence 1999).  Although the economic value of information is clearly correlated with 
accuracy, they are not equivalent.  The cake or death example of Section 1.3 illustrated 
that sometimes very coarse, inaccurate models can still be useful for decision making. 
For example, when distinguishing between two alternatives that differ 
significantly in performance, a very accurate and expensive model is less valuable than a 
simpler model that could have made the same distinction at a much lower cost.  
Conversely, in high-risk design problems, an expensive model that is more accurate than 
typically required may lead to a better solution even when factoring in costs, since a 
simple model may lead to a decision with disastrous consequences. 
Howard develops a theory of the value of information which takes both 
probabilistic and economic factors into account and he uses this theory to determine the 
optimal number of tests to perform to characterize a known distribution with unknown 
parameters (Howard 1965, Howard 1966).  Matheson extends Howard’s theory and uses 
it to determine the most economic computations and analyses to perform for a particular 
decision problem (Matheson 1968).  Although Howard’s and Matheson’s works are 
similar in objective to this paper, their approach depends on the designer’s ability to 
accurately assign precise probabilities to the possible states of nature (i.e. having accurate 
priors) before performing the analysis. 
In this paper, imprecise probabilities are used to extend the applicability of 
information economics to cases in which probability distributions are not perfectly 




support of engineering design decisions.  This new method is illustrated by extending the 
pressure vessel example of Chapter 5 .   
9.2 Information economics in engineering design 
In this section, the basics of information economics are introduced.  Economics is 
the study of choice under conditions of scarcity (Lieberman and Hall 2000).  Extending 
this definition, information economics is the study of choice in information collection and 
management when resources to expend on information are scarce.  Because designers 
face a scarcity of resources, such as time and money, the principles of information 
economics should be applied to the information collection process in engineering design. 
The area of information economics grew out of statistical decision theory in the 
1950s when Marschak published a series of papers on the economics of information and 
organization (Marschak 1974).  Recently, with the explosion of new information 
technologies, information economics has regained attention within the broader context of 
information management.  Current areas of research focus on corporate finance and 
industry policy, such as intellectual property rights, industry regulation, and fostering 
innovation (Rubin 1983, Strassmann 1999), or on the infusion of information technology 
into a corporation (Strassmann 2004).  Within engineering, the focus of information 
management has been primarily on data exchange, interoperability, and visualization to 
support collaborative design.  For an overview of these areas, refer to the following 
review articles (Ciocoiu, et al. 2001, Jayaram, et al. 2001, Rangan and Chadha 2001, 
Szykman, et al. 2001, Urban, et al. 2001).   
In a more general sense, information economics presents principles by which the 
cost-benefit tradeoffs of information collection can be managed in engineering design.  
Many of these principles have been developed and employed previously in standard 
micro-economics and the theory of the economic value of information, pioneered by 




substantial difference between engineering design applications and those of Marschak 
and Lawrence is the availability of perfectly known probability distributions—knowledge 
that Marschak and Lawrence assume to be available, but engineers often lack in practice.  
The goal of this chapter is to apply information economics directly to the management of 
information and uncertainty in engineering design. 
9.3 Example problem 
Throughout the remainder of this paper, the application of information economics 
is discussed in the context of an example of a pressure vessel design.  This example has 
been used previously to demonstrate the value of using imprecise probabilities in 
engineering design decisions in Chapter 5.  This experiment is now extended to explore 
the decision of how much information to collect in order to support design decisions. 
In the modified example problem, a pressure vessel is designed to meet certain 
requirements while maximizing payoff.  The complication is that the pressure vessel is to 
be built using a material with unknown yield strength.  It is assumed that the yield 
strength is well modeled as a normally distributed random variable, but that the 
parameters of the normal distribution are unknown.  Yield strength tests can be 
performed, thus sampling the distribution at a cost c per test.   
In this experiment, each yield strength test represents one sample from the true 
material strength distribution, a normal distribution whose parameters are unknown to the 
designers.  Specifically, the material strength is a random variable X  such that:  
 2~ ( , )X N µ σ  (9.1) 
The mean μ  and variance 2σ  are unknown, and the goal of the information 
collection is to determine these parameters such that a good design decision can be made.  
The experiment consists of drawing a set of n  samples =1{ }
n
i ix  from X .  Each sample ix  




characterize the true nature of the uncertainty.  Unless the designers have infinite 
resources, they cannot collect the infinite number of samples necessary for a perfect 
characterization of the distribution.  Instead, they need to determine when to stop 
collecting information—in this case, data samples. 
As a designer collects data samples ix , the marginal benefit of an additional 
sample decreases.  For example, if the designer has only 10 samples, an 11th sample will 
usually be quite valuable; in contrast, if the designer has 1000 samples, the 1001st sample 
usually will be considerably less valuable, because the situations in which it significantly 
affects the estimates of the truth are small; it is only one of 1001 rather than one of 11 
samples, and hence has much less impact.  In this sense, information displays diminishing 
returns.  At some point, the cost of gathering additional information will outweigh the 
benefit.  Thus, the value of a sample is not merely inherent in the sample; rather, the 
value is measured as viewed from the perspective of the designer.  A fundamental 
principle of information economics is that a decision maker (DM) should continue to 
collect information only as long as there is an information source available whose net 
value is positive.  Putting the example problem into more standard micro-economic 
terms, a rational DM will stop taking data samples at the point where the marginal benefit 
of the next sample is less than or equal to the marginal cost of acquiring it.  A 
formalization of the basic cost-benefit analysis noted above has been summarized in the 
context of information by Lawrence (1999).  This work is summarized and expanded 
upon in the next section. 
9.4 Mathematical problem formulation 
In engineering design, the value of information can be measured by observing 
how the information affects the design decision.  In this section and the next, the basic 




9.4.1 Specifying probabilities over the state space 
The set of all possible states of the world form a state space { }X x= .  In the 
example problem, the state of the world is the actual material strength x  of the material 
used in a particular pressure vessel.  The material strength, or state, is assumed to be 
normally distributed with associated probability density function ( )p x , with parameters 
that are unknown to the designer.  The state of the world is outside the DM’s control, so 
the DM can at best estimate the probabilities, thus forming the estimated distribution 
( )p x .  As described in Chapter 3, these probabilities are interpreted  according to a 
subjective interpretation of probability.    
9.4.2 The payoff of a decision  
As described in Section 3.6, for every decision problem a DM has a set of 
available actions 1{ ,..., }mA a a=  from which to choose one.  The state of the world is 
described by a vector of uncertain quantities 1{ ,..., }ns x x= .  Associated with every 
action-state pair was a particular set of consequences 1( , ) { ( , ),..., ( , )}hg a s g a s g a s=  .   
In this chapter, the model is refined slightly in order to match the notation 
commonly used in the economic value of information literature (e.g. (Lawrence 1999)).  
It is assumed that there is only one uncertain quantity, and hence 1{ }s x=  and the single 
variable x  can be used to capture the state.  It is also assumed that the only consequence 
of interest is the payoff ( , )a xπ  of an action a  given the state of the world x , and thus 
1( , ) { ( , )} ( , )g a s g a s a xπ= = . 
In the example problem, the action a  consists of a set of design variables that 
specify the pressure vessel dimensions.  The payoff function used in the example 
problem, shown in Equation (9.2), is highly skewed—the payoff when the vessel fails is 
largely negative (minus $1 million), yet the payoff when it succeeds is only slightly 
positive (the selling price of $200 minus the cost of the material used to build the 




where rarely occurring events with severe consequences play a significant role in 
decisions.  Note that for a given yield strength and design, the failure cost will either be 
zero (no failure) or a constant (the cost of the damage, lost productivity, etc. when the 
pressure vessel fails). 
 
3
( , ) * ( ) * ( , ),
where:
  selling price = $200
   material cost per volume = $8500/m
         true yield strength of pressure vessel
        d














{ max0 if ( )1 otherwise
esign variables (radius, thickness, length)
   cost incurred if vessel fails $1, 000, 000








Direct use of the payoff function in the decision implies that the DM is risk 
neutral.  If the DM is risk-averse or risk-taking, the payoff function should be mapped to 
a utility function according to this risk attitude.  It also assumes that all of the DM’s 
preferences are measurable in terms of the single attribute of payoff.  The information 
economic approach presented in this paper can be used in such situations by performing 
the same cost-benefit analysis in terms of utilities instead of dollars.   
The choice of a precise payoff function assumes perfect models of price, cost, and 
demand, models that do not typically exist.  Imprecise value models could be used; 
however, this additional imprecision would translate into larger (less precise) bounds on 
the value of information.  In this chapter, a precise value model is chosen in order to limit 
the number of sources of imprecision to one (the material strength characterization).  
Limiting the sources of imprecision allows for a clearer presentation of this new 




9.4.3 Making an optimal decision 
Because of uncertainty in the state of the world x , the DM cannot know the 
payoff of any action with certainty.  The DM seeks to maximize the expected payoff, 
given by [ ( , )]xE a xπ .  The expectation is taken over all states x because that is what the 
DM is modeling as random.  Note that ideally the expectation is taken with respect to the 
true distribution ( )p x .  However, in the example (and in most real world design 
scenarios), the DM does not know the true distribution ( )p x , and must instead use his or 
her best-guess distribution ( )p x .  The DM thus makes an optimal decision, a∗  such that 
 * ( )aarg max  ( [ ( , )])p xa E a xπ= . (9.3) 
The slight deviation from standard notation (i.e. writing ( )p xE   instead of xE ) is 
made to emphasize that the DM maximizes the expectation, as calculated using his or her 
subjective probability density function ( )p x .  A similar distinction must be made when 
determining the payoff of the decision.  The true expected payoff is calculated using the 
true ( )p x  that is unknown to the designer and is denoted as: 
 ( )[ ( , )]true p xE a xπ π= . (9.4) 
The estimated expected payoff according to the designer’s best-guess distribution 
is: 
 ( ) ( )[ ( , )]p x p xE a xπ π= . (9.5) 
This payoff ( )p xπ  will in general differ from the true payoff trueπ .  Although 
Lawrence (Lawrence 1999) does not make this distinction in his work, the distinction is 
crucial in cases in which the designer has only imprecise information about the random 




9.4.4 Information and information sources 
The definition of information varies significantly by subject and application.  In 
this dissertation, Lawrence’s definition (Lawrence 1999) is modified slightly and 
information is defined as any stimulus that changes the recipient’s best-guess probability 
distribution ( )p x  over a well-described set of states, { }X x= . 
An information source is anything that provides information.  This information 
arrives in the form of a message y  taken from a set IY  that information source I  can 
deliver.  There is some probability ( )p y  associated with receiving a particular message 
y  from the information source. 
In the pressure vessel design problem, the information source is the yield strength 
testing process, and a message is the result of a single yield strength test—that is, one 
observation of material strength.  Information economics studies whether it is valuable to 
pay an information source for a message.  Before the message is received, a DM does not 
know what information that message contains, and therefore the DM does not know 
exactly how it will change his or her subjective probability distribution ( )p x  over the 
state space.  In turn, the DM does not know how the message will affect the decision *a  
and its payoff.  Thus, a DM should apply the principles of information economics to 
arrive at a formal metric for determining if the benefit of a message outweighs the cost of 
acquiring it—the value of information.   
9.4.5 The value of information 
Two possible decision are now considered: the first decision is made using the 
current state of information, and the other is made after the receipt of message y.  In the 
first case, assume the DM’s subjective probability distribution of the states is represented 
as ( )p x .  These are the prior probabilities, and the optimal prior decision *0a  is given by 




After the message y  is received and incorporated into the DM’s knowledge, the 
DM has an updated posterior probability distribution ( | )p x y .  The corresponding 
optimal decision *ya  is given by 
 * ( | )arg max  ( [ ( , )])y p x yaa E a xπ=  (9.7) 
How can these two decisions be compared?  If the comparison is made after the 
true state of the world x  is revealed, the ex-post gross value of the message y —where 
gross implies before factoring in cost—can be calculated for the particular realized state 
x  as: 
 ( ) * *0| ( , ) ( , )yy x a x a xυ π π= −  (9.8) 
This represents the amount that the receipt of message y  (and the incorporation 
of its information into the decision) changed the decision maker’s payoff, given the 
particular outcome x  of the state. 
The term value is used throughout this paper in a marginal sense, that is, in terms 
of differences.  The ex-post gross value of a message y  is the marginal payoff of 
acquiring that message—the difference between the payoff of the decision with and 
without the information from message y .  This gross value can be positive, negative, or 
zero.  It will be positive if the message leads the DM to chose an action *ya  that has a 
higher payoff under realized state x  than action *0a .  It will be negative if the message in 
someway misled the DM into choosing an action *ya  that has a lower payoff than the 
prior decision *0a .  If the message did not change the choice of action, such that 
*
ya  is the 
same as *0a , then the ex-post gross value is zero. 
The previously defined ex-post gross value is not useful for determining the 
potential change in payoff of receiving a message because it measures the actual benefit, 
which can only be known after the decision is made and the truth realized.  It is common 




state of the world is realized—a situation referred to in the vernacular as bad luck.  
Conversely, a bad decision can lead to a good outcome—a case of good luck.   
Rather than assessing the value of a message for a particular state x , a DM is 
really interested in the expected value over all the possible states of the world. The gross 
value of a message y  is defined as the expected difference in the payoff with and without 
the message, such that: 
 ( ) ( ) * *0gross value [ ( , ) ( , )]x yy y E a x a xυ π π= = −  (9.9) 
Calculating the true gross value of a message requires the expectation over the 
true distribution ( )p x , which is not available to the DM.   
To complicate matters further, Equation (9.9) is valid for analysis of the value of a 
particular message y  only after it is received. However, when the DM needs to decide 
whether or not to purchase a message, the content of the message—that is the particular 
message y  from the set IY  of all possible messages from the source I —is also 
unknown.  When purchasing a message, it is as if the DM is purchasing a sealed 
envelope; he or she does not know what is inside until after buying and opening the 
envelope.  The DM must therefore consider the value of the information source I  instead 
of the value of a single message.   
If the DM had access to the true probability distribution of the messages, ( )p y , 
over the set IY , he or she could calculate the gross value of the next message from an 
information source I : 
 * *0gross value( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]y x yI E E a x a xπ π= −  (9.10) 
Because the DM does not have access to the parameters describing the true 
probability distribution of the messages ( )p y  or of the states ( )p x , Equation (9.10) 




approach for bounding the value of information that incorporates the imprecision of the 
DM’s information state is developed. 
A final definition that ties the notion of value back to the fundamental concept of 
cost-benefit analysis in information economics is net value.  A message y must be 
purchased at some cost; resources need to be expended in order to acquire more 
information.  Denoting this as cost( )y , the net value of a message is defined as 
 ( ) ( )* *0net value [ ( , ) ( , )] costx yy E a x a x yπ π= − − . (9.11) 
Similarly the net value of the next message from an information source is: 
 * *0net value( ) [ ( , ) ( , )] cost( )y x yI E E a x a x Iπ π= − − , (9.12) 
where cost( )I  is the cost of receiving one message y  from information source I .   
If the DM’s goal of making a cost-benefit tradeoff during information collection, 
is revisited, the information economic principle can now be stated that a designer should 
purchase a message from an information source if and only if the net value of that 
information is positive.  According to Equation (9.12), this requires the calculation of 
expectations across the distributions ( )p x  and ( )p y , which in general are not known to a 
designer.  Attention will be returned in Section 9.6 to the problem of not knowing ( )p x  
and ( )p y  after illustrating the simpler case of known probabilities. 
9.5 Example with known probabilities 
In this section, an example is presented to illustrate the calculation of value of 
information in the hypothetical case of known probabilities.  This example is extended to 
the more practical case of unknown probability parameters in Section 9.6.  While the 
information used in this example is not available to a DM, it is useful for illustrating the 




It is assumed that there is an omniscient supervisor overseeing the experiment.  
This supervisor knows the true distribution and can perform the actions shown in the gray 
boxes.  These actions are normally not available to the DM and are used in the 
experiment only for meta-analysis, not in the actual design decision.  In this approach, the 
DM begins with the observed set of samples 1{ }
n
i ix =Σ = .  The goal is to determine 
whether it is valuable to collect an ( 1)stn +  sample given the existing n  samples.  The 
DM first uses this set of samples to construct a best-fit distribution ( )p x , and then to 
choose an optimal design *0a , as shown on the left side of the figure.  The DM then 
receives a hypothetical additional sample jy  from the supervisor.  The DM constructs a 
new best-fit distribution ( )| jp x y  and makes a new decision * jya .  The difference in 
expected payoffs of the two decisions is then calculated by the supervisor to determine 
the true expected gross value ( )jyυ  of the particular message jy .  This process of 
calculating the value of an additional sample is repeated over many jy  to calculate the 
average value of the next sample for a particular starting set of n  samples, which will be 
denoted as ( 1| )V n + Σ . 
Recall that the net value of the next piece of information depends on the prior 
decision *0a , which in turn depends on the existing data samples.  For example, the net 
value of purchasing an 11th sample from the information source will depend on the first 
10 samples.  If the initial 10 samples just happen—by chance—to yield very good 
estimates of the distribution parameters, then the net value of the 11th sample will be 
small, but if they yield bad estimates of the distribution parameters, then the net value of 
the 11th sample could be large.  Consequently, the next step is to repeat the experiment 
over many initial sample sets Σ, which gives the average gross value of the next sample, 





The final step of the experiment is to repeat the process for different initial sample 
sizes.  By repeating the calculation over many initial sample sizes, a curve can be 
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shown in Figure 9.2.  This figure can be interpreted, for example, as follows: at a prior 
sample size n =32, the average net value of an additional sample (the 33rd sample in this 
case), is about $2.  The net value of the 52nd sample, starting from 51 samples, is 
negative, but the net value of the 51st sample is positive.  This means that the 52nd sample 
is the first sample whose average net value is negative; therefore, stopping at 51 samples 
will result, on average, in the highest expected utility.  Note that this conclusion is drawn 
using the true ( )p y  and ( )p x , which are not available to the DM. 
The results can also be interpreted by considering the net expected payoff, which 
is the payoff of the design that would have been realized if no additional information 
were collected, less the cost of the already collected n  samples: 
 *( )net expected payoff [ ( , )] cost( )p xE a x n yπ= − ⋅  (9.13) 
The results are shown for different sample sizes in Figure 9.3.  Again, because the 
actual observed samples affect the payoff, the payoff of the design is averaged over many 
initial sample sets.  The relationship between this result and the net value of additional 
samples should be clear; the maximum net expected payoff occurs at the same sample 
size at which the net value of an additional sample first becomes negative.  Recalling that 
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the net value is defined in a marginal sense, moving from 51 samples to 52 samples 
means a decrease in total payoff of the decision, as is revealed in both plots.   
In the preceding analysis, it appears simple to determine the optimal number of 
samples to collect.  However, this simplicity is due to the omniscient supervisor having 
precise knowledge of the true distributions ( )p y  and ( )p x .  In the example problem the 
information source is an unbiased model of the truth, which means that ( )p y  and ( )p x  
are identical yet unknown—they both describe the unknown true material strength.  The 
characterization of ( )p x  is the DM’s indirect goal for data collection—the DM wants to 
characterize ( )p x  well enough that the design based on the estimated ( )p x  is 
acceptable.   
To determine the value of information during the actual design process, the DM 
needs a method by which he or she can estimate the net value of an additional data 
sample when the parameters describing ( )p y  and ( )p x  are unknown.  A new approach 
is proposed that uses imprecise probabilities to calculate an interval of net value for an 
additional sample. 
What performance characteristics should be expected or demanded of this 
approach?  Insight can be gained by examining the distribution of the net payoffs about 























the expected value curve of Figure 9.3.  Box plots for sample sizes of 50, 100, and 150 
are shown in Figure 9.4.  The plots are constructed with the whiskers at the 0.1% and 
99.9% quantiles, and the boxes from 25% to 75%.  The extreme skewness of the box-
plots is due to the skewed payoff function; that is, the cost of slightly under-designing the 
pressure vessel is large compared to the cost of slightly over-designing it.   
The box plots reveal that both the variance of the payoff and the chance of a 
catastrophic result decrease as the sample size increases but that, simultaneously, the 
expected net value decreases significantly.  The behavior shown in Figure 9.4 suggests 
that a reasonable estimation of the optimal number of samples (when the DM has only 
imprecise knowledge about the true distribution) will often be well beyond 51 (the 
optimal stopping point based on expected value), because by stopping at 51 samples, a 
DM still faces a very large downside risk.  It is important to consider the distributions in 
Figure 9.3 and Figure 9.4 when developing an approach for determining the value of 
additional samples; however, in practice, an engineer will not have this information 
available for decision making, as considered in the next section.   





















9.6 Estimating the value of information  
In this section, a new approach to bounding the gross value of the next message 
from an information source is developed.  Section 9.6.1 is a description of the decision 
policies used in the example.  In Section 9.6.2, the use of imprecise probabilities is 
motivated.  The specific approach for estimating the value of information is explained in 
Section 9.6.3.  Finally, the computational experiment is described in Section 9.6.4.  
9.6.1 Design decision policy 
According to Equation (9.3), the DM chooses the design action that maximizes 
the expected payoff, with the expectation calculated using ( )p x .  This distribution is 
derived by assuming that the material strength is normally distributed and then using the 
sample mean and sample variance of the observed samples as precise estimates of the 
true mean and variance.  Other work (see Chapter 9) has presented a decision policy that 
incorporates imprecision into ( )p x  during the solution phase of the design decision, 
much as the approach in this paper incorporates imprecision into the problem formulation 
phase.  Nevertheless, in this chapter a decision policy based on a best-fit distribution is 
used in the problem solution phase in order to isolate the effect of accounting for 
imprecision in the problem formulation phase—that is, to emphasize the contributions of 
applying information economics to decisions regarding the collection of information to 
support the actual design decisions.  A noted item for future work is the combination of 
these approaches into one unified approach that explicitly considers imprecision 
throughout the design process.   
9.6.2 Motivation for using imprecise probabilities 
One motivation for using imprecise probabilities to represent the DM’s state of 
information is that the use of precise probabilities does not enable useful estimates of 
value. The necessity of an alternative to precise probabilities is illustrated in the 




precisely.  Using this information, the DM chooses an optimal design *0a  according to 
Equation (9.6), using ( )p x  when evaluating the expectation. 
Now assume that the DM acquired an additional data sample y .  With this 
information, the DM can create a new subjective distribution ( )|p x y , where in general 
( ) ( )|p x y p x≠ .  The DM would then choose an optimal design *ya  according to 
Equation (9.7), using ( )|p x y  when evaluating the expectation. 
If the DM wanted to calculate the gross value of this message y , he or she would 
use Equation (9.9), repeated here for clarity: 
 * *0( ) gross value( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]x yy y E a x a xυ π π= = − . (9.9) 
Ideally the expectation xE  would be taken over the true ( )p x , but the parameters 
of this distribution are unknown.  The DM’s two best options for approximating ( )p x  
are ( )p x  and ( )|p x y .   
If the DM uses ( )p x  as the best estimate of ( )p x , Equation (9.9) can be 
rewritten:  
 * *( ) 0( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]p x yy E a x a xυ π π= − . (9.14) 
or, by distributing the expectation as:  
 * *( ) ( ) 0( ) [ ( , )] [ ( , )]p x y p xy E a x E a xυ π π= − . (9.15) 
According to Equation (9.6), the design decision *0a  maximizes ( )[ ( , )]p xE a xπ , 
thus 
 * *( ) ( ) 0[ ( , )] [ ( , )]p x y p xE a x E a xπ π≤  (9.16) 
This means that the gross value of message y  is always estimated to be zero or 
negative, no matter how much new information is available.  Yet intuitively, the gross 




improve the DM’s ability to make a good decision on average.  Consequently, it is not 
useful to make information collection decisions using ( )p x . 
If the DM instead used the posterior distribution ( )|p x y , Equation (9.9) can be 
rewritten as: 
 * *( | ) 0( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]p x y yy E a x a xυ π π= − . (9.17) 
Expanding the expectation yields: 
 * *( | ) ( | ) 0( ) [ ( , )] [ ( , )]p x y y p x yy E a x E a xυ π π= − . (9.18) 
According to Equation (9.7), design decision *ya  maximizes ( | )[ ( , )]p x yE a xπ , thus: 
 * *( | ) ( | ) 0[ ( , )] [ ( , )]p x y y p x yE a x E a xπ π≥ . (9.19) 
In this case, the gross value is always calculated to be positive or zero, which is 
also unreasonable; there will always be “unlucky” samples, or messages, that lead to a 
worse design.  Another objection to using the precise ( )|p x y  is that it has no use in 
decision making, because ( )|p x y  is only available after the information message y  is 
collected. 
This exercise illustrates that an information collection policy based upon the 
assumption of precisely characterized knowledge about the true distributions is 
impractical.  However, the principles of information economics can be implemented 
using an approach based on imprecise probabilities that provides useful bounds on the 
value of information, as described in the next section.   
9.6.3 Bounding the value of information 
An overview of the approach for bounding the value of future information 
collection is shown in Figure 9.5.  The DM begins with the actually observed set of data 
samples 1{ }
n
i ix =Σ = .  The DM first uses this sample to construct a best-fit normal 




then uses the observed samples to construct a parameterized p-box using the method 
described in Section 4.3.  This method creates the p-box by using confidence intervals on 
the mean and variance given by Equations (9.20) and (9.21) (Hines, et al. 2003), where 
α  is the confidence level, n  is the number of samples and s  is the sample standard 
deviation, / 2, 1ntα −  is the t -statistic and 
2
2, 1nαχ −  the Chi-squared statistic. 
 / 2, 1 / 2, 1ˆ ˆ[ , ] [ , ]n n
s st t
n nα α
μ μ μ μ− −= − +  (9.20) 
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 (9.21) 
Recall that by assumption, this model of information—the p-box—contains the 
CDF that corresponds to the true distribution ( )p x .  The DM discretizes the p-box, as 
described below, and selects a single normal distribution from the p-box to represent both 
( )ip x  and ( )ip y .  Because the information source is an unbiased model of the truth in 
the example problem, these two distributions are identical; they both describe the 
unknown true material strength, meaning both x  and y  are realizations of the same 
random process.  This selected distribution is used to estimate the gross value of 
collecting an additional piece of information through the use of Equation (9.10) with 
( ) ( )ip x p x=  and ( ) ( )ip y p y= .  If the DM repeated this for every normal distribution 
inside the p-box, one of the calculated values would be the true gross value of the next 
piece of information.  Clearly, the DM cannot try every distribution, so the following 
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The DM can partition the p-box into a finite, representative set of distributions.  
This is done by discretizing the confidence intervals on the mean and variance.  The DM 
pairs all the combinations of mean and variance, resulting in a set of distributions such as 
shown in Figure 9.6.  Future work will explore more efficient methods for this 
partitioning such as concepts from design of experiments, direct manipulation of the p-
boxes, random sampling across the confidence intervals, or the optimized methods 
developed by Bruns and co-authors (Bruns 2006, Bruns and Paredis 2006, Bruns, et al. 
2006).  For illustration of the concept of the method for bounding the value of future 
information collection, the simple computational method suffices.  
The DM selects one distribution, say ( )ip x , from this finite set and assumes that 
this distribution is the true distribution ( )( )( )ip x p x= .  The DM then calculates the 
gross value of taking the ( 1)stn +  sample, denoted ( 1)iV n + , via a Monte Carlo 
simulation, as follows.   
Given the assumed message distribution, ( ) ( )i ip y p x= , the DM can draw a 
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hypothetical next sample, jy , from the distribution.  This sample is used, along with the 
actually observed samples i =1{ }
n
ix , to estimate a new posterior distribution ( | )i jp x y .  The 
DM uses this distribution to choose the optimal design, *
jy
a , for the given distribution and 
hypothetical sample.  The DM then evaluates the expected payoff of this design using the 
assumed ( )ip x , and calculates the gross value ( )i jyυ  of that particular jy .   The DM 
repeats this for many different 'sjy  drawn from ( )ip y  and calculates the average, or 
expected, gross value of the next message  with distribution ( )ip x  assumed to be the true 
distribution, denoted as ( 1)iV n + .  Finally, the DM repeats this process for all ( )ip x  in 
the chosen set (from the parameterized p-box).  This results in a set of gross values 
{ ( 1)}iV n + . 
Recall that if the p-box contains the true distribution17 and if it were sampled 
exhaustively, then one of the values ( 1)iV n +  in this set would be the true gross value of 
the ( 1)stn +  sample, given the previously observed n  samples.  The set { ( 1)}iV n +  would 
then form an interval ( 1) [ ( 1), ( 1)]V n V n V n+ = + + .  In this approach, the p-box is only 
finitely sampled and it may not contain the true distribution, so the set of values 
{ ( 1)}iV n +  only gives an approximate interval, ( 1) [ ( 1), ( 1)]V n V n V n+ = + + , with the 
lower and upper-bounds defined as ( 1) min ({ ( 1)})i iV n V n+ = +  and 
( 1) max ({ ( 1)})i iV n V n+ = + .  The accuracy of these estimated intervals improves as the 
density of sampling from the p-box increases.   
Based on this interval of value for the next sample, the DM decides if another 
sample should be taken.  If another sample is taken, the process repeats itself starting 




=Σ = .  It should be noted that in general the 




17 The p-box box may not contain the true distribution because it is created using 
confidence intervals at less than the 100% confidence level because the 100% level in 




p-box and hence the discretized distributions  used in the analysis will be different for 
this new data set, meaning that in general the quantities ( ) ( )| |i ip y n p x n=  are not equal 
to the quantities ( ) ( )| 1 | 1i ip y n p x n+ = + . 
9.6.4 Computational Experiment 
The method defined in the previous sub-section will now be applied to the 
pressure vessel design problem described in Sections 5.2 and 9.3.  The experiment 
proceeds according to the approach shown in Figure 9.5 and is repeated for sample sizes 
up to 200.   This generates intervals on the gross value for one particular sequence of 
random samples { }ix .  This experiment is then repeated many times to generate multiple 
sample traces, meaning multiples sets of random samples. 
9.7 Results 
Using the approach and experiment described above, bounds on the gross value of 
the next piece of information can be found.  A graph of these bounds 
( ( 1) [ ( 1), ( 1)]V n V n V n+ = + + ) for a particular sequence of samples 1{ }
n
i ix = —a particular 
sample trace—is shown in Figure 9.7.  A trace represents the bounds on the gross value 
of the next sample for a set that grows every time a sample is acquired.  For example, if 
the set of samples 101{ }i ix =  has already been collected, the bounds of the value of the 11
th 
sample can be estimated.  If the 11th sample ( 11x ) is actually acquired, then a new set is 
formed of the existing samples plus the new sample, such that 11 101 11 1{ } { }i i i ix x x= == ∪  .  
Figure 9.8 shows the upper-bound, lower-bound, and midpoint for two additional traces 
in the vicinity of their crossing of the cost line—the zero net value point.  The curves in 
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9.7.1 Small sample sizes yield large value intervals 
Examination of Figure 9.7 reveals that the potential value of the next sample for 
small sample sizes covers a very large range that is skewed towards the positive side.  For 
example, the gross value of the 17th sample is in the interval [-10, 880].  Based on a strict 
interpretation of traditional decision policies, an interval bounding zero leads to 
indeterminacy.  However, in the context of information collection, a decision musts be 
made.  This can be understood as follows.  In an information collect decision, there are 
two alternatives—collect information or do not collect information.  These actions are 
exhaustive of the universe; there are no other actions possible.  Normally when 
information is indeterminate, no decision is made.  In an information collection decision, 
not making a decision is equivalent to deciding not to collect information. 
Given this situation, essentially a decision must be made, and a decision policy 
that can resolve the indeterminacy is required.  In this dissertation, one extreme is 
assumed—the DM stops collecting data when the upper-bound on the gross value is less 
than the cost—that is, when the upper-bound on the net value is negative.  This is a so-
called Γ-maximax policy (Berger 1985, Schervish, et al. 2003).  At the accepted 
confidence level, the true value is assumed to lie in the interval, so this represents the 
point at which the true net value cannot exceed zero, therefore, no rational DM would 
take an additional sample.    Other possible policies for managing interval-based 
decisions include maximality (Walley 1991), Γ-maximin (Berger 1985), E-admissibility 
(Schervish, et al. 2003), and the Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 1972).   The 
general use of these policies in engineering design is an area for future work. 
9.7.2 The bounds on value are not monotonic 
In a general sense, it is reasonable to expect that the value of additional samples 
will decrease as n  increases.  However, each trace represents one sequence of actually 




1i −  samples.  Once the thi  sample is collected, the value of the ( 1)sti +  sample is 
calculated using all i  acquired samples.  If the actually acquired thi  sample is really 
“lucky” or “unlucky”, the gross value of the next sample can change significantly, 
potentially yielding non-monotonic bounds.  An example of such non-monotonicity is 
labeled in Figure 9.8.  Non-monotonicity can result in multiple cost line crossings, but 
these crossings were never observed to be more than a few (3-5) sample sizes apart.  
Because the bounds are already estimates, a deviation of a few samples is not likely to be 
significant. 
9.7.3 The lower-bound is always non-positive 
It is worth noting that the lower-bound on the interval will always be non-
positive, i.e., given the available information, it is always possible that the gross value of 
the next piece of information will be less than zero.  This happens because the best-fit 
distribution ( )p x  on which the design decision is based is always contained in the set of 
distribution samples from the p-box—it is a candidate for the truth in our approach.  This 
means that during the calculation of the interval on gross value, this distribution will be 
considered as the truth at some point, yielding the situation described in Equation (9.14)
—if the DM’s estimate already is the true distribution, which is possible though rare, then 
no information can make the estimate any better; it will in fact often make the estimate 
worse because the next random sample will rarely be a perfect confirmation of the 
existing information. 
9.7.4 Examining the net value 
Another point of note is the relationship between the gross value and cost.  In 
practice, there is a relationship between the number of pressure vessels being designed 
and the cost, because the cost of information collection is amortized over all the pressure 
vessels.  In this example, it is assumed that each yield strength test on a material sample 




pressure vessel.  Other cost functions could be used without adding significant 
complexity.  With the cost fixed at $0.50, an experiment following Trace A and using the 
upper-bound decision rule will stop with the 147th sample, because the upper-bound on 
the gross value of the 148th sample is less than the cost, as can be seen in Figure 9.8.  The 
same logic can be applied to Trace B.  In this case, a DM would collect 162 samples 
because the upper-bound on the gross value of the 163rd sample is less than the cost; the 
net value is negative.   
In this section, two representative results have been presented.  The overall results 
consist of many sample traces that can be analyzed in the same way as the examples 
above.  In the next section, the performance of the method is examined. 
9.8 Comparison of realized payoffs 
Using the true material strength distribution ( )p x —which is not known by the 
designers—an omniscient supervisor could evaluate Equation (9.13) to determine the 
actual expected payoff of the optimal design, *a , after each sample.  The results of this 
evaluation for Trace A from Figure 9.8 are shown in Figure 9.9.  Each point represents 
the true expected net payoff (y-axis) of a design chosen based on the current number of 
samples (x-axis).  Figure 9.9 is similar in nature to Figure 9.3 in Section 9.5; the volatility 
of the curves in Figure 9.9 is due to the fact that the value along a single trace is 
investigated, rather than an average of the value of the next sample over many traces as 
was shown to Figure 9.3.  Because a DM would never create all of these designs and does 
not have access to ( )p x , this is a hypothetical exercise that only the omniscient 




The results in Figure 9.9 indicate that, given the actual observed sequence of 
samples, the DM would have been best-off stopping earlier (at 5 samples) than the new 
approach suggests (at 147 samples).  In this example, the DM loses about 60% of the 
payoff by collecting the additional 142 samples. 
Is this a result of the stopping policy?  Because the DM stops collecting 
information only when he or she is absolutely sure that the value of the next piece of 
information is less than its cost, the Γ-maximax decision policy will often be overly 
conservative.  An alternative policy would be to use the midpoint of the bounds, a special 
case of the Hurwicz criterion (Arrow and Hurwicz 1972).  Using this stopping rule the 
DM would collect 114 samples, for Trace A in Figure 9.9.  This still results in a loss of 
50% payoff from the optimal. 
Is such a loss in payoff justified?  In the discussion surrounding the distribution of 
payoffs and Figure 9.4, it is concluded that the DM may wish to go beyond the average 
“optimal” stopping point due to the imprecision in the DM’s knowledge and the large 
downside risk of stopping too soon.  The actual expected net payoffs for trace B from 
Figure 9.8 are shown in Figure 9.10.  In this example trace, it turns out that given the 
actually observed samples, it would have been much worse to stop after 80 samples as 




























compared to 100.  According to Figure 9.8, the midpoint stopping rule would have 
stopped at 124 samples for this trace.  While this is still about 50% below the optimal, it 
yields a significantly better result than a policy that would have stopped at 80 samples.   
Before ending this analysis, one last trace is presented in Figure 9.11.  For this 
trace, the optimal stopping point would have been at 110 samples.  The midpoint 
stopping rule would have led to the collection of 130 samples.  This is relatively close to 
the optimal but still results in some loss of payoff.  What causes the optimal stopping 
point to be so high in this case?  One contributing factor is that the first five actual 
samples were 192 MPa, 200 MPa, 194 MPa, 197 MPa, and 181 MPa.  These are all 
above the true mean of 180 MPa.  This initial “unlucky” bias leads to a severe over-
estimate of the material strength, which in turn leads to a severe under-design of the 
pressure vessel.  Consequently, the pressure vessel fails much more often than expected, 
leading to a significantly higher average failure cost.  This example indicates how 
sensitive the design can be to the sample data, and why a large number of samples may 
be needed to reach a stable result. 




























Before reaching a conclusion on the effectiveness of this approach of bounding 
the value of information, it is emphasized that the DM would not have the actual 
expected payoff curves available.  Therefore, the DM does not know if he or she is in an 
example similar to that of Figure 9.9, Figure 9.10, Figure 9.11, or something else 
altogether.  A conservative policy therefore leads the designer to keep taking samples 
until he or she is reasonably sure that there is no chance of a large negative payoff; that 
is, samples are taken until the downside risk is acceptable. 
9.9  Future work 
In this chapter, a foundation for applying information economics to engineering 
design decisions involving the collection of information about probability distributions 
with unknown parameters was laid, but there is still significant room for improvement 
and additional exploration. 
Decision policies for gathering information.  In this chapter, an approach for 
bounding the value of collecting additional data samples was developed.  These bounds 
need to be resolved according to some policy in order to make a decision.  Given just the 






























bounds, any policy that selects a point between the bounds for a single decision is 
acceptable, because the true value is only known to be somewhere between them.   
For certain problems, a particular policy may tend to work better.  For example, 
the Γ-maximax and midpoint policies are compared loosely for the pressure vessel design 
example, and it was found that the midpoint policy almost always performs better.  If 
such results could be generalized to specific sets of problems, then designers might be 
able to choose an appropriate decision policy based on meta-information about the design 
problem.  This would greatly increase the impact of the approach for bounding the value 
of information presented in this paper.  Whether such generalizations are possible is an 
open research question. 
Design decision policies.  As explained in the 9.6.1, a design decision policy 
based on precise probabilities (the best-fit normal distribution) is chosen in order to focus 
on the effectiveness of using imprecise probabilities to represent the DM’s state of 
information when estimating the value of information.  Previous work has shown the 
value of incorporating the imprecision of the DM’s state of information directly into the 
design decision policy (see Chapter 5).  The use of imprecise probabilities for both the 
design decision policy and the prediction of the value of information appears to be a more 
realistic representation of a typical design problem and could possibly lead to additional 
insight. 
Unknown Distributions.  The p-box can be used to represent the DM’s lack of 
knowledge about a distribution when the DM has varying amounts of initial knowledge 
about the distribution (see Section 4.3 ).  In this paper, it was assumed that the DM knows 
the type of distribution but has no knowledge about the values of the distribution’s 
parameters.  It could be that the DM can only specify a set of all possible distribution 
types, or even that the DM lacks any knowledge about the possible distribution types.  In 
both cases, the p-box would be significantly broader resulting in wider value bounds. The 




investigating how it performs under varying amounts of initial knowledge about the 
distribution being characterized. 
Computational cost.  The approach presented in this paper requires a double-
loop Monte Carlo simulation for every sample size.  For this experiment, the calculation 
of bounds on the value of the next sample takes about 5 minutes with a high number of p-
box and message samples, though results for runs as short as 30 seconds appear nearly as 
good.  These times are on a single 2.6 GHz Pentium 4 processor system with 512 MB of 
RAM.   
Although this computation time seems perfectly reasonable, the computational 
complexity can be expected to increase substantially for more complicated design 
problems; hence, the proposed approach will need to be modified for application to 
complex design problems.  For example, some p-box computations can be performed 
using algorithms with foundations in interval analysis that do not require second order 
Monte Carlo techniques (the DBC method described in Section 4.5.1) and are 
consequently much less computationally expensive on average (Ferson and Ginzburg 
1996).  Future work investigating how to adapt these methods for computing and 
simulating directly with p-boxes such that they can be used in the proposed approach is 
needed. 
Design problems.  The pressure vessel example used in this paper is deliberately 
simple, in order to illustrate concisely the information economic framework for 
information collection in design.  To assess the general applicability of our approach, 
several variations of the design problem should be investigated.  First, the material choice 
and hence the true distribution being characterized could be varied.  Second, the payoff 
function could be varied to consider different levels of risk-preference.  Third, a design 
problem in which there are multiple uncertain parameters and multiple sources of 
information could be explored.  Modifications in the computational methods, as 




approach itself may be required in order to apply this approach in a computationally 
feasible manner to complex engineering design problems.  These three design problem 
variations could lead to more general conclusions about the applicability of the approach. 
9.10 Summary 
In this chapter, the principles of information economics have been introduced and 
related to engineering design problems in which statistical parameters describing 
distributions are not fully known.  The approach for applying information economics has 
been presented, several example scenarios and decision policies have been explored, 
limitations have been described, and areas for future work have been identified.  An open 
question is how to make a decision given these bounds on value. 
The main contribution of this work is the development of an approach by which 
the bounds on the value of information can be calculated by a designer during the 
information collection process using imprecise probabilities.    This contribution can have 
a significant impact on engineering design by opening more problem classes to formal 
cost-benefit analysis during the problem formulation phase and information collection 
tasks of design decisions.  Specifically, a formal cost-benefit analysis could help guide 
expenditures for information gathering in high-risk designs where difficult-to-










DISCUSSION AND REMARKS 
 
This chapter is a discussion and synthesis of material from the preceding chapters.  
The first goal is to reflect upon the material presented earlier by restating the motivating 
questions and answers proposed in Section 1.5 and by highlighting the main 
contributions.  The second goal is to look outward and to the future.  Throughout the 
dissertation, remarks were made with regard to future work.  In this chapter, the 
limitations of the presented methods and needs for future work are reviewed from a 
broader perspective of practical use in engineering problems. 
10.1 Review of motivating questions 
The primary motivating question for the dissertation is: 
How should engineering designers manage information to 
support decision making under uncertainty? 
The basic answer presented in this dissertation is: 
 It is often valuable for engineers to represent the 
uncertainty in their information using probabilities that are 
most generally subjective and imprecise and to manage 
information collection and uncertainty modeling decisions 
using the principles of information economics. 
This answer was developed in several steps, which can be broken into three parts.  
The first part, which is composed of Chapter 2 through Chapter 7 and forms the core of 




uncertainty models in engineering design.  The second part, Chapter 8, addresses decision 
making in engineering design using the selected model.  In the third part, Chapter 9, 
management of information collection is addressed.  Each of these sections of the 
dissertation is reviewed in he following sections of this chapter.  First, the contributions 
are reviewed in terms of the motivating questions (Sections 10.1.1 through 10.1.3).  Then 
the main contributions of the dissertation are summarized in Section 10.2. 
10.1.1 Contributions relating to modeling uncertainty 
Effective decision making under uncertainty requires the DM to recognize the 
limits of the available information by modeling the uncertainty in the decision.  The 
selection of an uncertainty model involves three important sub-questions:  
1. What is the nature of uncertainty? 
2. What is the most appropriate model of this uncertainty? 
3. How should uncertainty models be compared? 
These questions roughly correspond to Motivating Questions 1-3.  The answers to 
these questions and the related conclusions are summarized in the following. 
 
Motivating Question 1: What are the fundamental characteristics of uncertainty 
in the context of engineering design? 
Answer 1: Uncertainty can have characteristics of being irreducible (or random) 
in nature as well as characteristics that are related to a imprecision in available 
knowledge—a reducible lack of knowledge. 
Main conclusions:  In Chapter 2, both the philosophical and practical literature 
on uncertainty was reviewed.  Building from this literature and using simple examples, an 
argument was constructed that not all uncertainty that engineers face is random or 




uncertainty: imprecision and irreducible uncertainty.  Although this distinction is not 
always clear philosophically, the distinction is useful from a modeling perspective.  The 
practical value of a method that represents imprecision distinctly from irreducible 
uncertainty in engineering design was demonstrated in Chapter 5.  This practical 
comparison moves beyond the theoretical discussion and speculation in the existing 
literature. 
 
Motivating Question 2: What is the most appropriate and general model of 
uncertainty for engineering design? 
Answer 2: It is often valuable to use probabilities that are most generally 
subjective and imprecise. 
Main conclusions:   
• In Chapter 3, several uncertainty models that have been proposed in the 
literature were considered with particular emphasis on the existence of an 
operational definition for them and their ability to represent both irreducible 
uncertainty and imprecision.  Imprecise probability theory is the only model 
with both a clear operational definition and the ability to represent both 
irreducible uncertainty and imprecision distinctly from each other.   
• In Chapter 3, it was determined that if probability theory is to be used in 
engineering design, it is necessary to adopt a subjective interpretation of 
probability.   
• In Chapter 4, the existing work on a sub-set of imprecise probability theory, 
called probability bounds analysis, was described and related to decision 
making in engineering design.  
• In Chapter 5, a computational method for comparing the practical value of 
two uncertainty models was developed for the scenario of modeling limited 




high (i.e. when the DM has little information), the use of PBA can lead to 
better designs than a precise, best-fit probability approach.   
• In Chapter 6, the theoretical generality of probability bounds analysis as a 
sensitivity analysis for robustness is derived.   
• In Chapter 7, the value—benefits, costs, and limitations—of using probability 
bounds analysis is compared to a decision analysis approach with sensitivity 
analysis with an example problem. 
 
Motivating Question 3: How should engineers compare alternative models of 
uncertainty? 
Answer 3:  Designers should compare both the theoretical and practical validity 
of different models. 
Main conclusions:   
• In Chapter 4, the theoretical ability of imprecise probability theory to model 
the important characteristics of uncertainty is discussed, and this ability is 
compared to other proposed models.   
• In Chapter 5, a computational method for comparing the practical value of 
two uncertainty models is developed for the scenario of modeling limited 
statistical data.  This method is used as part of the validation of Answers 1 and 
2.   
• In Chapter 6, the theoretical generality of probability bounds analysis as an 
approach to sensitivity analysis for decision robustness is derived.   
• In Chapter 7, the value—benefits, costs, and limitations—of using probability 
bounds analysis is compared to a decision analysis approach with sensitivity 




10.1.2 Contributions related to decision making 
Motivating Question 4: How should a designer make a decision in the case of 
seemingly indeterminate information? 
Answer 4:  There is no generally optimal way to resolve inherent indeterminacy, 
but set-based decision rules exist that guide the efficient use of available information. 
Main Conclusions:  In Chapter 8, the decision criteria of interval dominance, 
maximality, and E-admissibility are described and demonstrated.  Interval dominance is 
clearly valid to use in engineering design, and maximality can lead to additional, rational 
eliminations of alternatives by incorporating information about shared uncertainties.  In 
the context of engineering design, it is rare that all imprecision will be eliminated before 
a final decision is taken.  Consequently, E-admissibility is not a good policy because it 
may eliminate robust designs.  It was also noted that the possible need to resort to 
arbitrary choice suggests an important direction for future work. 
10.1.3 Contributions related to managing information collection 
Motivating Question 5:  What are the fundamental principles for managing 
information collection in engineering design? 
Answer 5:  Designers should apply the principles of information economics and 
can use methods that bound the value of information collection. 
Main conclusions:  In Chapter 9, the principles of information economics were 
introduced and related to the engineering design problem.  A method was developed for 
bounding the value of additional information collection in the form of additional 
statistical samples.  The method creates bounds on the value of the next sample, but in 
general it is necessary to resort to an arbitrary decision policy for resolving indeterminacy 
in the analysis.  Consequently, the general applicability of the current method as an actual 




10.2 Summary of contributions 
This dissertation makes three significant contributions to engineering design 
under uncertainty, as summarized in the following subsections. 
10.2.1 Contribution 1: Value of imprecise probabilities 
The first contribution summarized is the core contribution of the dissertation.  In 
this dissertation, the value of using an uncertainty model that explicitly recognizes 
imprecision and irreducible uncertainty was established from both practical and 
theoretical perspectives, and important limitations were noted.   
1. The practical value—measured in terms of quality of the final design—of 
using PBA was compared to the practical value of using a traditional, best-
fit precise model of uncertainty in a specific high-risk design problem 
involving limited statistical data.   
a. It was shown that when imprecision is high, the PBA approach 
yields designs that perform significantly better on average.   
b. It was shown that when imprecision is low, the PBA approach 
performs slightly worse on average. 
c. The identification of which state—high or low imprecision—is 
non-trivial for a specific design problem.  The development of 
heuristics for guiding such judgments is an area for future work. 
2. Via mathematical argument and example problem, it was demonstrated 
that PBA generalizes a global, all-way sensitivity analysis (as defined in 
decision analysis) and has its own advantages and limitations.   
a. When PBA is implemented using DBC, the PBA approach will not 
yield a Type I error, meaning that if the decision is sensitive to the 
existing lack of information (i.e. imprecision), then the PBA 




b. PBA can result in a Type II error, meaning that it can lead to the 
conclusion that there is sensitivity when there is not sensitivity. 
c. Even with existing meta-sensitivity analysis approaches, PBA is 
severely limited in its ability to identify and prioritize the sources 
of sensitivity in a problem.  Therefore, PBA does not help the DM 
prioritize information collection to reduce the sensitivity. 
10.2.2 Contribution 2: Decision making with imprecise 
information 
The second major contribution is in a crucial area for applying imprecise 
probabilities in engineering design—decision making in the presence of imprecision. 
1. Existing decision criteria for eliminating imprecisely characterized 
decision alternatives from consideration in a design process were 
demonstrated. 
2. The conclusion that one of the previously proposed approaches, E-
admissibility, is not a good policy because it can remove robust solutions 
from consideration was reached. 
3. Brought together the notion of set-based design with the decision policies 
for imprecise information, related these approaches to engineering design, 
and demonstrated their application in specific problem.  As such, the 
preliminary foundations for a formal set-based approach to design in 
which the focus shifts from selection of the best alternative to the 
elimination of the inferior alternatives were established. 
10.2.3 Contribution 3: Information collection and information 
economics 
The third major contribution of the thesis involves the application of information 




the practical value of different uncertainty models and also explored more extensively in 
Chapter 9. 
1. The principles of information economics were introduced into the 
engineering design process.  Existing information economic concepts were 
extended to a formalized statement of the design process.   
2. A method that uses imprecise probabilities to establish bounds on the 
value of future statistical data sample collection was developed.  Previous 
methods assumed perfectly known joint and conditional probabilities.  The 
new method lifts these restrictions and is a significant step forward 
towards the goal of formalizing the information economic trade-offs that 
designers should consider.  However, the method requires the use of 
arbitrary choice, and consequently the results may not be generally 
application in a rigorous manner. 
10.3 Onward and outward 
As noted in the previous section, this dissertation contains several major 
contributions in engineering design.  However, there are still significant opportunities for 
future work in the areas of imprecise probabilities, information economics, and the 
general area of engineering design under uncertainty.  This dissertation is best viewed as 
a starting point—a starting point that will hopefully evolve into a turning point in 
engineering design. 
Current practice in engineering design focuses on representing uncertainty using 
precise probabilities.  This practice may have evolved for several reasons.   
1. Engineers are generally exposed to traditional probability and statistics in 
their undergraduate programs, so there is a sense of familiarity with 




2. Precise probability theory comes with a neat, well-established decision 
theory—von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory.  The maximization of 
expected utility fits relatively nicely into optimization theory as it provides 
a single, precise objective function.   
3. In general, precise probabilities are simpler to compute with than 
imprecise probabilities, so there may have been practical limitations on 
what representations were previously valuable for engineers to use.   
None of these reasons are justifications for ignoring other uncertainty models.  
They can even be viewed as motivations for researching other models.  As computing 
power increases, computing costs decrease, thus shifting the cost-benefit trade-off 
balances for particular design methods and uncertainty models.  If a model promises 
significant benefits, then research can be focused on reducing the associated costs.  This 
dissertation serves as a stepping stone towards future research by demonstrating this 
promise. 
Specific benefits of using imprecise probabilities to capture both imprecision and 
irreducible uncertainty were established in this dissertation.  Given these results, a 
complete dismissal of imprecise probabilities in engineering design cannot be made 
without acquiring significant evidence to support that conclusion.  However, there are 
limitations to existing approaches for computing with imprecise probabilities in complex 
problems and making decisions with imprecise information that must be considered. 
10.3.1 Considerations for complex problems 
Many of the computing issues were discussed in Chapter 4.  It was noted that 
recent work (Trejo and Kreinovich 2001, Kreinovich and Ferson 2004, Bruns 2006, 
Bruns and Paredis 2006, Bruns, et al. 2006) has examined and developed methods for 
applying PBA to black-box engineering models.  However, these methods still require the 




cost is likely to be prohibitive for the immediate future unless new methods are 
developed.  For example, the replacement of complex analysis models with response 
surface models (Box and Wilson 1951, Myers and Montgomery 1995) and kriging 
models (Sacks, et al. 1989) is an important area for future work.  Until such approaches 
are examined, the applicability of PBA to large scale engineering problems or problems 
with complex analysis models is an open issue. 
The focus in this dissertation was on problems involving the acquisition of 
observable data, such as statistical data samples.  However, a large source of information 
in the design of complex systems is expert opinion.  Imprecise probabilities can 
theoretically model the uncertainty in such expert opinions, but the practicality of 
eliciting p-boxes from experts is questionable.  Among other things, experts are not 
trained in creating p-boxes, and analysts are not trained in eliciting imprecise 
probabilities.  For statistical problems, a large number of experts have experience in the 
combined art and science of fitting distributions and statistical models.  There is no such 
expertise for p-boxes, so despite the promise of representing imprecise expert beliefs, 
there is currently no practical way of guiding the creation of such p-boxes.  The general 
elicitation and assessment procedures introduced by Walley (1991) need significant 
refinement and extension for application in engineering design. 
In a complex system, there are generally many sources of uncertainty.  While 
PBA is great tool for performing sensitivity analysis for decision robustness 
identification, it is currently limited in its ability to prioritize information collection.  In 
short, it informs the DM that he or she has a problem, but it provides no guidance as to 
how to fix the problem.  To have a large impact on decision practice, an approach must 
be developed that captures at least some of the advantages of both PBA-based sensitivity 
analysis and the types of sensitivity analysis currently performed in decision analysis.  




analysis for decision robustness identification while the traditional approach is well 
suited for sensitivity analysis for information prioritization. 
10.3.2 Considerations with regard to decision policies 
Because imprecise probabilities generally lead to intervals of expected utility, 
traditional decision theory cannot be applied directly to analyses involving imprecise 
information.  The potential overlap of intervals can lead to indeterminacy, a situation in 
which it is not possible to determine which decision alternative is the most preferred.  
Strictly speaking, this should lead to indecision because the available information 
provides no means for making a decision; that is exactly the point of using imprecise 
probabilities—to accurately model the decision maker’s information state. 
In a context such as set-based design in which the initial goal is just to reduce the 
design space, such indecision is acceptable provided some alternatives can be eliminated 
at every step.  Essentially, the decision is recast from a selection of a preferred alternative 
to an individual decision about whether or not to eliminate that particular alternative.  
This will often work well up to a point, but eventually a single design must be chosen.  In 
some cases, the elimination process may converge to a single alternative, but this will 
likely be the exception rather than the rule. 
10.3.2.1 The use of arbitrary decision policies 
Arbitrary decision policies have been suggested for resolving indeterminacy.  
These policies often result in single decisions that appear reasonable.  However, the 
application of arbitrary decision policies in a sequence of decisions has not been studied 
in detail.  When a DM applies an arbitrary decision rule, he or she is essentially selecting 
one point in the interval as the truth and using this truth to make a decision.  This point 
corresponds to specific assumptions about the probabilities, probabilities that fall 
between the decision maker’s upper and lower previsions.  In order to maintain 




probabilities that was discussed in Section 3.4.3, a decision maker cannot later make a 
decision using a point that corresponds to different probabilities; the DM must be 
consistent in his or her selection of probabilities. 
Initial investigations suggest that the consistent application of arbitrary policies is 
non-trivial.  Perhaps the very notion of “arbitrary” implies “inconsistent.”  The practical 
consequences of using arbitrary policies in engineering design are unclear.  In the context 
of gambling, the inconsistent selection of probabilities can result in a Dutch Book, a 
sequence of bets in which the DM is guaranteed to lose (see Section 3.4.3).  This 
situation requires multiple decisions to be made—a situation that often exists in 
engineering design.  Ideally, a decision policy would be applicable across multiple 
decisions, so this problem of arbitrary choice requires additional investigation. 
10.3.2.2 The impact of arbitrary decision policies on this dissertation 
The possibility of arbitrary decision policies leading to inconsistent behaviors 
does not undermine the primary results of this dissertation.  The possible inconsistency in 
the use of arbitrary decision policies has no effect on the contributions regarding PBA as 
a sensitivity analysis because those methods do not rely on any decision policies.  The 
sensitivity of the decision is identified by the presence of overlapping intervals; there is 
no need to reduce the intervals to points in order to identify the sensitivity.  
Consequently, the validity of arbitrary decision rules is irrelevant in this area.   
The example problem in Chapter 5 was based on the assumption of a Γ -maximin 
policy, which does not lead to inconsistent behavior, as explained briefly in the 




case scenario18 will occur and chooses the action that gives the best result in that worst 
case scenario.  If a subsequent decision is made, the DM again considers the worst case 
scenario and makes a decision that leads to the best result in that worst case.  Since the 
DM is always considering (and mitigating) the worst case, no subsequent decision could 
make him or her worse off (on average) that the lower bound on the expected value for 
the chosen decision, because that lower bound already is the worst case.  Consequently, a 
Dutch Book cannot be constructed.   
Viewed in terms of gambling behavior, a Γ -maximin policy is the most 
pessimistic policy possible.  A very pessimistic DM would never be induced into a 
sequence of bets that result in a sure loss, because the pessimistic DM assumes that he or 
she will almost always lose.  To the pessimist, both buying and selling look like worse 
decisions that they probably area.  In order for a Dutch Book to be constructed, a DM 
must be optimistic in that he or she sells a bet at a price lower than reasonable and buys a 
bet at a price higher than reasonable.  A pessimist does the opposite, buying only at a 
lower price that reasonable and selling only at a higher price than reasonable.  




18 The notion of  “worst case” is defined in terms of the imprecision, such as the lowest 
bound on the expected utility.  It is not “worst case” in terms of the worst single 
outcome possible, which would depend on any stochastic process, too.  For example, 
consider an event with two outcomes, good (G) and bad (B).  The probabilities of these 
two outcomes are not known precisely.  It is known only that P(B)= [0.01, 0.05] and 
P(G)=[0.95,0.99].  In this context, the worst case is when P(B)=0.05 (as large as 
possible) and P(G)=0.95 (as small as possible).  Even in the worst case, the good 
outcome can occur, and is in fact highly probable to occur in this example.  





10.3.3 Potential areas for future application of imprecise 
probabilities and information economics 
The preceding two sub-sections examined future research aimed at removing 
some of the existing limitations of using imprecise probabilities in engineering design.  
There are also many reasons to be optimistic, as there are many applications for 
imprecise probabilities beyond those of simple design selection, design elimination, and 
bounding the value of future information collection.  Several application areas are 
explored in the following sub-sections. 
10.3.3.1 Extensions to reliability and risk-based design 
Reliability analysis and risk-based design are two important areas in which the 
use of imprecise probabilities may be valuable.  In both of these areas, uncertainty plays a 
key role.   For example, reliability analysis studies the probability of failure.  When 
information is scarce, the probability of failure can be difficult to estimate.  Imprecise 
probability theory presents a means for establishing bounds on probabilities instead of 
point estimates.  However, the introduction of imprecise probabilities into traditional 
reliability analysis raises new questions, such as the propagation of imprecise reliability 
estimates through the analysis of systems and subsystems.  This might be particularly 
valuable in situations in which experiments are prohibitively expensive, such as space 
craft design, or situations in which rare events are important.  In these cases, expert 
opinion and generalizations from prior experience may be the only sources of 
information.  A possible future research question is how can subjective judgments be 
represented using imprecise probabilities in reliability analysis?   
A related question is the use of imprecise probabilities in reliability-based design 
optimization (RBDO).  In RBDO, the designer seeks to maximize some performance 
function subject to probabilistic constraints.  Recent literature has examined the use of 
alternatives to precise probabilities in RBDO, such as possibility theory (Mourelatos and 




bounds on the possibility of failure of constraints are used in the optimization rather than 
point estimates.  The goal is to ensure that the possibility of failure is below the critical 
level, the scarcity of available information.  The application of imprecise probabilities in 
RBDO is an important direction for future work, especially given the apparent benefits 
seen with other bounding approaches that do not have the rigor of the operational 
definition and the solid axioms provided by imprecise probability theory. 
A basic goal of risk-based design is to reduce risk while meeting the other overall 
goals of a system.  The risk associated with an action is generally defined in terms of the 
magnitude of the consequences of the action and the likelihood of those consequences 
(Stamatelatos 2000).  The estimation of the likelihood of particular consequences is tied 
directly to the probabilities of particular states of the world.  When information is scarce, 
it can be difficult to estimate these probabilities.  It therefore may be valuable to apply 
imprecise probabilities to risk-based design and to extend probabilistic risk assessments 
to include measures of imprecision.  A related research question is in which aspects of 
risk analysis can these methods quantify risks that are currently dealt with qualitatively?  
An answer to this question could improve significantly the accuracy and rigor of risk-
based design approaches. 
10.3.3.2 Set-based design methods for exploration of novel and imprecisely 
defined concepts.   
As discussed in Chapter 8, engineers traditionally start with a large set of concepts 
and quickly narrow that set down to a single alternative that is iteratively modified and 
refined during embodiment and detail design.  Because preliminary concepts are 
incompletely defined, a designer usually cannot determine an optimal concept; such a 
choice would require information about the details of the design that are not available 




As mentioned in Chapter 8, some researchers have noted the success of set-based 
approaches to design in the automotive industry (Ward, et al. 1995, Sobek and Ward 
1996).  In these approaches, several concepts are designed in parallel.  One advantage of 
these approaches is that creative, untested designs can be considered while 
simultaneously developing variants of existing, tried and true designs.  Something novel 
is by definition new, and hence no one has experience with it.  This lack of knowledge, or 
imprecision, makes predicting the exact performance of a novel concept impossible.   
In this dissertation, methods for representing and reasoning with imprecision were 
developed and demonstrated, but the question remains as to how to manage a design 
process such that imprecision in several designs is systematically and efficiently reduced 
until one design can be chosen as the superior.  By fostering the exploration of creative 
concepts, such a formal and rigorous set-based design method that considers multiple 
concepts in parallel and actively manages imprecision and information could lead to 
revolutionary advances in engineering technology that would otherwise be dismissed as 
too risky. 
10.3.3.3 Model validation and uncertainty propagation.   
The use of computer models and simulations for engineering analysis is 
widespread, a fundamental question remained unanswered: how can a decision-maker 
develop sufficient confidence that a model is appropriate for guiding a particular 
decision?  Additional questions arise when models are reused or connected, either 
directly or in the form of a federated simulation.  For example: How can actions and 
responses be coordinated in a federated simulation when the uncertainty in the acting 
model is significantly different from the uncertainty in the reacting model?  More 





The use of imprecise probabilities to represent the uncertainty associated with 
modeling simplifications and assumptions appears to be relatively novel research area.  
Recent work has considered the characterization of models using interval-based context 
and interval-based inaccuracy representations (Malak 2005), as well as the selection of an 
appropriate model from a set of models whose accuracy is characterized as intervals 
(Ling 2006).  Based on these works, there may be ways to use imprecise probabilities to 
extend the process of model validation and assessment, just as imprecise probabilities 
enable an extension of application of information economics in engineering design, as 
described in Chapter 9. 
10.3.3.4 Sensor tasking and data fusion.   
Networks of distributed sensors are becoming quite common and important, 
especially in military applications.  For example, information from radar, infrared, and 
visual spectrum sensors on various platforms must be integrated to create a full picture of 
battlefield.  The entire purpose of sensors is to provide information, thereby reducing 
uncertainty.  The information extracted from sensor data frequently is used to make time-
critical decisions, such as neutralizing an incoming torpedo or missile.  It is therefore 
essential to use available resources efficiently.  This leads to the important question: how 
can sensors be efficiently tasked to reduce uncertainty and quickly support tactical 
decision making?    A corollary question is how can uncertain data from a network of 
various sensors be aggregated and processed quickly?  Non-military applications include 
monitoring plant performance (such as a refinery, manufacturing unit, or nuclear power 
facility) and implementing digital control systems.   
The questions presented in the preceding paragraph are very complementary to 
the questions of information management in engineering design discussed in Chapter 9.  





10.4 Revisiting the journey 
The previous sections were structured reviews of the motivating questions, 
contributions, and areas for future work.  In this section, the overall story of the 
dissertation and the cohesion of the different components is revisited.   
In Section 1.5, the important elements of the general story of the dissertation was 
summarized with the following five questions: 
1. When constructing a model, it is first necessary to understand what one is trying 
to model, in this case asking what are the fundamental characteristics of 
uncertainty in the context of engineering design?   
2. Once the nature of uncertainty is described, what is the most appropriate and 
general model of uncertainty for engineering design? 
3. Given several potential models from which to choose, how should engineers 
compare alternative models of uncertainty?   
4. Once a model is chosen, how can this model be used to support the decisions?   
5. Finally, given an existing state of knowledge, a model of uncertainty associated 
with it, and an approach for solving the original decision problem, how should 
one decide whether to collect more information (proceeding with the problem 
formulation phase) or whether to proceed to problem solution phase?  
In this section, the story of the dissertation is retold in a summarized form via 
loose analogy.  The goal of the section is to capture the essence of the dissertation. 
10.4.1 Modeling uncertainty and making decisions: using the 
right tool for the right task 
When an engineer approaches a design problem, he or she usually brings certain 
tools along.  Each tool has specific benefits, costs, and limitations.  The goal of this 
dissertation is to examine the tools available to the engineering as he or she explores the 




Most engineers have precise probability theory strapped tightly to their utility 
belts, and this is the first tool that they reach for when they need to model uncertainty.  In 
this dissertation, the engineer is taken back to the toolbox and encouraged to reexamine 
the available options.  Before being allowed to examine the tools, the engineer is directed 
back to the planning phase and challenged to answer, “What is the task that you really 
want to perform?”  Once the task—modeling uncertainty—is reviewed (in Chapter 2), the 
engineer is allowed to open the toolbox and select a tool (in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). 
The first few tools that the engineer examines—fuzzy sets and possibility 
theory—are very different from his or her trusted sidekick of precise probability theory.  
Unfortunately, they do not come with instructions on how to use them—they lack an 
operational definition.  Additionally, as an uncertainty tool, they do not seem to be 
applicable to many of the tasks that probability theory completes with ease.  The engineer 
once again takes probability theory from its home in his or her utility belt and admires its 
qualities. 
However, the engineer still longs for more.  Occasionally applying probability in 
engineering design is a bit like inserting a screw into wallboard with a hammer; the screw 
enters the wallboard, but the result is messy and not as sturdy as one would hope.  The 
engineer ponders aloud, “Isn’t there some way I can improve this tool without sacrificing 
its basic functionality?” 
This is what imprecise probability theory does.  It generalizes probability theory, 
including precise probabilities as a special case.  It is as if the engineer’s hammer now 
has a set of fold-out screwdrivers built in; it can do everything a hammer can do, and then 
some.  The engineer decides to choose a tool—PBA—that is slightly less sophisticated 
but much easier to use than the general tool—imprecise probabilities. However, as 
anyone who has every ordered from a gadget catalogue probably knows, not everything 




In this dissertation, specific advantages of imprecise probabilities were 
demonstrated, both in terms of practical value of the added “tool” of modeling 
imprecision that imprecise probability theory adds to precise probability theory (Chapter 
5 and Chapter 7) and in terms of a form of analysis based on imprecise probabilities to 
perform an existing function—sensitivity analysis—just as well or better than other tools 
(Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). 
10.4.2 Managing uncertainty: exploration 
The management of information and uncertainty in engineering design is not just 
a practical matter of finding a good tool and using it.  It is also a philosophically 
challenging problem.  Decision making under uncertainty is journey into a dark cave of 
the unknown.  An explorer can take several approaches to traveling through this cave.  
For example, the explorer can crawl forward blindly, bumping into walls and frequently 
backtracking, essentially using just his or her hands and feet as tools for environmental 
exploration.  This explorer might stumble into a hidden treasure or an exit now and then, 
but more often he or she will fall into an unforgiving crevice or forever be lost in an 
unyielding labyrinth of darkness.    
A slightly smarter but less adventurous explorer may bring a tool along to assist 
with the journey, such as a flashlight.  The flashlight reveals imminent perils and can 
illuminate exits from large caverns.  As such, a flashlight provides specific benefits to the 
explorer.  However, it comes with costs; the explorer must carry the weight of the 
flashlight and batteries,  and the use of a flashlight may awaken pesky bats or stir 
intimidating insects.  The benefits of a flashlight are also limited.  No matter how 
powerful the beam, it will not reach around the next bend.  When the DM comes to a fork 
in the cave, he or she will have to pursue one, and often without being able to see the end 




An engineer is an explorer in the design process.  No matter what tool he or she 
uses to model uncertainty, the uncertainty will still exist.  A good uncertainty model 
allows the decision maker to assess exactly what information is available, just as a 
flashlight allows an explorer to identify tunnels leading from a cavern and to avoid 
dangerous pitfalls.  However, when two tunnels lead from a cavern and the engineer 
cannot see the end of either, the available information leads to indecision, and some other 
approach must be used to make a choice (Chapter 8). 
Often when faced with indecision, an engineer can perform experiments or hire 
experts in order to acquire more information about the alternatives of a decision (Chapter 
9).  This process of acquiring information is also a bit like peering down a tunnel.  When 
an engineer chooses to acquire information, he or she does not know what information 
will be received.  If he or she did, then there probably is no reason to collect that 
information because it is already known.  For example, consider the explorer peering 
down two possible exits from a cavern.  The explorer can collect information about the 
decision by exploring one of the tunnels.  However, the explorer has no idea what he or 
she will find;  if he or she knew that a priori, there would be no reason to explore the 
cave to start with! In the design context, the engineer is left with an approach (Chapter 9) 
that bounds the value of additional data sample collection.  This method provides 
guidance, but no clear answers. 
Continuing the analogy from above, these bounds are to the engineer what a quick 
glimpse around the next bend of a tunnel may be to the explorer.  A quite glimpse may 
reveal a very promising take on the situation, or it may yield a very discouraging outlook.  
Either way, the explorer cannot be sure where the tunnel leads.  The idea is that by 
accounting for such glimpses, better decisions can be made, even if only in a heuristic 
manner.  Previously, the methods for characterizing this type of information were limited, 
so the approach presented in this dissertation is a significant step forward and a strong 





 The establishment of strong foundations for future research is a concise 
description of the overall contribution of this dissertation.  In this dissertation, a pervasive 
challenge in engineering design was examined: the management of uncertainty in design 
decisions.  For a variety of reasons, standard practice is to model uncertainty using 
traditional, precise probability theory.  The familiarity and success of probability-based 
methods gives most designers little motivation to seek other models of uncertainty.  This 
dissertation is an effort to motivate designers to consider other options. 
In this dissertation, it was argued that there is more to uncertainty than what is 
captured by precise probabilities.  It was shown that it is sometimes valuable to explicitly 
recognize imprecision (i.e. a lack of knowledge) in addition to probabilistic aspects by 
using a subset of imprecise probability theory called probability bounds analysis (PBA).  
It was also shown that PBA generalizes sensitivity analysis and allows for a rigorous 
identification of lack of robustness to imprecision in a particular decision.  Preliminary 
approaches to decision making in the presence of imprecise information and to set-based 
design were presented, and an approach for guiding information collection decisions was 
developed. 
These contributions form a foundation.  The methods used in the dissertation are 
several steps from being employed in industrial practice.  However, they are necessary 
and well-positioned stepping stones along the path to widespread use.  The location of 
some future steps has been suggested, but ideally additional researchers will chart their 
own paths from the starting point built in this dissertation and revolutionize the 
management of uncertainty in engineering design using imprecise probabilities and 
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